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STUDIES IN NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEISM

By

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To my revered *Ācārya*

DR GAURINATH SASTRI, M.A., D.LITT.

FOREWORD

The present work deals with the problem of God from the view-point of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It is well-known that the Buddhist and the Jaina whose systems of thought had no room for *Īśvara* led regular crusade against the orthodox theistic schools. Leaving aside the Lokāyata, even the Sāṃkhya and the Mīmāṃsaka each in his own way and for specific reasons peculiar to his view-point were opponents of *Īśvaravāda*. The theistic philosophers of the different schools were consequently compelled to array themselves against this common opposition in a sort of common defence. This happened before Udayana and continued for sometime after him. Yāmuna-cārya's *Īśvarasiddhi*, Utpala's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*, Sadyojyoti's *Nareśvara-parīkṣā* etc. are some of the best known works in this field. But the crown and glory of the literature bearing on this subject is the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana. Other works, though of comparatively minor importance, followed in later ages almost in every theistic system. But Udayana seems to have said the last word on the subject, so far as the theistic proofs are concerned.

It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that the present writer has focussed his attention on the position taken up by Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. The writer has dealt at some length on the moral arguments in support of the existence of God. He presents the views of those thinkers whose ways of thinking are determined by their respect for what is usually known as *svabhāva-vāda* (Lokāyata), as *Prakṛti-vāda* (Sāṃkhya) or as *śakti-vāda* (Mīmāṃsaka) and criticises them in the manner of Udayana. A special chapter has been added to clear up the position of the Mīmāṃsaka thinkers of the Prābhākara school, viz, Śālikanātha and Bhavanātha, who found fault with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of *Īśvara* as the supervisor of human *adṛṣṭa*. Two separate chapters have been devoted to the exposition of Buddhist and Jaina view-points. The section

on Buddhism is based on Śāntaraksita's *Tattvasamgraha* and its commentary by Kamalaśīla, while the chapter on Jaina philosophy is based on *Saddarśana-samuccaya* of Haribhadraśūri and its commentary by Gunaratna. The work closes with a short discourse on the nature of God and in the two appendices which follow there are some notes on the position on Kanāda as a theistic philosopher and on the difference between the Yoga and the Nyāya conceptions of God.

As for myself I have every reason to believe that the present work will be properly appreciated by the academic world as a pioneer work in the field. The subject taken up is admittedly as wide in its scope as it is deep in its implications and though it may strike one that the writer has been comparatively narrow in his outlook in respect of the available source of information regarding the *pūrvapakṣa* literature, it has been certainly wise on his part to have confined himself mostly to a single line of approach or defence, viz, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Let me commend this book which comes from the pen of a young scholar who has trained himself up in both the traditional and modern methods of research to the academic world in an age when astounding scientific achievements testifying man's superiority over nature tend to strike at the root of our belief in the existence of a Supreme Being who is posited as the author of this physical world, who is regarded as omnipresent and omniscient controlling human destinies and possessing unimpeded knowledge, will and volition.

Sanskrit College,
Calcutta
March, 1961

GAURINATH SASTRI

PREFACE

The present work embodies substantially the results of my research on Nyāya-Vaisesika theism which was submitted in 1960 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Calcutta

After I had completed my post graduate studies my revered teacher Dr Satkari Mookerjee M A , Ph D , the then Asutosh Professor of Sanskrit, Calcutta University, advised me to continue my study in Nyāya Vaisesika philosophy and it was at his suggestion that I focussed my attention on the problem of Nyāya-Vaisesika theism But before I could make any progress Dr Mookerjee left Calcutta and joined the Nava-Nalandā Mahāvihāra as its Director Then I approached Dr Gaurinath Sastri, another teacher of mine, for guidance and he gave his consent to act as my supervisor I feel it a solemn duty to express my deep sense of gratitude to him for all his affectionate encouragement and abiding interest in my work I must also express my indebtedness to my *acarya* Pandit Anantakumar Nyāya Tarkatīrtha of Sanskrit College without whose able guidance it would never have been possible for me to understand some of the most outstanding cardinal texts on the subject I must also record here my debt of gratitude to late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Jogendranath Tarka-Vedāntatīrtha for the encouragement that he gave me when I was preparing my thesis

I would like also to record my sincerest thanks to Pandit Nanigopal Tarkatīrtha of the Publication Department of the Sanskrit College, Dr Sisirkumar Mitra, M A , LL B , D Phil and Sri Bimal Krishna Matilal, M A , for the active interest they took in seeing the work through the press

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March, 1961

G BHATTACHARYA

INTRODUCTION

Rightly does Udayana observe in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* that people professing allegiance to different faiths agree in regarding God in some form or other as the source of their inspiration and the guiding principle of their life. Yet it is most surprising that almost all the different systems of philosophy, orthodox and heterodox, have tried to prove that the concept of God is logically untenable. In our ordinary life we seem to believe in the existence of God who is a benevolent personality, omniscient and all-powerful, through whose infinite grace and compassion the entire world-order runs. Whenever we are in difficulties and fail to overcome them, when trials and vicissitudes upset our programme of life, we seek to derive strength and courage from what we call God—not knowing whether that God resides within us or occupies an exalted throne elsewhere in the universe. It is, therefore, the theologians all over the world have through ages devoted themselves to the task of inspiring people and encouraging them in their hours of depression and despondency. Notwithstanding all this, the discerning mind has questioned the utility and purpose of admitting the concept of God and refused to be swayed by popular judgment and belief. In Indian philosophy we find not only the Cārvākas, the Buddhists and the Jainas engaging themselves in setting aside the case for the recognition of God as the supreme principle standing at the background of creation, preservation and annihilation of this world, but the so-called orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, viz, the Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta—have all agreed in denouncing the concept of God as the Ultimate Reality. In this context of stiff opposition it is gratifying to find that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of Indian thought has taken up cudgels against the ruthless criticisms made by his opponents.

So far as the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* are concerned we do not light upon any text that would establish beyond doubt that their author championed the cause of theism. There is

only one *sūtra* where some commentators have tried to read a reference to God while others, at the same time, have categorically registered their disapproval of the same interpretation and tried to explain the text in a different way. As far as the *Nyāyasūtras* are concerned it must be admitted that the term *Īśvara* has neither been specifically mentioned in the context where the nature of *ātman* has been discussed nor any dissertation has been attempted to explain the concept of God. It may be mentioned that in the *Nyāyasūtras* IV. i. 19-21 God has been conceived as the ordainer of the individual destiny which has, however, led scholars to surmise that this reference in an unexpected quarter raise suspicion as to whether the author of the *Nyāyasūtras* was a theist or not. But it must be said in all fairness that since the days of Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and Uddyotakara, the author of the *Nyāyavārttika*, the Nyāya position has become absolutely theistic and the reason for the same may be discovered in the conflict of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* teachers with their opponents—the Buddhists and the Jainas. It is worthy of notice in this connection that though Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, the author of the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṣikā* were sturdy champions of the cause of theism, yet the most staggering blow to the Buddhist position was dealt by Udayana who in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* vindicated theism in a very efficient manner. Udayana is well-known for his trenchant logic and his work is looked upon as the most cardinal text on this subject. History tells us that Jñānaśrī, a most formidable Buddhist dialectician, refuted theistic arguments in his *Īśvarabhāṅgakārikā*. Udayana who came after him had enough confidence in him to meet the arguments advanced by Jñānaśrī and declared in a most emphatic way that he rescued theism from the clutches of the Buddhist critics. The work of Udayana led all later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers under a deep debt of gratitude who all derived inspiration from his outstanding work. Even the great Gaṅgeśa-pādhyāya, who set forth a most masterly defence of theism in his *magnum opus*, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, followed in the foot-steps of Udayana.

In the present thesis, which is divided into seven chapters, I have at the outset sought to advance the moral argument of the existence of God. Thus, I have argued how the concept of God is required to be postulated as the determinant for the fruition of *karman*. It has also been pointed out that *svabhāvavāda*, as sponsored by the Cārvaka, is untenable and in this context I have endeavoured my best to be thorough in my treatment of causality as an ontological principle. In the second chapter, I have dealt with the antitheistic arguments of the Prābhākara and have tried to bring out the futility in the view-point of scholars who charge the Mīmāṃsā with atheism. I have been drawn in the third chapter to an elaborate exposition of the antitheistic position of the Buddhists. I have tried to be scrupulously faithful to the celebrated exponents of Buddhist thought and, I believe, my treatment will enable my readers to understand the problem in a clear perspective. The fourth chapter deals with the criticisms as advanced by the Jainas. The Jainas have vehemently criticised the causal argument of the existence of God as advanced by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher and have brought out the futility in the effect character of the universe. In the fifth chapter, I have shown how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have squarely and boldly faced the sledge hammer blows of the antitheists. In this connection I have been drawn to a critical examination of the Buddhist position which seeks to discard the existence of God on the basis of non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). Udayana has shown that the charge of non-perception cannot be substantiated by logic. I have tried to bring out in a nut shell the implications of different theories of error and have shown how Udayana has succeeded in overthrowing the doctrine of *asatkhyati* as sponsored by the Mādhyamika school of Buddhist thought. Thus, the theory, that God may be presented through misapprehension (*asatkhyaty upanīta*) as the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference which seeks to nullify the existence of God, has been criticised in all its perspective. The sixth chapter deals with a critique of the antitheistic arguments. I have shown how Udayana has set aside the contentions of

the opponent against the causal argument of the Naiyāyika. I have endeavoured my best to give a dispassionate and faithful exposition of the treatment as advanced by Udayana. A study of this chapter will throw welcome light on the implications of the eight proofs of the existence of God as advanced by Udayana. My last chapter is on the nature of God. The belief in monotheism is rather common to all theistic schools of Indian philosophy. But the Vedāntic dialecticians have pointed out logical inaccuracies in the monotheistic conception of the Naiyāyika. In the appendices I have tried to show that the architectonic plan of the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics cannot entirely dispense with God's agency which is strictly demanded by logical necessity. I have also made a comparative study of the Nyāya and the Pātañjala conceptions of God. The Yoga admits God only as an object of meditation and devotion and in his opinion the unseen potency (*adrsta*) is competent enough to produce effects. God does not take any initiative in determining the course of the individual.

It must be mentioned here that in my approach to the study of the problem I have always gone to the sources and have not in any place depended on second-hand information available through translation etc. My originality lies in the faithful reproduction of the most difficult texts of the masters through a foreign medium. And, I am sure, I have tried my best to represent them as clearly and correctly as possible. I am sure, the limitations of a foreign tongue to be the vehicle of a most abstruse pattern of thought have, at places, stood in the way of a clearer and more effective exposition. But, that could not be helped. Still I might claim sympathetic consideration from my readers for the reason that I have not chosen to avoid difficulties and intricacies which are involved in the respective positions of the theists and their opponents. The language of the Neo-logic texts is extremely difficult. The language of Udayana also is most cryptic. But I have tried my best to put them before the intellectuals of the world with as much precision and perspicuity as possible. All that I may claim is that my attempt

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	v—vi
PREFACE	xi
INTRODUCTION	viii—xii
ABBREVIATIONS	xiii—xiv

Chapter I • Moral Argument for the Existence of God	1—28
---	------

The necessity for inferential argument of the existence of God—Necessity of the postulation of *adṛṣṭa* (a metempirical force)—Causality as a necessary principle—Objections of the *Carvāka* Four possible alternatives, *hetuniśedha*, *bhūtinīśedha* *śva* and *anupādhya*—*Naiyāyika* s reply—*Śabharavāda* refuted—Difference between *śva*, the third alternative and *śabharavāda* Correspondence between the *Carvāka* and H me—Udyana s criticism of the theory of spontaneous origination—Causality established—Summing up

Law of *karma* as the explanation of the imperfections and diversities of the phenomenal world The *Samkhya* view *Prakṛti*, the unitary principle as the root cause of diversity—*Bhaskara* s view—Criticisms of the *Samkhya* and *Bhaskara* standpoints—Refutation of the concept of *śakti*—Merit and demerit as the explanation for the inherent diversity in Nature established—Moral argument for the existence of God—Relation between God and *adṛṣṭa*

Chapter II The <i>Prābhākara</i> position analysed	29—41
--	-------

Is *Prābhākara* an atheist?—Implication of the *Prābhākara* s contentions against the theistic inferences of the *Naiyāyikas*—The *Prābhākara* s criticisms Immediate knowledge of *adṛṣṭa* is a contradiction in terms—the dictum, that a *viśeṣanumāna* nullifies a *sāmanyānumāna*, is not applicable—*Bharaṇatha* s contentions—the *Nyaya* position involves logical see *śva*—Relation between God and *adṛṣṭa* not possible—*Adṛṣṭa* depends, for its fructuration, on spatio-temporal relation—*Uddyotakara* s suggestion refuted—*Śaṅkarātha* s position

Chapter III The Buddhist position analysed 42—64

Moral progress as the *alpha* and *omega* of early Buddhist thought—Buddhist's position discussed—Aviddhakarna's cosmological argument criticised—four-fold fallacies detected—Buddhist's criticism of the teleological proof—Śantaraksita and Lotze—Uddyotakara's theistic proof criticised—Nyaya position involves self-contradiction—Prasastamati's view assailed—Śantaraksita's criticism of the unitary character and omniscience in God—Eternality is incompatible with causal efficiency—Theory of supplementation leads us nowhere—Summing up

Chapter IV The Jaina position analysed 65—78

The law of *karman* determines the course of the individual, it does not require intelligent guidance—Criticism of the causal argument—Effect character indeterminate—Four possible alternatives refuted—Diversity inherent in the nature of the effect—Theistic argument involves contradiction (*badha*) and circular reasoning (*cakraka*)—World architect is a myth—God's creative urge inexplicable

Chapter V The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view A critique of the antitheistic arguments 79—101

Śridhara's position—Identity of causality with teleology—effect character of the universe established—Śridhara's criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka's contentions—Implications of the theistic argument unfold—Charges relating to the physical apparatus of the Supreme Creator—Śridhara's reply—Desire, effort etc. are not necessarily associated with a physical body—Individual self unfit for moving the atoms as it lacks natural consciousness—Consciousness not an eternal entity, Jayanta's position—Teleological argument—Productivity is an empirical fact—Argument from design and purpose—Opponent's criticism—Jayanta's reply

The Buddhist position as reviewed by Udayana—Two-fold inference of a positive entity *Stabhavalinga* and *karyalinga*—Non-existence of God asserted on the ground of non-perception—Udayana's reply—Negation

is intelligible with reference to a negatum fit for perception—Non cognition is not an independent means of knowledge (*pramana*)—The Buddhist maintains that God is presented through misapprehension (*asatkhyāty upanīta*)—Implications of different theories of error—Udayana's criticism God is neither the *anuyogin* nor the *pratyogin* of negation—Knowability (*jñejatva*) and verifiability (*prameyatva*) are universal subsistents

Chapter VI · The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view—a critique continued .. 102—139

Charges against the causal argument answered Opponent's antitheistic inferences involve the fallacies of *āśrayasiddhi*, *bādha*, *vyāpkyatvasiddhi*, *svarūpasiddhi* etc —Śaṅkara Miśra points out the fallacy of *virodha* in the counter-inference of the opponent—The charge of *virodha* against the theistic inference answered—Universal concomitance of cause and effect as the pivotal basis for proving the existence of God—The charge of the existence of condition (*upādhi*) in the reason of the theistic inference—Udayana's reply—Opponent's plea that universal concomitance obtains between the precedence of intelligent authorship and that of a physical apparatus—Udayana's criticism elucidated—Further criticism of the antitheistic arguments—God, not a condition but a cause of his creation—God's creativity does not involve futility of human endeavour—God as a logical postulate—The charge of *regressus ad infinitum* replied

Other proofs of the existence of God elucidated *Āyojana*, *dhr̥ti*, *pada*, *pratyaya*, *sruti*, *vakya*, *saṃkhyānuśeṣa*—Summing up

Chapter VII Nature of God: Some important points explained .. 140—159

Motive of creation—Different theories explained—Creativity is in God's nature, Uddyotakara, Jayanta and Udayana

God's will and effort Nature of God's agency—Direct cognition and will in God—His unimpeded desire—Vacaspati and Udayana on the nature of God's agency—Udayana attributes God with *kṛti*

Metaphysical attributes of God Will, desire, etc
Śrīdhara's opinion—Vatsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācas-
pati and Raghunātha

Eternity of Divine knowledge and will Opponent's
criticism—Naiyāyika's reply Nature of relation of
desire, and volition with cognition—Divine will and voli-
tion are not contingent on God's knowledge—They
require the assistance of knowledge in order to be specified
by an object—Opponent's retort—Udayana refuses to
accept *jīvanayoni kṛti* as a type of volition

Plurality of God is a metaphysical impossibility
Vedantist's criticism of monotheism—Naiyāyika's reply
—Conclusion

APPENDIX A Is Kanāda an atheist ? 160—163

APPENDIX B The Nyāya and the Pātañjala
conceptions of God — Compared 164—166

ABBREVIATIONS

ĀTV	Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayana, ed BI
ĀTVD	Didhiti of Raghunatha, a commentary on ĀTV, ed BI
ĀTVK	Kālpalata of Śamkara Mīśra, a commentary on ĀTV, ed BI
BH	Bhaskarabhasya on BS
BhP	Bhasapariścheda
BI	Bibliotheca Indica
BS	Brahmasutra
CSS	Calcutta Sanskrit Series
ChSS	Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series
Din	Dinakara Bhaṭṭa's commentary (<i>Dīnakarī</i>) on Siddhanta-muktavali
NBh	Nyayabhasya of Vatsyayana, ed CSS
NBT	Nyayabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara, ed Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1955
NK	Nyayakandalī of Śrīdhara, ed VSS
NKu	Nyayakusumanjalī of Udayana, ed ChSS, 1950
NKuB	Nyayakusumanjalībodhanī of Varadaraja, a commentary on NKu, ed ChSS, 1950
NKuP	Nyayakusumanjalīprakaśa of Vardhamana, a commentary on NKu, ed ChSS, 1950
NKuPM	Nyayakusumanjalīprakaśamakaranda of Rucidatta, a commentary on NKuP, ed ChSS, 1950
NKuPra	Nyayakusumanjalīprakaśika of Megha Thakura, a commentary on NKuP, ChSS, 1950
NL	Nyayalīlavatī of Vallabhacarya, ed ChSS, 1934
NLk	Nyayalīlavatīkāṇṭhabharana of Śamkara Mīśra, a commentary on NL, ed ChSS, 1934
NM	Nyayamānjari of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed ChSS, 1936
NS	Nyayasutra of Gotama, ed CSS
NSP	Nirnayasagara Press, Bombay
NV	Nyayavarttika of Uddyotakara, ed CSS
NV ₁	Nayaviveka of Bhāvanatha Mīśra, ed Madras University Sanskrit Series
NV ₁ R	Ravideva's commentary on NV ₁
NVTP	Nyayavarttikatatparyapariśuddhi of Udayana, a commentary on NVTP, ed BI
NVTT	Nyayavarttikatatparyāṭīkā of Vacaspati Mīśra, a commentary on NV, ed CSS
PKM	Prameyacakalamartanda of Prabhacandra, ed NSP

PP	Prakaranapañcīkā of Śalikanātha Mīśra, ed ChSS
PPBh	The Bhasya of Praśastapāda on VS, ed ChSS
PV	Pramanavarttika of Dharmakīrti, ed Rahula Sankr tyayana
PV ₁	Prabhakaravijaya of Nandisvara, ed Sanskrit Sahitya Parisat, Calcutta
RVP	Rjuvimalapāñcīkā of Śalikanātha
ŚBh	Śarīrakabhāṣya
SDS	Saddarsansamuccaya of Haribhadrāsūri, ed Asiatic Society, 1905
Setu	By Padmanabha Mīśra, a commentary on PPBh, ed ChSS
Sukti	By Jagadīśa Tarkalankara, a commentary on PPBh, ed ChSS
SVM	Syādvadamanjari of Mallīśena, ed Bhandarkar Orien tal Research Institute
TRD	Tarkarahasyadīpikā of Guṇaratna, a commentary on SDS, ed Asiatic Society, 1905
TS	Tattvasamgraha of Śantarakṣita, ed Baroda, 1926
TSP	Pāñjika, a commentary on TS, by Kamalāśīla, ed Baroda, 1926
VK	Vedantakālpataru of Amalananda Sarasvatī, a com- mentary on Bhamati, ed, NSP
VKP	Vedantakālpataruparimāla of Appayya Dīkṣita, a commentary on VK, ed NSP
VP	Vedantaparibhāṣā of Dharmarajadhvarīndra, ed University of Calcutta
VS	Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kanāda, ed ChSS, 1923
VSS	Vizianagram Sanskrit Series
VUp	Upaskāra, a commentary on VS, by Śaṅkara Mīśra, ed ChSS, 1923
VV	Vyomavati, a commentary on PPBh, by Vyomasīva, ed ChSS
YD	Yuktīdīpikā, a commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, Calcutta, 1938
YS	. Yogasūtra

felt by us but accrue as a result of our manifold activities. It is our activities that give rise to *adrṣṭa* which in its turn produces happiness or misery. It becomes clear, therefore, that the postulation of *adrṣṭa* is based upon the tacit assumption of the principle of causality.

The Cārvāka, therefore, goes to the root of the problem and maintains that causality has no legs to take its stand upon. Causality, according to the Cārvāka, is nothing but a fictitious relation between any two events, one following the other. Such a relation between an antecedent and a consequent is not an object of perceptual cognition. Perception is, according to the Cārvāka, the only means of valid cognition and those objects which do not come under the purview of perceptual knowledge have no existence. The principle of causality—that every event has a cause or that every phenomenon is related to some phenomenon preceding it—is a matter of common belief. Such an assumption of causal principle lacks the ‘practical degree of precision, fixed and determined’. Causality is nothing but an imaginary relation between two phenomena. Perception is not a warrant for causality. Though the two events X and Y, as such, are perceived, their causal connection may even remain dubious.¹

The Realist asserts that causality is determined by the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference (*anvaya-vyatireka*). Invariability of succession is ascertained by perception. Every consequent is found to be connected with some particular antecedent or group of antecedents. But the Cārvāka emphatically declares that the element of invariability and necessity of succession (*ananyathasiddha nyatapurvavaritva*) is not entirely free from all doubts.² In other words, causality cannot be assured with absolute certainty between two phenomena occurring in succession. We observe that an event, suppose a pot, is invariably preceded by another event, i.e., the potter, and causal connection is

¹ Kāryakaraṇābhave pratyakṣam na tāvat mānam dharmasvarupapratyakṣe pi tatra saṁśayaḥ. NKuP p. 41.

² Niyamā nanyathāsiddhyo ca śāṅkakalāṅk tatvenā navadhāraṇāt. NKuP p. 41.

sought to be established between these two events. But the Cārvāka refuses to agree to it. For, he thinks that such sequence can merely vouch for the antecedence of the potter and the subsequence of the pot and nothing more. For, such sequence, he asserts, may be quite accidental and there is no guarantee to rule out the possibility of a change in the order in which the two events occur now. This logical or ontological nexus between two events constitutes the backbone of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) through which validity of inference is warranted. But the Cārvāka does not pin his faith to inference as a means of valid cognition because its invariable character cannot be proved beyond all vestiges of doubt. The Naiyāyika may contend that it is the perceptible objects alone (*pratyaksayogya*) that can be denied. Knowledge of the negatum (*pratiyogin*) is an essential² condition for its negation. So fictitious objects cannot be denied. The denial of causality presupposes the knowledge of causality as its condition. So in both denial and affirmation of causality the reality of causality stands unassailed.

But the Cārvāka is not convinced by the argument put forward by the Naiyāyika, for the former believes that the cognition of fictions is not an impossibility.¹ The Cārvāka admits the cognition of the negatum as a condition for the cognition of negation. But, in his opinion, it is not required that the negatum must be a real entity. In a case of error, therefore, the superimposed object is a fiction, pure and simple; and still we have the knowledge of such a fiction. When the rope is mistaken for the snake, the Cārvāka argues, it is a fictitious snake and not the real one which becomes the content of erroneous knowledge. Hence there is no bar to the negation of a fiction (*alīkapratyogī abhāvaḥ*). The Cārvāka thus sets aside the contention of the Naiyāyika that if causal relation is to be negated the opponent would be constrained to admit the reality of causal relation.

The plea of the Cārvāka, the Naiyāyika observes, is

1. Mama tva pramitasyā satkhyāty abhyupagamān na nisedhyā 'prasiddhir ita.
NKuP, p 41

Compare also, Pratyogī cā satkhyāty upanīta ita smartavyam NKuPM, p 47.

not attested by experience and as such does not carry any conviction. The Naiyāyika is confident enough about his own position and feels no difficulty in recording a staunch protest against the sceptical position. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realist asserts the fundamental principle of causality. To him, an uncaused event is a contradiction in terms. An event occurs but it is free from any prior contingency—is logically inadmissible. The uniform regularity of succession of any two events brings about the validity of causal relation. A follows B with regularity and there is no lapse from this universal nexus. Udayana retorts that if the Cārvāka is an uncompromising sceptic and thinks, like Hume, causality to be a subjective concept, he should not have sought the aid of words to communicate his ideas to others. Or, to put it in other words, the Cārvāka will be constrained to admit a causal relation between the word and the meaning signified by it when he is found to employ a particular expression for the purpose of conveying a particular meaning.

Let us now examine the four possible alternatives which the Cārvāka advances for the repudiation of causality. Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* has studied all these arguments and offered meticulous criticism of the same.

Firstly, an effect is produced from what is not a cause. Or, in other words, we do not deny that an effect is produced and that there is something which produces it. But what produces an effect is not a cause (*hetu-nisedha*).¹ Secondly, it may be maintained that an event is not produced at all (*bhūti-nisedha*). It is ordinarily understood that an object is produced. But this is not the actual state of things. The very fact of origination is denied. Thus, while the first view admits origination, the second one denies it altogether. In the first view what is denied is this: That which produces an effect is not its cause. It is, however, common to both the cases that there is no such thing as cause and that causality, viz, the relation between a cause and an effect, is an ungrounded fiction.

Let us now study the third and the fourth views which

1 Hetv abhāve bhavanam labhyate. NKuP, p 49

follow directly from the first one. Thus, the first view holds, as we have seen, that what is not a cause produces an effect. Now, if we carefully study the implications of what is not a cause, we shall see that it means either the effect itself or a fiction or void.¹ The third view is that an effect is produced by itself. An event happens from what is identical with itself (*sva*), i.e., an event is not caused by something different from it. Fourthly, an event happens from something which is not real (*anupākhya*).

It must be mentioned in this context that we have not been able to trace any one of these alternatives in the extant works of the Cārvākas. It may be that Udayana had first-hand knowledge of such texts in which some or all of these views were discussed. Or, it is equally plausible that he got them from floating traditions which he considered to be so much authoritative that he could not disbelieve their authority. In the absence of further material we propose to criticise the aforesaid views in the manner in which Udayana has done.

With regard to the first alternative Udayana argues: If it be held by the Cārvāka that an event happens from what is not a cause the Naiyāyika would ask him to explain what prevents an effect from appearing at all times and what determines its appearance at a particular point of time.² As for the Naiyāyika he explains the point by positing a cause which determines the character of an effect. If a cause as the determinant is not postulated it becomes difficult to account for the specific character of the effect. To be more explicit, we all know that a particular event happens at a particular point of time, neither earlier nor later. The Naiyāyika asks how is it that the said event occurs at that specific point of time. If there is no cause which accounts for the emergence of that event at that definite point of time it may just happen at any other point of time earlier or later.

1. Ahetuś ca kāryasvarūpam avastu ca NKuP., p. 50

2. Hetuṇsedhe bhavanasyā 'napeksatvena sarvadā bhavanam, avisesāt NKu, p. 51.

Also, Bhavanasya sattvasyā 'viśeśāt sadātanatve kāryasya kādācitkatvavyāghātaḥ. NKuP., p. 51.

It is the cause which prevents the effect from happening at any time other than when it exactly happens. In other words, it is the cause which determines the character of an event.

The Cārvāka has anticipated the force of logic in the argument of the Naiyāyika as recorded in the preceding paragraph. And he may, therefore, reply to the Naiyāyika by saying that an event does not occur at all.¹ The position of this school is that if origination itself is challenged and proved to be a hollow construction the postulation of a cause would not be necessary. But Udayana retorts that origination is warranted by perceptual cognition and it would be unreasonable to contradict it. Udayana, therefore, enquires of the Cārvāka about the underlying implication, if any, of his argument when he denies the very origination of an event. Origination is a matter of perceptual knowledge—a thing which did not exist in the past is found to appear at a later time. And if it be held that the thing had not originated at all it would have to be admitted that the thing did not originate after its origination—that is to say, non-origination should be sought to be understood with reference to a future time after its origination—a position which is absurd on the face of it.

Let us now proceed to examine the third view of the Cārvāka which seeks to refute causality. The Cārvāka might say that an event happens by itself. In other words, it is not required of a thing to depend on anything beyond itself to usher it into existence. This leads practically to the identity of a cause and its effect. But such a view does not carry any conviction as it cannot explain fortuitous occurrence. If it is held that an event would happen by itself the Naiyāyika would point out that the event would not happen at all. Since it is an admitted fact that an event does not exist prior to its appearance it is not conceivable how it can exert causal efficiency upon the event.² The cause invariably

1 MM Dr Gopinath Kaviraj historically traces this view to a form of *Sāvatavada* or to the *Sāṅkhyavada* of the Sāṅkhya. *Sarasvatī Bhavan Studies* Vol II, p 188.

2 *Utpattih purvam svayam asatah svotpattav aprabhutvena svasmat ita pakṣā nupapattih*. NKu p 51.

precedes the effect and if the effect be not existent prior to its production there would be no cause and as a result no event would occur. Moreover, the identity of a cause and its effect is an absurdity and will flout the testimony of perception. A person who requires a piece of cloth is found to collect some quantity of yarn, the material that produces the cloth—he does not take up the cloth itself for this purpose. Had the effect been identical with the cause he should have, in this case, collected the cloth and not the yarn. Time-sequence also is a necessary factor in causal nexus and he who advocates absolute identity of a cause and its effect ignores this fact as well.

The Carvāka may not be silenced by the aforesaid argument of the Naiyāyika and he may suggest yet another alternative to defend himself, viz, an event happens from what is unreal. If the Naiyāyika insists upon a cause which brings an effect into existence the Cārvāka might say that the same cause is void or unreality. This hypothesis also is not free from absurdity. What is unreal or void is destitute of any manner of practical efficiency (*arthakriya janakatva*). If it be held that such an object is the cause, it would transpire that an effect may as well exist prior to its production in view of the fact that void has no part to play in bringing into existence a particular product at any particular point of time and this would land us in the absurdity of a perpetual existence of the product, a position which is obviously untenable¹.

Thus, the Naiyayika asserts that the opponent cannot but accept causality in order to avoid the absurdity involved in the eternal non existence or existence of an event. He avers that the occasionalness (*kadacīkatva*) of an event presupposes a preceding limit (*avadhi*) which is described as the cause. The pot was non-existent prior to its production and it is only at a particular point of time that it is brought into existence. How are we to account for this occasional nature of the pot? An antecedent fact comes in at this stage

¹ Anupākhyasya hetutve prag api sattvaprasaktau punaḥ sadātanatāpattibh
Vāu p 52

which is technically called the cause. This explains the contingency of the effect to the satisfaction of the Naiyāyika.

The Cārvāka, however, does not believe in the antecedent fact (*avadhi*) as the determinant of any event. He does not question the contingency of any phenomenon but does not lend support to the way in which the Naiyāyika seeks to explain the situation. The Naiyāyika sets forth that the principle of causality can adequately explain the contingent character of the effect which is strongly contradicted by the Cārvāka sceptic.

We have studied in the foregoing paragraphs as many as four views of the Cārvāka as recorded in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana. We shall now refer to yet another view of the Cārvāka known as *svabhāvavāda*.

At the very outset we should be careful to point out that this view should not be confused with the third alternative discussed above. The word *svabhāva* comprises two parts: *sva* and *bhāva*. If it be held that an effect is produced by its own self (*sva*) the position would be identical with the third view, according to which an effect is brought into existence by its own identity without the aid of anything external to it. If it, however, be held that an effect is produced from *bhāva*, i.e., *dharma* or property of its own, it may be enquired whether such property stands in the relation of identity or difference to the effect. In case the character (*dharma*) is regarded as identical with the subject (*dharmin*), i.e., the effect, it would mean that the effect is produced from itself. If, however, *dharma* is regarded as something other than the *dharmin* it would mean that an effect is produced from something different from it, which would be tantamount to the admission of a cause.¹ It is, therefore, that the Cārvāka explains the implications of *svabhāvavāda* in the following manner. It is held by the Svabhāvavādin that occasionalness (*kādācitkatva*) in respect of the appearance of an effect is not contingent on any previous limit. That an object appears at a particular point of time and not at another is due to the very

1. Yady api svabhāvah kāryam tad dharmo vā, ādyaḥ akasmād iti nirāśenai 'va rastaḥ, antye dharmasya kāraṇatvam āngīkṛtam eva. NKuP., p 52

nature of the object itself. The Cārvāka will point out that the Naiyāyika need not be surprised at this for he also has accepted similar position when he says that it is the very nature of atomic magnitude to inhere in the atom and not in other places. It is well-known to a student of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school that atomic magnitude is an uncaused eternal entity and when such entity is held to inhere in one particular locus and not in any other, there is no other way but to admit that it is its very nature to be so located. What holds good in the case of location in space will also hold good in the case of location in time. And as such occasionalness of an event may well be explained as due to its own nature and is in no way determined by any cause.¹

Let us now try to understand the difference between *svabhāvavāda* and the third view mentioned in a foregoing paragraph. According to the third view the effect is held to be produced by itself, i.e., the same thing has been described as the cause and the effect. Or, in other words, there is a limit to the appearance of an effect though the said limit is identical with itself. In the case of *svabhāvavāda*, however, the question of limit does not arise at all. The occasionalness of an effect which has been sought to be explained in the third view by stating a limit is, in the case of *svabhāvavāda*, explained as due to its very nature.

It will not be out of place to mention in this context that Empiricists among Western philosophers did not accept the principle of causality. Thus, Hume holds that there is no logical justification for the assumption of a necessary relation between two events. Causal relation is nothing but a subjective construction. Hume asserts that invariable happening in succession of any two events engenders our habit of conjoining them as cause and effect. We hope that since A happens B will follow but this should not warrant us in upholding any necessary relation between them. Thus, Hume says: "It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar

1. Kālanīyamo 'py ahetuka eva samgacchate. NKuṢ., p. 53.

instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances. the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we *feel* in mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion".¹ The aforesaid view on causal relation advanced by the Empiricists of the West finds a striking parallel in Indian Philosophy where it has been said that if there is any causal relation between any two events the same should be understood as a purely subjective construction.

The theist raises a storm of protest against the theory of natural origination (*svabhāvavāda*) and his arguments pave the way for the postulation of a Supreme Cause. It has been shown that *svabhāvavāda* is incompatible with the occasionalness of an event. Occasionalness of an event means that an effect sometimes exists and sometimes it does not. It should be carefully remembered that occasionalness does not simply imply a relation to a subsequent moment, since not only non-eternal objects but eternal objects as well relate to a fixed subsequent moment. But it is quite obvious that there cannot be any occasionalness with regard to an object which is eternal. It needs, therefore, be stated that occasionalness means the relation of an object, which was non-existent before, to a subsequent point of time.² *Svabhāvavāda*, in the opinion of the theist, does not and cannot satisfactorily explain this occasionalness of a phenomenon. Udayana points out that eternal objects like space, time, etc. are found to be non-contingent, i.e., the question of a previous limit does not arise in their case. So occasionalness and non-

1. *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 75. (Second Edition).

2. *Pūrvakālāsattve saty uttarakālāsattvam kādācītkatvam*. NKuB, p. 54.

existence of a preceding limit are contradictory.¹ But the Cārvāka seems to ignore the dictum *factum valet* by his insistent demand that causation is an appearance and not a reality. The Cārvāka may aver that like the theist he also will admit that occasionalness presupposes a previous limit but he turns round to point out that this admission of a previous limit will not compel him to accept causal relation. He will declare that the previous limit spoken of before should not be looked upon as the cause giving rise to the effect but it is the pre-negation (*prāgabdhāva*) of the event which ushers the effect into existence.² But this explanation is not immune from logical difficulties. Udayana argues with convincing logic that pre-negation does not alone serve the purpose of a previous limit. Pre-negation is without a beginning (*anādi*). Thus, if that had been the only antecedent fact the event might have come into existence even at any earlier point of time.³ Further, though pre-negation has a precise office and function as the determinant of contingency of an event, still it must be admitted that there are other positive factors too, viz, conditions—principal and subsidiaries, which possess the same degree of pragmatic efficiency. The shuttle, the yarn and the like must be mutually cemented together so as to bring about the effect. The entire collocation of all conditions productes the effect. It is worthy of notice in this connection that Jayanta posits the collocation of conditions (*sāmagrī*) as the determinant of an effect. Vardhamāna also applies the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference to prove that the antecedent factors contribute to the production of an event. But the Cārvāka while admitting the collocation of certain positive facts prior to the production of the effect asserts that there is hardly any justification for recognising a causal connection between the two. The testimony of experience cannot be disowned and as such it is not proper to say that there is no collocation of facts prior to the birth of an effect. On a careful analysis of the situa-

1. Niravadhikatvakādācitkatvayor virodhāt NKuP., p 53.

2. Prāg abhāva eva hetur na bhāvā avarjanīyasannudhivāt NKuB, p 55

3. Itaranirapeksasya prāg abhāvāsyā 'vadhivte prāg apī tad avadheḥ kāryasattva-prasaṅgāt. NKu, p 55

tion it appears that the assemblage of all conditions is the most effective in so far as the emergence of an effect is concerned. It is then and then only that an effect emerges when all the conditions assemble, if any one of them is absent, the effect does not come into existence¹. Thus, the Naiyāyika points out that the assumption of the Cārvāka that the invariable antecedent factors and the effect are not causally related is belied. If the antecedent positive factors were not invariably required (*nyāta*) for the production of an object, a person in need of an earthen jar would not have sought for clay, wheel, staff and the like.

But the Cārvāka is not silenced by the argument of the opponent. He goes on to say that though invariable presence of certain positive facts is noticed in the case of emergence of an event still it remains to be proved beyond doubt that they possess pragmatic efficiency (*upakarakatva*). Against this the Naiyāyika maintains that efficiency is not the determinant of causal character in view of the fact that this efficiency presupposes a preceding phenomenon and that also another and the process continuing would ultimately land us in *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavastha*). The invariability is the essential characteristic of causality and in the absence of this invariability causality can never be upheld².

Thus, the theory of spontaneous origination leads us to a complete indeterminism and it has been proved that causality is the demand of rationalism. All logical process and scientific investigation will come to a dead stop if causality is thrown overboard. Disbelief in causal nexus even stultifies the position of the Cārvāka. He cannot overcome the difficulties that beset his own theory. All practical activity will come to a standstill if causality is disowned. It will be just in the fitness of things to mention here that though it passes current that the whole host of Cārvākas repudiates causality the truth is that while one section known as Dhūrta Cārvāka repudiates causality for all purposes, there is yet another

1 Samudayinām sāmagryavasthayām ap svarupanapāyāt samudāyivśeṣe karmanī sāmagrikāranam NM p 13

2 Na hy upakāravāptā kāranatā yena tad abhāve na syāt upakāre pi kartavye upakārantarā pekṣayā navasth tēh k n tu svarūpavśeṣavyāptā NkūP p 57

section, viz, the *Suśikṣita Cārvāka* who admits causality for answering empirical situations but does not recognise it as a metaphysical principle. But the *Naiyāyika* fails to understand the logic behind the contentions of the *Suśikṣita Cārvāka* in view of the fact that causality as a metaphysical principle can be proved on the strength of reasoning and experience. The whole world of reality, material and spiritual alike, is subject to the relentless operation of the law of causation—one coming after another in a clock-like regularity. Thus, we demur to accept the position of the *Cārvāka* which is rather fanciful and based on unconvincing logic and the *Naiyāyika* says that his opponent has not studied the reality in its fullest and most comprehensive perspective.

We have discussed in the foregoing paragraphs the views of the *Cārvāka* on the principle of causality and presented a criticism of the same by the *Naiyāyika*. It may, however, be pointed out that the *Cārvāka* has a further say in the matter and we address ourselves to the task of reviewing it in all its bearings before we see how far the *Naiyāyika* succeeds in answering the difficulties raised by his opponent.

We have already found that the *Cārvāka* seeks to repudiate the objective basis of causality. The *Naiyāyika* asserts that the causal nexus rests between two events—an antecedent and a subsequent. Thus, two individuals are causally related. A is invariably and unconditionally followed by B. Whenever B happens it comes to happen with A as its antecedent fact. Hence, the *Naiyāyika* finds causal relation between two definite and universally related individuals.

Here the *Cārvāka* enquires: What does the *Naiyāyika* mean by the term individual? Does it point to all individuals? Not only A is followed by B or B is preceded by A, but each and every individual also is followed and preceded by each and every individual. Or, does the causalist mean to say that a particular individual is necessarily preceded or followed by a particular individual or class? The former alternative does not convince a sceptic. A jar is preceded by clay and so a piece of cloth by yarns. But

if antecedence and subsequence of two definite phenomena were not established, there would not have been the slightest surprise if the yarn would have been looked upon as the cause of the jar and clay as that of the cloth and further that the jar would have been looked upon as the effect of the yarn and not of clay. To say, therefore, that all individuals are causally connected with all individuals does not stand the test of logical scrutiny.

If the Naiyāyika sees through this anomaly and resorts to the other alternative by holding that the causal nexus relates to two definite individuals—smoke is invariably preceded by fire and thus they two are causally connected, the Cārvāka will point out that the theist will be confronted with two alternatives. Is antecedence alone a sufficient ground for causality or a definite antecedence? If antecedence alone were enough to determine a cause, the yarn could also come out as a cause of the jar, since the yarn might be there prior to the production of the jar, and the yarn and the jar are definite individuals. A donkey may be present by chance just prior to the production of a jar. The donkey is no doubt a definite prior individual. Causality is as yet unestablished. Should we, therefore, be justified in maintaining that the donkey constitutes the cause of the jar? The reply obviously will be in the negative. No sane person would ever think of connecting the two individuals, the donkey and the jar, as cause and effect.

The Cārvāka again asserts that causality cannot subsist in class-character as maintained by his opponent. The Naiyāyika maintains that not only definite individuals are related as cause and effect as such but all individuals coming under a class are causally related. Thus, pot *qua* potness is the effect of clay as characterised by clay-ness. It has been trotted out by the Cārvāka that a smashed or half-chewen seed lacks the capacity for generating a sprout though the universal character of the seed (*bījatva*) is there. And a seed lacking the power of generating a sprout is equivalent to a piece of stone which is unproductive by its very nature. Thus, the smashed seed presents a negative instance where

seedness subsists but the sprout-generating character is absent. Thus, universal character does not unmistakably explain causality. Hence, the Cārvāka avers that all attempt at finding an objective basis for causality is shaken to its very foundation.

To this the Naiyāyika will reply that if causality is denied no one would feel the urge of exerting himself for the purpose of producing an object. If the potter is not assured that clay could be turned into a pot he would not have undertaken the arduous task of collecting materials for producing a pot.

It is refreshing to note that Vardhamāna makes a most fitting rejoinder to the issue under discussion. Causal relation, after all, is determined by the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference¹ and the universal character is the determinant of both the cause and the effect. It is observed that a particular sprout is the effect of a particular seed. But the causal relation must be understood to exist between anything that is seed and anything that is sprout. Seedness is the determinant of the cause-character of the seed; so also sproutness determines the effect-character (*kāryatva*) of the sprout². It is not only implied that the cause is one which being present invariably brings about the effect, but it is also implied that what alone being present brings the effect into existence is the cause.³ The smashed seed lacks the power of generating the sprout. It does not necessarily mean that the smashed seed is no better than a slab of stone. The seedness in the smashed seed is never denied by the Naiyāyika, but what prevents the smashed seed from generating the sprout is the absence of auxiliary conditions. All conditions, i.e., accessory causes, must muster strong so as to produce the effect. If one of them fails, the production of the effect is delayed. The pragmatic efficiency,

1 Vastuto 'smun satī'dam bhavati, asati na bhavati 'ti pratyaksena niyatapūrvabhāvasya grahāt pratyakṣam eva karanatve mānam NKuP, p 60

2 Bijādivyaktūnām eva bijatvadīnā samānyenā 'nanyathasiddhā 'nvayavyatirekavattveṇa kāranatvat NKuP, p 89

3 Na hi yasmin satī kāryam bhavaty eva tat kāranam api tu yasmin saty eva bhavatu NKuP, p 89

which is one of the requirements, is absent in the present case. So the smashed seed does not sprout.

To sum up. We have seen that causality is not a subjective construction but an ontological real. It is not the result of mere repeated observation but it has logical and ontological basis. We think we have been able to expose the absurdity involved in the position of the Cārvāka and we refrain from arguing with them any further in view of the fact that the opponent is firmly determined not to take recourse to logic, for logic never finds favour with him.

We have already found that the divergent character of effects is to be traced to their respective causes. That is why the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School postulate merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*) as the explanation of the diversity of this phenomenal world. But the Sāṃkhyāite, who professes to be an atheist, postulates *Prakṛti* or Primordial Matter out of which the world evolves. *Prakṛti* is but a state of equilibrium of the three *gunas*, viz, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It is posited that in the presence of the *Puruṣa* there is a disturbance in the equilibrium of *gunas* and evolution sets in. All evolutes beginning from *mahat* have their roots in the triple *gunas* and the diversity of the phenomenal world is due to the preponderance of one *guna* over the other. To be precise: In the opinion of the Sāṃkhyāite Primordial Matter, as the triple *gunas*, is the material cause of the cosmic order. The difference of contents does not imply numerical difference of the cause. It has been observed that a lamp removes darkness, produces illumination, creates heat in the wick and helps the different articles in the room in being amenable to visual perception.¹ Thus, the Sāṃkhyāite admits the plausibility of evolution of diversity from unity which, he thinks, does not land him in any uncomfortable situation. In the circumstances the Sāṃkhyāite and the followers of Bhāskara, who are usually known as the Tridandins, do not find any necessity for postulating a plurality of causes. The followers of Bhāskara posit Brahman, the One, as the

1 Drīyate hy avilaksanam apī vilaksana 'nekakaryakārī Yatha pradīpa eka eva tumurā'paharī, vartuvikārakārī rūpāntaravyavahārakārī NKu, pp 91 2

material cause of the universe ¹ To them the world is a real modification of the Brahman

The Naiyāyika, however, observes that the Sāmkhya or the Bhāskara conception of cause as an identical principle savours of mysticism for its defiance of logical canons Diversity belongs to the objective data and it cannot be explained by reference to the unity in the cause The Sāmkhyāite holds that the diversity comes from the preponderance of one of the *gunas* But this is cleverness *par excellence* Preponderance or no preponderance, the fact remains that all collocations or groups of *gunas* are homogeneous in nature (*samanajatyā*) *Prakṛti* is there as the ultimate cause and this Primordial Matter is immune from all sorts of diversity Homogeneous objects can have no causal efficiency with regard to heterogeneous objects for the simple reason that the quality of the effect follows from that of the cause ² And if the effect is not traceable in the cause, the doctrine of *asatkaryavāda* is accepted with all its consequences which runs counter to the Sāmkhya view-point

The Sāmkhya position is open to other charges as well It has been shown that, according to the Sāmkhya, the unity of cause is not incompatible with the heterogeneous character of the effect Were it so, the faggot which is looked upon as the cause of illumination (*dahana kārana*) might as well be regarded as the cause of the absence of illumination in view of the fact that the Sāmkhyaite holds that the self same cause may have causal efficiency with regard to different effects Thus, such an assumption vitiates his own position

It may be further observed that if the cause of illumination gives rise to its absence also, the absence of illumination will be looked upon as identical in all respects with illumination And we are sure that an assumption like this cannot appeal to the logical mind Positive assumption *per se* stultifies its negation This is an observed fact and any manner of diviation from this axiomatic truth is tantamount to the termination of all logical investigations Likewise, the

1 Teṣam Brahmanā eva sakalākaranatvat NkūP p 91
2 Na hy ekarupāt karanāt karyabhedam paśyamah NV p 900

determinant factor of the non-existence of fire lacks the capacity of producing fire. The self-same object is destitute of the power of production and non-production of fire. Two contradictory objects must not have the same locus. Were it so, the homogeneity of the locus would not have been possible. Thus, the position of the Sāṃkhya does not appear to be very much convincing.

But it must not be supposed that the Sāṃkhyaite will yield ground to his opponent so easily. The point at issue, as we have seen, is how we should explain the divergent character of effects which, as the Sāṃkhyaite assumes, arises out of a numerically identical cause. The Sāṃkhyaite may rely upon the Prābhākara theory of *śakti* which is, by nature, not a unity but divergent in character. The unseen latent potency, called *Śakti*, may be regarded as ultimately responsible for the heterogeneity of effects. Concept of a super-sensible entity, viz, power, is known to have been developed by the Prābhākara, and we must admit that we have not as yet been able to light upon a text where the Sāṃkhya philosopher has actually been found to explain his stand by means of this concept of *śakti*. It is Udayana who, while examining the position of the Sāṃkhya and criticising the same, argues that if the Sāṃkhya philosopher seeks to strengthen his position by an appeal to this concept of *śakti*, he would say that the concept of *śakti* as a separate entity is challenged by him and, as such, the defence of the Sāṃkhya position by means of the concept of *śakti* will not bear the test of criticism.

In this context a pertinent question may be raised. Is *Prakṛti* a separate entity from the power or not? If it is held that the causal power is distinct from *Prakṛti*, then the causal efficiency of both of them would have to be acknowledged. Since like *Prakṛti* this power will be related to the effect by the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference. The effect will follow from concomitance of this adventitious power. Thus, the power comes to acquire the necessary character of the cause, and the unitary character of the cause would thereby be vitiated¹. So Udayana remarks that the

postulation of power even though it is admitted by the opponent would not serve any useful purpose, and rather it would make the issue still more complex. If, on the other-hand, the causal power is held to be identical in all respects with its locus, i.e., *Prakṛti*, the difficulty will not be obviated in the least. The divergent character of the effect would remain unexplained as before. A self-identical principle cannot explain diversity. It cannot be gainsaid that the causal power is identical with the cause and also distinct from it, inasmuch as this view of identity-cum-difference presents an obvious absurdity. Identity and non-identity, being contradictory by nature, are not predicable of the same thing. The Naiyāyika, therefore, concludes that the postulation of any causal power is not only devoid of logical justification but also vitiates the position which the Sāṃkhyāite seeks to establish.

The philosophers of the Bhāskara school have postulated causal efficiency in respect of only one absolute object, i.e., Brahman. It is the material cause of the universe. All phenomenal objects are real modifications of the Absolute. Bhāskara upholds the theory of identity-cum-difference (*bhedābheda-vāda*). To him, Brahman is an undifferentiated and unitary mass of pure consciousness out of which multiplicity evolves.¹ Worldly objects are viewed by him as homogeneous mass in their causal and generic aspects, while they reveal their heterogeneity as effects and distinct particulars. The multiplicity in reality is not absorbed by the unity in Brahman. Yādavaprakāśa, a follower of *bhedābheda-vāda*, also upholds that all things present non-difference, so far as their causal character is concerned. The divergence, so far as their effect-character is concerned, is, according to Bhāskara, due to limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) though he admits that the *upādhi* is real and not a fiction. To him, *upādhi* is not *avidyā*. And thus if identity is proved to be the ultimate real, there is no possibility of assuming *dharma* and *adharma*.

This view also has been vehemently opposed by Udayana.

Causal efficiency is exercisable either in succession or in simultaneity and there being no *tertium quid* we must concentrate our dialectic on these two alternatives as *exclude a middle*. We may legitimately enquire: If the cause be a unity and homogeneous in nature, why does it fail to execute the future actions exactly in the same way as it executes the different actions in present time? If there is one cause, it must be supposed to possess the practical efficiency of future actions also. A produces B at a certain period and after a lapse of time produces C. It must be conceded that at the moment of the production of B, A did not possess the efficiency of producing C. Had it been possessed of the practical efficiency of generating C, A would have produced C. There is no reason why there should be any delay in the effectuation of such actions, as the causal efficiency lies intact.¹ The Naiyāyika would evade the difficulty by an appeal to the theory of supplementation (*sahakārivāda*) in the causal entity. Absence of the effect must be preceded by the absence of the cause. C was not produced at the moment when B was produced, for the obvious reason that the cause which would produce C was not present at that time. So the assemblage of all conditions is regarded as the cause. But Bhāskara cannot seek shelter under the Nyāya theory of supplementation, for it would tend to strike at the very root of his theory of a unitary cause.

The Cārvāka also does not rely on these accessories for the birth of the effect. The self-same wick, as the Cārvāka points out, illumines the room and removes the darkness simultaneously. Because we have already found that if one cause is assumed without any supplementation, simultaneity in the production of the effect would be inevitable. If Brahman be the only cause it will produce this world with all its varieties simultaneously, and there would be no succession. But succession is a felt reality. The Cārvāka, as is well-known, did not face the difficulty squarely and con-

1. Yāvatkāryakaranasamarthasvabhāvo bhāvo jātaḥ sa tāvanti api kāryāni tadar 'va kuryāt samarthasya kṣepā 'yogāt. NKuB, p. 93

tented himself with his favourite theory of *svabhāva*. In order to evade this incompatibility the Buddhist had to hold the theory of flux. To him, every object is momentary, and lacks the practical efficiency of producing all effects simultaneously. According to him causal efficiency stands as the test and definition of reality. It is observed that an object, suppose a lump of clay, generates a round pot; sometimes after a jug is produced out of it and so on. A thing does not possess the practical efficiency with regard to all objects at the same time because it ceases to exist at the next moment. Why would not A produce C when B is produced—such a question should not be put to the Buddhist fluxist. Succession in the execution of causal efficiency is not possible in one permanent cause. So the Buddhist postulates the theory of flux.¹ The cause being fluxional, succession in the nature of the effect is possible. Though the Naiyāyika upholds the permanent character of the cause yet he assumes that permanent cause as discharging successive functions in association with successive subsidiaries. Supplementation of the subsidiaries to the cause should be assumed so as to explain succession in the nature of the effect of a permanent causal entity.² Thus, in order to determine the succession in the nature of the effect the Cārvāka must have to take resort either to the theory of flux or to that of supplementation. But both of these theories do not find favour with the Cārvāka, and so his theory of *svabhāva* transpires to be unsound. The theory of *svabhāva* fails to explain facts and, moreover, it introduces logical absurdities. Further, the illustration of the lamp advanced by the Cārvāka does not afford a logical explanation of the homogeneous nature of the cause. The lamp, no doubt, illumines the household articles in the room, but that does not alone stand as the cause of illumination. Contact of those objects with light as well as sense-object contact bring them under the purview of visual perception.

1 Kṣanāntare arthakriyā 'bhāvād asattvam eve 'tī yadā Bauddhah kṣanabhaṅgam brūyāt tatra 'sa parihārah saṃgacchate NKuB, p 93

2 Sthāyīyapaksu tu kramikasahakārya apaksām vīmā tādṛśah svabhāva eva na syāt. NKuP, p 93.

Cf Sthūravādinān tu tādṛśasvabhāvasya sahakārinam vīmā 'nupapattiḥ. NKuPrā, p 93.

The lamp and its contact with the wick also stand as the determinants to the creation of heat in the wick. So, the lamp alone does not exercise causal efficiency with regard to all heterogeneous effects. Hence, the postulation of one indivisible cause falls to the ground and paves the way for the assumption of merit and demerit as the cause of diversity in the phenomenal world.

We have surveyed all the relevant points by which the Naiyāyika establishes merit and demerit as the explanation for the inherent diversity in nature. Let us now study how the Naiyāyika presents the moral argument for the existence of God. It will not be out of place to mention in this context that such arguments have been advanced by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara with great force. The *Nyayasutras* do not, however, contain any specific statement which would unmistakably lead us to assume that this argument finds favour with Gotama, the author of the *Nyayasutras*. Udayana has followed in the footsteps of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara and has set forth this argument with great boldness and vigour in the first chapter of his *Nyayakusumanjali*. The argument of the Naiyāyika may be put in the following syllogism.

All that which is not sentient fructuates only when guided by some intelligent agent. *Adṛsta* is an unconscious principle. Therefore, *adṛsta* is guided by some intelligent agent.

The Naiyāyika contends that the combination of two atoms forming a dyad and the *adṛsta*, which is, after all, an unconscious principle, are operated only when they are guided by a sentient being who is God.¹ The Naiyāyika proposes to justify his syllogistic argument by an appeal to an instance from our everyday life. An axe, for instance, fructuates only when it is used by the wood cutter. And the wood cutter can use it to some purpose if he has knowledge of its nature and capacity to successful activity (*svarūpa* and *śakṭi*). The wood-cutter must be cognisant of all the looks of the axe. But it remains to be seen whether the individual soul can be

¹ Dharmadharmau buddhimatkarāṇādhīṣṭatau puruṣasyo pabhogam kurutaḥ
karaṇatvād vāsyādivat. \V p 947

equipped with this knowledge. Obviously the individual soul lacks omniscience and as such it is not possible for the individual soul to know the nature of *adrsta* which is responsible for the unification of atoms resulting in the birth of different effects. Thus, the omniscient God comes in the picture who renders the operation of *adrsta* possible.¹

Let us now pursue the point in detail. It has been made abundantly clear that without the aid of a super-intelligent being guiding and regulating the activities of *adrsta* the latter fails to be effective. In the illustration cited before we sought to prove an intelligent agent and nothing more and on the strength of it we proceeded to posit a super-intelligent agent. The inanimate axe cannot cut a piece of log unless an intelligent sentient being uses it. But it is not required to presume that this sentient being must be a Super-Being and not any kind of sentient being. Thus, it is quite clear that there is some difference in the character of the probandum (*sādhyā*) in the instance (*drstānta*) and that in the subject (*pakṣa*). To be more precise, the probandum is of a general character in the illustration, whereas it is particularistic in the subject. But it should not be supposed that due to this difference in the nature of the probandum in the instance and the subject we go against the verdict of reasoning and for that matter, the Naiyāyika position as well. To take a concrete example, fire is the determinant concomitant (*vṛthapaka*) of smoke and smoke is the determinate concomitant (*vṛthāpka*) of fire. Now, the condition of inference consists in the doubt regarding the presence of the probandum in the subject of the inference (*pakṣa*). Indubious knowledge of the probandum (*sādhya siddhi*) often prevents inference. Now we have the indubious knowledge of the probandum, viz, fire, in the kitchen. In spite of such knowledge the inference is not counteracted. Fire in the kitchen is known, but fire existing in the hill remains yet uncognised. Inference is prevented only by the indubious knowledge of the probandum in all instances of the subject

(*pakṣa*) In the same way, the person who uses the axe may be known. But the animate agent controlling *adrsta* is not known. It comes to this, therefore, that the animate agent is not known in all cases of the activities of the inanimate object. Hence, it stands to reason that the inference of an animate agent controlling the movements of the inanimate object is absolutely logical.

The net result of the discourse would then stand as follows. In the instance (*drstanta*) knowledge of the universal concomitance between the probans and the probandum is derived from the example. In that particular instance the probandum is known universally (*samanyatah sādhyasiddhi*). Still by virtue of subject-adjunctness of the ground of inference (*hetoh pakṣadharma*) the knowledge derived of the probandum points to a specific instance of the probandum and not to probandum in general. To put it logically 'All S is P' turns into 'Some S is P'. Herein lies the efficacy of the knowledge of the presence of the ground of inference in the subject.¹

It has, however, been pointed out by the opponent that the Naiyāyika will find it difficult to prove the existence of God as the guiding principle of unseen deserts. And the argument that he advances may be summed up in the following way. In the opinion of the Naiyāyika the individual soul is not omniscient and as such it does not possess the capacity for cognising *adrsta*. Thus, he cannot say that the individual soul is competent to guide *adrsta*.² If this be so, the opponent would contend that God, which the Naiyāyika states to be of kindred nature of the individual soul, can hardly be described as endowed with the capacity for the supervision of unseen deserts. The Naiyāyika, in reply, points out that the evanescent character of knowledge possessed by the individual soul militates against the possibility of

¹ Bhavanatha in his *Nyāyika* describes this knowledge of some instances of probandum as *adh karamasiddhanta*. But Gotama in his *Nyāyasūtra* defines *adh karamasiddhanta* as those conclusions which being accepted other conclusions will naturally follow. NS I, 30.

² *Yasya tau dharmādharmau sa eva dhiṣṭhata bhaviṣvati ti na yuktam*. NY, p. 947.

his supervision. Eternality of knowledge and its unimpeded character are the conditions of supervising such unseen entities. Eternal knowledge is independent of any condition whatsoever and as such relates to each and every object of the universe irrespective of any space-time factor. So unseen objects also come under the ken of eternal knowledge. Although it is admitted that there cannot be any direct proof of eternal knowledge by means of observation still the same may be inferred with the help of cogent reasoning.

The opponent at this stage might reasonably argue that it is not understood what the Naiyāyika means by saying that the knowledge of God is eternal and that of the individual soul is transient. The Naiyāyika makes bold to reply that there is no inconsistency when he declares that the knowledge of God is eternal and that of individuals is not so. And he seeks to explain his position with the help of the following argument: The qualities such as colour, taste etc. of physical atoms are of an evanescent nature whereas those of acquatic atoms are held to be of eternal character. If there is such variation in the character of atoms then there cannot be any justification for the opponent's contention that the knowledge of God cannot be different in character from that of individuals since both of them, viz, God and *jīva*, are described as *ātman* as such.

But the opponent may still argue: *Adṛṣṭa* inheres in the individual soul and the logician posits God as the supervisor of such *adṛṣṭa*. But it is not possible to supervise things which are not related to him¹ but to the individual soul. But the theist steers clear of this apparent difficulty by asserting a relation between God and *adṛṣṭa* of the individual soul. It is pointed by him that God and the individual soul are related to each other, the relation being one of contact (*saṁyoga*) and as *adṛṣṭa* is a quality pertaining to the individual soul which is its substratum, the relation between the individual soul and *adṛṣṭa* is one of inherence. God is, therefore, related to *adṛṣṭa* of the individual soul the relation being, in

the opinion of the theist, inherence-in-the-thing-in-contact (*saṁyukta-samavāya*).¹

But it may be argued that such an explanation involves further difficulty. Thus, we are led to assume that there is contact between two eternal and ubiquitous entities—a position which is not universally accepted. Eternal and ubiquitous entities can never be related through contact in view of the fact that if such contact be at all admitted it would prove to be eternal. Hence, we find Praśastapāda denying the relation of contact between eternal and ubiquitous entities.² But we may point out in this connection that Uddyotakara does not subscribe to this view and he has admitted the relation of contact between two eternal and ubiquitous entities. Though Uddyotakara, at first, refers to this view as being posited by others (*aney āhuh*), yet in his subsequent observation he has made it clear that the eternity of contact does not militate against the thesis of the Naiyāyika.³ It is worthy of notice, however, that Uddyotakara has gone a step further and maintains that if the relation is held to be of contact-cum-contact-cum-inherence (*saṁyukta-saṁyogi-samavāya*) then the difficulty involved in the supposition of eternal contact may be obviated. God is related by contact with atoms, the latter and individual souls are mutually related by contact and *adr̥ṣṭa* inheres in the individual soul. Thus, the relation existing between *adr̥ṣṭa* and God turns out to be one of contact-cum-contact-cum-inherence.⁴

It is a fact that *adr̥ṣṭa* is not independent in the matter of producing effects. Unlike activity (*karma*) it depends on some external condition, such as space, time, etc. to give rise to different effects. Activity, as the Naiyāyika states, does not expect external conditions to produce effects. For instance, separation of atoms follows as a result of some activity, but this activity does not require the aid of any external condition

1 *Samyuktasamavāyo vā kṣetrajñe 'svaraṣya saṁyogāt* NVTT, p. 957

2 *Vibhūnān tu parasparataḥ saṁyogo na 'sti yutasiddhy abhavat* PPBh, p. 65.

Also, *Vibhūnos tu na saṁyogah kāranabhavāt* VUp, p. 181

3 *Ajasambandho 'papatteh* NV, p. 952

Also, *Ajasamyogasya 'py upapāditatvāt* NVTT, p. 957.

4 *Samyuktāḥ khalv īṣareṇa paramanvādayaḥ tais ca kṣetrajñāḥ tatsamavetau dharmadharmav it* NVTT, p. 957.

so far as the separation of atoms is concerned. But the case of *adr̥ṣṭa* is entirely different. Until and unless it is aided by external conditions it fails to produce any effect. The aid comes from time, space, the intelligent agent and so forth. The Naiyāyika elucidates this point with the help of an apt illustration. It is the charm of the spell which removes the poison of a person bitten by snake. But the spell must needs be uttered by the snake-charmer in order that it may produce the expected result. Spells by themselves are never expected to destroy poison. In the same way *adr̥ṣṭa* by itself cannot give rise to any effect. - It can operate only when some intelligent person regulates it.

It may be contended against the Naiyāyika's position that the argument advanced by him would not enable him to establish God as the supervising agent of *adr̥ṣṭa*. In the case of an empirical event, say, for instance, the cutting of a log of wood with an axe an intelligent agent possessing a psychophysical organism may be reasonably posited, but as a supervising agent of *adr̥ṣṭa* is not endowed with a psychophysical organism it does not stand to reason to assert an intelligent agent controlling *adr̥ṣṭa*.

But the Naiyāyika does not yield ground to his opponent and states that the contention of the opponent rests upon a bad analogy. False analogy has been responsible for many a stupendous blunder and the Naiyāyika makes no secret of the fact that the present case is no exception to that. The analogy which the opponent tries to set forth between God and any empirical agent does not hold good. The vital difference between God and an empirical agent lies in the fact that whereas will and volition of the former are eternal verities, those of the latter are never so. Hence, the postulation of God as an intelligent agent on whom rests the operation of *adr̥ṣṭa* is not without foundation.

It follows from the above that the Naiyāyika posits *adr̥ṣṭa* as an insentient principle and as an insentient principle cannot work independently¹ it has been found necessary to

posit a sentient principle to guide it and this sentient guide is called God. Now a question may arise. If *adr̥ṣṭa* be regarded as a sentient principle and not as an insentient one, as the Naiyāyika holds it to be, the necessity for the assumption of a sentient principle, viz, God, as the guide of *adr̥ṣṭa* will not be felt. The answer is that if it be assumed for the sake of argument that *adr̥ṣṭa* is a sentient principle it will fail to account for the diversity of the phenomenal world satisfactorily, as the said sentient principle will itself be of a unitary character. Thus, the unity of cause will fail to explain the diversity of the effect and this being so, the assumption of *adr̥ṣṭa* will serve no fruitful purpose.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PRĀBHĀKARA POSITION ANALYSED

The Mīmāṃsā has been charged with atheism Śālikanātha¹ and the author of the *Nayaviveka*² have strongly criticised the Nyāya view on theism The main principle on which they base their arguments is as follows

The Naiyāyikas are almost unanimous on the possibility and actuality of the periodical dissolution of the universe and they assert that all Vedic usages will cease to exist at the time of such dissolution But the Mīmāṃsaka does not believe in the creation and complete dissolution of the universe³ He holds like the Jaina that the universe is an eternal existent⁴ There may be partial dissolution and reconstruction but the world as a whole persists through all times The postulation of God, however, is necessitated, as the Naiyāyika holds, for the revival of religion and the recreation of the Vedas But as, in the opinion of the Mīmāṃsaka, there is no cessation of the entire universe the traditional cultivation and knowledge of the Vedic lore continues unimpeded and this continuity is preserved by the activities of teachers and the taught The Mīmāṃsaka posits that the world with its ramification is in existence at all times of creation and there has not been a point of time when the order of the universe, as it exists to-day, was not in existence It is not possible to conceive a world differing in every respect from the one we experience in present times The position of the Mīmāṃsaka is, therefore, that since time immemorial the world is in existence and as such it is not necessary to assert God as its creator The Naiyāyika has sought to establish God on the strength of the following argument All non-eternal objects have a creator As the world is an effect it

1 PP pp 137-40

2 NV, pp 194-9

3 Ekadai va sakalajanasya samutpado vilayas ce ti na sunah pramanam pratyuta yathādarsanam etāvad avasatum ucitam kramena ca vilaya iti PP p 137

4 Anād kalas ddham eva va c tryam SSM p 27

must have a creator, who is God. If the world is not a product (*kāryadṛavya*) but beginningless, the Mīmāṃsaka cannot, so the Naiyāyika thinks, prove the existence of God as its creator. In other words, the Mīmāṃsaka fails to prove the utility of the concept of God in its scheme of the Universe. The Mīmāṃsaka also cannot aver like the Naiyāyika that God creates the Vedas. The Naiyāyika looks upon word as an ephemeral entity and as such the Veda, which is but a collection of such ephemeral entities, cannot but be non-eternal. Hence, the Naiyāyika can establish God on the strength of the authorship of the Vedas. The Mīmāṃsaka, however, looks upon word as an eternal entity and, in his estimate, the Veda, like the world, is also an eternal entity. In that case it is not possible for him to opine that there is some such entity as God who is the author of the Vedas.

It has been observed that the Mīmāṃsaka does not admit a complete cosmic dissolution and a subsequent creation by any agency. But he maintains day-to-day evolution to which the world as a whole is subjected. The process of becoming and passing away is constant.¹ The Naiyāyika may contend that part-creation and part-dissolution of the world are also determined by that Universal Intelligence. But the Prābhākara does not appear to disown the truth of the contention and it is borne out by the remarks of the author of *Nayaviveka* when he says that the position of the Prābhākara is not embarrassed if the assumption of God as an author of day-to-day destruction and creation is assumed.

It is striking that Prābhākara has not answered the objections of the theist and it may be presumed that he appreciates the cogency of the opponent's argument. Indeed the pronouncement of the author of the *Nayaviveka* seems to strengthen the supposition.²

The Prābhākara has made an elaborate plea against

1. The Vedāntin also holds the same view. VP, Chap IV.

2. *Ekadā kṛtūna-śṛṣṭivilayau mānasūnyau, pratyuta yathādarśanakramena tad anume 'ti jagati 'śvarakartṛke 'pi na gurunayavirodha itī guror abadhīranam* NVi, pp. 187-8.

the theistic arguments advanced by the Naiyāyika. The implication of those elaborate contentions is not that the Prābhākara is chary of assuming the existence of God but that the syllogistic process of the theist is by itself fallacious. The Prābhākara endeavours to point out those fallacies only but does not dispute the existence of God. And it must not be misunderstood that by disowning complete dissolution he cannot believe in the existence of God. For Śālikanātha, while rejecting the syllogistic arguments of the Naiyāyika by which the latter proves the existence of God, simply condemns the process of reasoning which enables the Naiyāyika to prove his thesis.¹

It has already been pointed out that the Mīmāṃsaka does not believe in cosmic creation and absolute annihilation and it has also been pointed out that he is not opposed to partial dissolution. Considering the above two points we are led to conclude that the Prābhākara system of philosophy is not antitheistic. It has also been shown on the strength of the text of an authority like Śālikanātha that the Mīmāṃsaka is not opposed to theism. The contention of the Mīmāṃsaka is that he is not prepared to accept the theistic arguments advanced by the Naiyāyika.² We, therefore, may be excused if we are inclined to presume that the Prābhākara position is not opposed to theistic ideology.

Ravideva in his commentary on the *Nayavūka* observes that the existence of God has been established by the scriptures. So any attempt to discard the existence of God would stand in direct opposition to the Vedic lore and would transpire to be an unwarranted assertion.³ That is why the learned commentator thinks that the upshot of this type of antitheistic reasoning does not involve the fallacy of absurdity and illogical argumentation but it would have been so if

¹ Samprati suhṛdbhavenā 'ha nāstīha keśāñcī cetanādhūṣṭhānānumānam ayuktam NVi, pp 188-9

² Evañ ce 'svaro paroktam evā 'numānam nirastam ne 'svaro nirastah NVi, p 199

³ Na caī 'am Śruti-smṛti-nisiddhesvaranirāsāpatyā sādhuvaḥśāryatāpatih Śruteśvaravivādatāhe 'tvāha NVi, p 109

any attempt were made to discard the possibility of divine existence.¹

THE PRĀBHĀKARA POSITION

The Prābhākara is in agreement with all atheistic schools of Indian Philosophy when he criticises the inferential argument of the Naiyāyika for the existence of God. The Prābhākara argues that in determining the superintendence of *adr̥ṣṭa* the Naiyāyika banks upon the testimony of experience. Experience envisages that the superintending agent must be cognisant of the nature of the object supervised, its effect and the capacity for producing the same. But here the Prābhākara contends that a careful examination will reveal that the Naiyāyika may be charged against with the arguments which he advances in support of his position. Direct knowledge of the object is the condition precedent for supervision. One lacking such knowledge cannot act as a supervisor. Moreover, the object of supervision should be directly perceived. The object which is not the content of direct perception cannot be superintended. Unseen deserts of individual actions (*adr̥ṣṭa*) do never come under the ken of direct perception. Immediate knowledge of *adr̥ṣṭa* is a contradiction in terms. Thus, as the unseen deserts of actions do not offer themselves as the content of perceptual knowledge the hypothesis of an intelligent supervising agent as upheld by the Naiyāyika falls to the ground.

The Naiyāyika holds that an inference relating to a particular (*viśeṣānumāna*) negates a general inference (*sāmānyānumāna*). But the case under review reveals that this dictum of the Naiyāyika stands against his own position. The Naiyāyika has posited that the inference which proves the superintendence is particularistic in character whereas the inference

1. Śālikanātha seems to opine that Prābhākara does not substantially differ from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regarding the problem of God. That is why Prābhākara keeps silence on this much-debated problem of God.

Vide Tad idam pratipaksakakṣyām aprī nāroḍhum kramate ity upekṣitam bhagavatā bhāṣyanibandhakāreṇa. RVP, p. 193.

which negates superintendence is general in character and it is not, therefore, capable of setting aside the other one. Now the two inferences stand as follows: X: Unconscious object fructuates only under the supervision of intelligent entity. This is an instance of general inference. Y: Perceptible unconscious objects fructuate under the supervision of an intelligent entity. It is obvious that while X is general in character, Y is particularistic. According to the dictum mentioned above the latter, i.e., Y, will oppose the former, i.e. X. Hence, it will not be possible for the Naiyāyika to assert the existence of any intelligent supervising agent of *adr̥ṣṭa*, which is an imperceptible entity.

Further, the Mīmāṃsaka will argue that the theist may, however, steer clear of the difficulty by positing that the superintendent of *adr̥ṣṭa*, being essentially different from the individuals (*jīva*) may possess direct knowledge of the object supervised, i.e., *adr̥ṣṭa*. But superintendence through immediate knowledge requires the aid of sense-organs. A blind person cannot supervise an object since he lacks the visual organ. And as the Naiyāyika would not agree that God has a sense-organ he cannot maintain that God is endowed with the power of supervision.

The difficulty is set aside by the Naiyāyika who opines that the position of his opponent would have been tenable if he would have asserted that the knowledge of the supervising agent were of a transient character. According to the Naiyāyika knowledge of God is eternal in character and as such there is absolutely no necessity whatsoever for assuming a sense-organ for divine knowledge. Thus, the contention of the opponent transpires to be unsound.

But the Prābhākara still argues that first of all the existence of any such superintending knowledge should be proved to be valid and then the question of eternity or otherwise of that knowledge will arise. But the imperceptible unconscious object does not require any conscious supervision. Unless the existence of any such knowledge is proved the question of its eternity or non-eternity floats in the air.

Here the exposition of Bhavanatha Miśra deserves careful consideration. He observes that some theists while admitting the eternity of divine knowledge have declared divine volition to be non eternal. It is an admitted fact that will and volition are conditioned by soul mind contact. Psychological contact is held to be the non inherent cause of will and volition. But as God has no psychological organ His will and volition turn out to be fictions. In order to explain the difficulty thus involved the theists are constrained to assert that when the merit and demerit of liberated souls are destroyed their minds (*manas*) remain in an unattached and self sufficient condition (*svatantra*) and a contact of divine self with the minds of liberated souls gives rise to divine will and volition. In view of this these theists must acknowledge that God's will and volition are not eternal. Indeed God is the supervisor of these liberated minds. God requires knowledge, will and volition for this supervision. These theists say that divine will and volition are continuing from eternity in a series. So it is never possible to find out a point of time when divine will does not exist. But a question may be raised. The hypothesis of continuation of divine will and volition in a series may appear to be veridical during the period of creation of the physical world. But such hypothesis does not stand to reason if cosmic rest (*pralaya*) is affirmed, since nothing is produced during dissolution. This, therefore, guarantees the non existence of divine will and volition during cosmic rest. And as the *continuum* is dissolved will and volition of God do not necessarily arise even in the beginning of the subsequent creation. Thus, the postulation of God as the creator falls to the ground¹. It is for this reason that some philosophers have asserted that divine will and volition are as much eternal as divine knowledge. It should not be supposed, however, that if divine will and volition are held to be as much eternal as divine knowledge, occasional appearance and disappearance of the phenomenal world remain unexplained. For, when a particular object

1 *Sāṅkhya samhitā* punaḥ surāśoh prabhāha reclede k ta cchaprāyatna or
janma NV p 196

comes in direct contact with divine will and volition, it is then and then only that the same object is created by God. The aforesaid position may be explained with the help of a suitable example. It is a fact that the sun shines for all times, but it reveals those objects only with which it finds its contact.

Bhavanātha does not agree with this solution of the Naiyāyika and charges it with the logical fallacy of interdependence (*anyonyāśraya*). Thus, he points out that if there is divine will, there may be contact between it and an object, and if there is contact between God's will and an object it is then that a particular object may be the content of God's will.¹ Hence, the Naiyāyika's argument to prove his objective by reference to subsistence of the reason in the subject of the inference (*paksadharmatā*) does not appear to carry conviction.

The Mīmāṃsaka further contends that the supervision of *adrsta* by intelligent being cannot be established on logical grounds. It is a matter of common knowledge that an axe can cut a piece of log only when it is used by the wood-cutter. Unless there is physical contact between the axe and the hand of the wood-cutter, a log of wood cannot be hewed. Such physical contact is not conceivable between *adrsta* and the intelligent supervisor in view of the fact that the former, unlike the axe, is not a substance but a quality (*guna*) and as such contact, which is also a quality, cannot inhere in it. It may be argued, however, that though *adrsta* is an attribute and it cannot, on that account, stand in relation of conjunction with the intelligent supervisor, still the relation of co-inherence (*samavāya*) between the two is not unthinkable. But this argument also is not convincing inasmuch as *adrsta* can in the fitness of things co-inhere in the individual soul only, but to assert that it co-inheres in God lacks precision. It is understandable that the quality of a substance co-inheres in it but it does not stand to reason to say that the

1 Atha jñāne 'cchā 'dī nityam, tat tad bhāvopadhīnāt tat tad śaśanam raviprakāśavat. Tan na, anyonyāśrayāt. Upadhāne 'dhuṣṭhānam adhuṣṭhāne co 'padhānam NVi, p. 196

attribute of one substance co-inheres in another To be precise, in the present instance it is the individual and not God wherein *adrsta* lies Hence, *adrsta* may be described as inhering in the individual and not in God ¹

The Naiyāyika may still argue that the relation of individual *adrsta* to God is neither one of contact nor one of inherence but one of contact-cum contact cum inherence (*samyukta-samyogi-samavaya*) God is related to the atom through contact and the same relation subsists between the atom, viz, the mind and the individual soul Now it is inherence through which *adrsta* resides in the individual soul That being so, the relation between God and *adrsta* is one of contact cum-contact-cum inherence That is to say, the relation is not a direct one but something indirect It is, why the Mīmāṃsaka contends that when the Naiyāyika describes supervision as a type of indirect relation he defies the verdict of empirical knowledge Experience guarantees only direct and immediate supervision of unconscious entity by some sentient being The birth of an *adrsta* synchronises with an urge for fructuation (*phalanukūlapravṛtti*) To be precise, whenever an *adrsta* is posited it means that there is a tendency to produce certain results Under the circumstances, it is futile to posit a supervisor who would see through the operation of *adrsta* in bringing about certain effects, for *adrsta*, by itself, conveys the meaning that there is a movement in the direction of certain results which follow Still *adrsta* does not fructuate immediately on its genesis because of the fact that such fructuation is conditioned by a time-factor

To take an illustration The supervision of a person, viz, the wood-cutter, is necessary for the axe chopping a log of wood Likewise, the supervision of a sentient being, viz, God, is required for *adrsta* in producing certain effects Now the Mīmāṃsaka holds that the birth of an *adrsta* implies volitional urge (*phalanukūlapravṛtti*) towards fructuation and that volitional urge, which is a kind of

¹ Na tāvat samyogo dharmādharmayor gunatvena samyogabhāvat Samavāyo 'pi parapuruṣa samavāyīnor dharmādharmayor īśvaram praty anupapannah PP, p 138

activity (*karma*), can hardly relate to *adr̥ṣṭa* which is not a substance but a quality. In the case of the axe such volitional activity may be conceived in view of the fact that the axe is a substance and not an attribute. But being an attribute *adr̥ṣṭa* like the volitional urge cannot be looked upon as the locus for an activity.

Furthermore, the fructuation of *adr̥ṣṭa* does not depend on any intelligent agent. Concomitance in presence and absence guarantees that volition towards fructuation (*kāryābhimukhya*) invariably suggests the collocation of all conditions (*samagra-sahakāri-samavadhāna*).¹ This collocation of all conditions depends, in its turn, on respective causes. Again, the entire collocation of causes is dependent on the time-factor in the matter of producing effects. As time ripens nothing can prevent the collocation of causes from yielding the intended result. Sprouting of the seed is an instance to the point where supervision by any intelligent agency is not required to be posited. But where the effect-producing efficiency is not determined by any spatio-temporal condition, as in the instance of the wood-cutter and the axe, the fructuation of practical efficiency results from intelligent superintendence. But as *adr̥ṣṭa* depends solely on spatio-temporal relation for its fructuation, it does not stand in need of any external supervision.²

Uddyotakara sees through the weakness in the position of his predecessors and meets the charges of the opponent in the following manner. He proposes that when the Naiyāyika says that there should be an intelligent supervision of *adr̥ṣṭa* he seeks to establish God on the strength of it. The Naiyāyika intends to suggest that such intelligent supervision is only another name for divine will. As *adr̥ṣṭa* requires the aid of time for its fructuation so also it depends upon divine will and thus there will hardly be any difficulty in proving the existence of God.

1. Anvayaavyatrekanirddhāritasahakāriyogo hy ābhimukhyam NViR, p 198

2. Jalagatānām eva keśāñcid ankuradījanakatvam, sthālagatanām eva keśāñcid ity anvayaavyatrekasiddhā desakālā 'pekṣā' 'py rtubhedena puspādy utpattidarsanasiddhā, vāsyādīvyūtinām eva tu cetanādhusthānamātrāyattakāryābhimukhyam dṛṣṭam itī kālādy apekṣānām tanmātrakṛtam ābhimukhyam, cetanādhusthānā 'pekṣānām (na) tanmātram itī nā'dṛṣṭe desakālāpekṣāvat cetanā 'pekṣe 'ti śakyam vaktum NViR, p 193

But that also does not stand the test of criticism. Divine will alone is incapable of inducing any productive power in *adrsta*. Physical action is conditioned by the volitional urge of the individual. Even this productivity of volition is limited to the particular body only which is born of the *adrsta* of the particular individual. The *adrsta* of one particular individual cannot produce volitional urge in the body of a different individual¹. It is, therefore, that atoms do not become creative simply by divine volitional urge (*prayatna*) since they are not bodies acquired by the *adrsta* of the Supreme Lord. Thus, the Mīmāṃsaka exposes the defect in the Nyāya theory of intelligent supervision of *adrsta*.

But he does not stop here. Like other sceptics, viz, the Jaina and the Buddhist, he hurls the same weapon which, in his view, deals a most staggering blow to the Nyāya position. The Prabhākara contends that supervision remains an impossibility unless the supervisor is possessed of psycho physical organism which the Naiyāyika would never admit. Dissociation with a physical organism leads to the denial of supervision as it goes against the verdict of experience.

We have stated in the foregoing paragraphs the views of the Prābhākara as presented by Bhavanātha in his *Naya viveka*. But we think that unless the views of Śālikanātha on this issue are set forth in particular, the examination of the Prābhākara position would not be adequate and as such we propose to review the position of Śālikanātha vis-a-vis the theory of superintendence of the Naiyāyika. Śālikanātha lays emphasis on the point that cosmic dissolution is a fiction. The verdict of empirical experience bears testimony to the fact that the different objects of the universe meet decay one after another and as such simultaneous dissolution has not a plank to take its stand upon and if cosmic dissolution is not proved it will be difficult, if not impossible, to establish God as the creator of the universe.

¹ Yatnamatradh nam adhiṣṭhatrtvam svadehan āta n drśam na nyatrt NV R
p 198

Moreover, the Naiyāyika maintains that the uncaused deserts of individual actions are supervised by a conscious agent and that dispensing agent is God. The Naiyāyika argues, as we have seen, that *adrṣṭa* cannot by itself produce its effects and fructuates only when it is guided by an intelligent spirit. God stands in need of supervising the course of *adrṣṭa*. The Naiyāyika further holds that the individual soul cannot be the controller of *adrṣṭa*, since it lacks knowledge prior to its coming into contact with a psycho-physical organism; for, as we know, such contact is the *sine qua non* of knowledge.

But the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka urges that if the individual soul lacks the capacity, no other object would be able to serve as the guiding agent. Knowledge is conditioned by the soul-mind contact which, in its turn, is conditioned by individual deserts in concurrence with sense-object contact.¹ Knowledge is conditioned by the union of the soul with the mind, the senses and their objects. Collocation of all these conditions determines the appearance of knowledge. But none of these separate elements, composing the causal group, is to be found in an unseen object. The theist posits God as an unseen entity and as such collocation of the conditions mentioned above can hardly be expected in the case of God.

The Naiyāyika may, however, contend that God does not require these conditions, since God's knowledge is eternal and ubiquitous and as such there is no anomaly involved in the view of the theists that God is the dispensing agent of *adrṣṭa*. But Śālikanātha contends that the aforesaid position of the Naiyāyika is sure to involve complexities. It is a fact of common knowledge that inference conforms to empirical reality (*drṣṭānusāri sarvatrānumānam*). But a guiding agent as posited by the Naiyāyika possessing eternal knowledge is contradicted by our experience. Any knowledge which is obtained by us should stand in conformity with reality. So an attempt at steering clear of this difficulty by an appeal to eternal knowledge is futile.

The Naiyāyika may, however, argue that the Prābhākara seems to be adamant in his view that there is hardly any room for unseen conditions, but it is difficult to understand how he disowns reality. Insentient objects are seen to fructuate only when they are guided by some intelligent principle. If he refuses to admit such a conscious guiding principle he would be charged of explaining away the fact.

In reply to this charge the Prābhākara seeks a way out through logical device. He avers that inference admits of two types according to the nature of the object inferred. If the inference points to some universal object, i.e., if the inference relates to the object which exceeds in extension, then that inference is called general in character (*sāmānyānumāna*). If, however, the inference points to an object less in extension, then that is called particular inference (*viśeṣānumāna*). The law is that a *sāmānyānumāna* stultifies a *viśeṣānumāna*. The inference of the Naiyāyika that unconscious object fructuates only when it is guided by some conscious agent is more pervasive while the inference of the Prābhākara that knowledge depends on psycho-physical organism for its emergence is particular in character. Thus, the inference of the Naiyāyika being general in character should make room for the inference of the Prābhākara which has got logical preference because of its being particularistic in character.

Furthermore, Śālikanātha argues that according to the Naiyāyika God is said to supervise the work of *adṛṣṭa*. But the Prābhākara may ask—What is the nature of supervision of this principle of *adṛṣṭa*? The wood-cutter is seen to supervise the axe in the act of cutting. Such a type of supervision cannot be admitted in the case of God, since, unlike the wood-cutter, God does not possess any psycho-physical organism so that the contact of body with the non-intelligent principle of *adṛṣṭa* is not possible. It is through the supervision of an intelligent agent that the axe functions, i.e., the contact of the axe with the wood is made. But here the fructuation

possible by the performance of sacrifices and as such it is not conceivable what part will be played by an intelligent principle like God who has been sought to be established by the logician. So Śālikanātha concludes, as we have stated in course of our review of the position of Bhavanātha, that the Mīmāṃsaka objects to the inference or inferences with the aid of which the logician seeks to establish the identity of God. It is quite worthy of notice that the Mīmāṃsaka says that he has no objection to the theory of God probably meaning thereby that he is prepared to admit the existence of God if such existence could be proved on the strength of mightier arguments. The inferences employed by the Naiyāyika do not conclusively prove the existence of God. And hence he sets forth his criticism of the line of argument employed by the Naiyāyika.¹

1 Nandisvara in his *Prābhākaravyāsa* states in unequivocal terms that the inferential existence of God has been challenged by the Prābhākara and that God is not denied. Vide *Evāñ cā 'numānukatvam eva 'śvarasya nirākṛtam, ne 'śvaro 'pi nirākṛtaḥ* P.V., p. 82

Now it remains to be pointed out to which particular subject the aforesaid concomitance applies and the subject in this particular case will be such objects as are perceived by at least two sense-organs (*dvīndriya-grahya*) as well as those that baffle sensual perception (*agrahya*). Thus, the inference will be of the following nature. Objects under dispute that are perceived by two sense organs and those not perceived at all must have an intelligent cause to produce them, because they are all differentiated from other objects on account of the particular conjunction of their constituent parts¹.

It now remains to be seen what is precisely the subject of the inference and for that purpose let us pursue the point. Atoms of air (*vāyu*), though imperceptible because of the absence of colour in them, do not stand as the subject of the inference as none of the contestant parties, neither the Buddhist nor the Naiyāyika, endeavours to justify that they are produced by some intelligent agent. Jars and other common objects though capable of being perceived by two fold sense-organs do not form the nucleus of dispute and as such cannot be included in the subject. The same is with regard to other atoms also which are imperceptible². None contends that atoms are products. Thus, the dyads (*dvyanuka*) of earth, water etc. and sprout etc. stand as the subject of the inference of which the preexistence of a sentient being is predicable.

Having summed up the standpoint of Avīddhākarna we now propose to give a resume of the observation of the Buddhist on the aforesaid syllogism.

This time-honoured cosmological argument was for the first time subjected to scathing criticism by Dharmakīrti, 'the central figure around whom all the creative minds in India revolved'. It has subsequently been elaborated by Śāntaraksita and Kamalasīla. These two philosophers have

opposed the above syllogism with all the emphasis they could command. Śāntaraksita observes that the syllogistic argument advanced by Aviddhakarna is vitiated by fourfold fallacies.

In all cases of valid inference the probans (*hetu*) must be a proved fact and not assumed. Fictitious or unreal probans leads us nowhere. The indubious and real probans only can prove the probandum by virtue of universal concomitance. Now, in the aforesaid inference of Aviddhakarna the probans, i.e., the quality of being differentiated (*vyāvṛttatva*), includes such concepts to which the Buddhist denies any existence. In the reason (*hetu*) we find two terms, i.e., *sva* and *avayava-sanniveśa*. It is apparent that Aviddhakarna, as a logician, admits the existence of the whole (*avayavin*) independent of its parts (*avayava*) as also of conjunction which is the *conditio sine qua non* of the whole, as a perceptible quality apart from colour, size etc. The Naiyāyika is of opinion that clear perceptual experience testifies to the existence of the 'composite substance' (*avayavin*). The marshalling of parts (*avayava-sanniveśa*) in a particular way which is nothing but a type of conjunction is also admitted by the Naiyāyika as a perceptible quality apart from colour, size etc. Uddyotakara and Vācaspati have made an elaborate plea to justify independent existence of composite body (*avayavin*)¹ and hold that it is perceptual cognition which justifies its independent existence.

Now, the Buddhist as a fluxionist denies independent existence to wholes. The idea of a whole is incompatible with the supposed impermanence of every object. The independent existence of wholes, the Buddhist observes, is an idle hypothesis. The Realist, no doubt, starts from sense-experience as ultimate data. Take for instance, a whole, viz, a piece of cloth. When we perceive a piece of cloth what we experience are the yarns characterised in a specific way and not anything external to it. The unsophisticated individual who would, on analysis, certainly find that

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1 "Dvīndriyagrāhya 'grāhyam vimaty adhikaranabhāvāpannam buddhimat-kāraṇapurvakam svārambhakavayavasanniveśavisistatvāt, ghaṭādivat" TSP, p 41

2 It should be borne in mind that the atoms of earth, water and fire possess the capacity (*yogyata*) of being perceived as they possess manifested colour (*udbhūta rūpa*), but the atom of air lacks such capacity for being devoid of colour

knowledge may not vouchsafe the independent existence of such concepts but inferential cognition justifies the existence of composites and the relation of conjunction apart from the conglomeration of atoms and colour, size etc. As such there is no reason why the probans should remain unproved

But the Vaibhāsika does not think that any valid syllogism is competent to prove the independent existence of whole or conjunction. Any such inferential reasoning will ultimately turn out to be fallacious. The Buddhist admits that non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) can function as the logical probans. Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara clearly posit that non-perception is an instrument of inference.¹ Non-perception has been described as the natural correlate of absence of a perceptible fact (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*). Non-existence of wholes and the relation of conjunction is no doubt known through perception and it is recertified by inference. This has been described as the *reductio ad absurdum* (*tarka*) which may be put in the following manner: 'Certainly wholes and the relation of conjunction do not exist independently. Were they existents they could not but be perceived, as they are competent to be perceived like the chair, the table etc.' Thus, it is proved beyond doubt that the two entities which constitute the probans turn out to be entirely non-existent and as such the probans as a whole remains unproved.

The Buddhist further contends that the aforesaid syllogism suffers from the fallacy of partial unreal subject (*aśataḥ pakṣāsiddhi*). Aviddhakarna is reported to have clearly stated that the dubious objects which are perceptible by two sense-organs and which are imperceptible constitute the subject of the inference of which precedence of an intelligent agent is predicated. But the first part of the hypothetical subject, i.e., the objects perceptible by two sense-organs, is really a fiction.² There is not a single object on earth which can be demonstrated as capable of being perceived by visual as well

1 Aṭṭo 'nupalambhaḥ sphūtaḥ smāryamāṇaḥ pramāṇam, vartamāṇaḥ ca 'Tato 'nā 'śid iha ghaṭaḥ, anupalābhatvāt',—'nā 'sti anupalābhyamāṇatvāt' iti śakyaṃ jñātum. NBT, p. 121

2 Dvīndriyagrāhyo na kascid dharmī siddhaḥ TSP, p. 45

the specifically arranged yarns only and nothing more in the nature of a whole comprising of these yarns are presented to our senses. Take also the case of a series of ants. Does the Naiyāyika as the experiencing individual perceive the separate existence of a series absolutely external to the individual ants? And as a realist the Naiyāyika also should not postulate such an experience which has no object as its counterpart. An objectless experience is not veridical.

In the same way no conjunction of parts becomes the content of our perceptual experience. What we perceive is nothing but colour, shape and the like.¹ As the whole and the conjunction are thus shown to be imperceptible, it is intelligible that the two epithets, viz, *sva* and *avayava-sanniveśa*, are nothing but fictions. Had they been endowed with reality they would have surely been perceptible. If such objects which are capable of being perceived are not comprehended by our perceptual knowledge it is proved that they do not exist at all.

The Naiyāyika opines that the whole (*avayavin*) which is a perceptible entity is not merely a collection of atoms but has a separate individuality of its own; likewise, conjunction of parts also is something apart from colour, shape and the like and is apprehended by perception. If, therefore, it can be shown that such entities, as whole or conjunction, which the Naiyāyika holds to be perceptible, are not perceived, it cannot but lead one to conclude that such entities have no existence of their own. But the whole and the relation of conjunction are stated as constituting probans and as we have already stated that a probans must necessarily be real and indubious these wholes and conjunction being chimerical abstractions vitiate the entire probans also. Thus, the present syllogism involves the fallacy of unproved probans (*hetvasiddhi*).²

The Naiyāyika may, however, retort that perceptual

1. Na rūpādīvyatrekeṇā 'parah samyogo 'vayavi ca dr̥ṣyatīene 'śto buddhau pratibhāsate. TSP., p. 45

2. Tad atrā 'siddhatā hetoh prathame sādhanē yataḥ /
Sanniveśo na yogākhyah siddho nā 'vayavi tathā //
TS, sl. 56., p. 44

knowledge may not vouchsafe the independent existence of such concepts but inferential cognition justifies the existence of composites and the relation of conjunction apart from the conglomeration of atoms and colour, size etc. As such there is no reason why the probans should remain unproved.

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1. Atīto 'nupalambhah sphūtah smaryamānah pramāṇam, vartamānaś ca. 'Tato 'nā 'sīd iha ghaṭah, anupalabdhatvāt',—'nā 'sti anupalabhyamānatvāt' iti sakvaṃ jñātum NBT, p 121.

2. Dvīndriyagrāhyo na kascid dharmī siddhah TSP, p 45

as tactual sense-organ. When we perceive an object two sense-organs often function. We see a table and also feel it by touch. But the objects of these sense-perceptions, the Buddhist avers, differ in their character. What we cognise through visual organ is its colour and touchability of the substance is apprehended by tactual perception. Thus, each sense-organ comprehends a particular object and not another which is apprehended by a different organ. The Buddhist does not admit the existence of a substance apart from its qualities and as such there is no possibility of its being perceived by two sense-organs.

Moreover, that the two types of perception do not relate to an identical object may be demonstrated from another point of view. The odour is the content of olfactory perception (*ghrāṇaja-vijñāna*), while taste stands as the content of gustatory perception (*rāsana-vijñāna*). Objective realities are presented to consciousness through the medium of sense-organs. It is odour which is revealed by olfactory perception while it is taste which is revealed by gustatory perception and it is admitted on all hands that the two cognitions have not an identical content. It follows, therefore, that those that reveal different objects cannot have an identical content.¹ On the strength of this we may draw the inference that ocular and tactual perceptions do not have an identical content in view of the fact that they reveal different objects. Hence, when it becomes difficult to prove that there is no object which is cognised by two sense-organs the inference of the opponent seems to be vitiated by partial subjectless reason (*aṁśataḥ pakṣāsiddhi*).

The opponent, of course, may not yield ground on this issue. He may contend that it is on the authority of the universally admitted recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) that the two kinds of cognitions, ocular and tactual, due to two different sense-organs, are found to have the same content and it is on this ground that it cannot be maintained that the cognition which reveals different objects must necessarily have different

content. To illustrate, it is common knowledge that the jar which I cognised with my own eyes is now being felt by me with the help of the tactual sense-organ. Thus, in this instance of recognition the thing just known and that which is already known are the same but the means of perception differ. The visual as well as the tactual sense-organs operate on the same object.¹ It is, therefore, not understandable how the Vaibhāṣika can say that there is no object in this world which can be comprehended by more than one sense-organ. The Naiyāyika does not, therefore, see any reason why the inference with which he seeks to establish God suffers from the defect of partial unproved subject (*anīśataḥ pakṣāsiddhi*).

In fairness to the Vaibhāṣika, however, it may be said that the position of the Naiyāyika is not tenable for the illustration which the latter states is not a case of an object which is comprehended by two sense-organs. The illustration under consideration presents a case of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) which may be described as a memory-knowledge that presents unreal entities only. If we analyse the nature of recognition, it becomes obvious that we first of all cognise colour and touch by their respective sense-organs and at some future time the impressions left by the pre-perceived object are presented to our memory accompanied by those qualities and the present object is perceived by direct sense-object contact, and thus there appears a notion of unity.² This synthetic notion is essentially wrong which is primarily based on memory (*smṛti*) which is after all a form of invalid cognition.³ It is not possible for such a cognition to prove any individual object which exists in reality (*paramārthasat*), and as such memory-cognition is not competent to prove the reality of any entity which is cognised by more than one sense-organ. Let us explain the point in detail. In the case of recognition first of all perceptual knowledge arises which reveals colour only and subsequently, in course of time, there

1. NS, III. 1. 1. and *Vārtika* thereunder.

2. 'Cakṣuḥ-sparśanābhyām yathāśvaṁ bhinnam viṣayam upalabhyā 'nyad eva tatsahacaram samudāyaviṣayam smārtabhedajñānam utpadyate.' TSP, p. 46

3. Ekatvādhyavasāyi prakṛtibhṛāntam smārtam idam jñānam utpadyate. TSP., p. 46.

arises tactual cognition which reveals only such qualities as hardness and the like. According to the Buddhist a jar is nothing but a conglomeration of atoms (*paramānu-puñja*) which includes atoms of colour and taste, and as such these two kinds of conglomeration of atoms are comprehended by different sense-organs at different periods of time. So in this case the two cognitions which reveal colour and touchability have different contents of their own. It is only when these two cognitions have arisen in succession that the person whose impression of a jar is awakened is found to remember that he touches the same identical jar which he visually perceived on a previous occasion. The jar, in the case, is nothing but an unreal whole which is suggested by our latent impressions (*samskāra*). The Buddhist, as we know, denies the existence of a whole apart from its parts. Hence, in recognition the first part, viz, 'the jar that I saw', means the atoms of a form that I saw; while the second part, viz, 'the jar that I touch', means the tactual atoms that I feel. It is, therefore, quite evident that the cognitions referred to in the two parts have for their contents different identities which are presented as a synthetic unity through recognition. The unity is due to the latent impression of a jar which we commonly have. It is this impression of the unity of a jar which presents a fictitious whole, i.e., jar, as revealed by recognition, viz, the jar that I feel now is the jar that I saw before.

Invalidity of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) may be substantiated from another point of view. Validity of knowledge consists in cognising an object not cognised before. Some new information must enter into the content of knowledge if it is to be regarded as a valid one. Recognition presents an object already cognised in the past and no new element is introduced by it and as such recognition can on no account be regarded as a valid form of cognition.¹ It is,

1 It is interesting to note that the Prābhākara also holds the same view. Cf. *Pūrva-pratipattivyapeksanā* PP, p. 42.

The Naiyāyika, however, thinks that validity does not consist in cognising the non-cognised. The test of validity of knowledge, according to the Naiyāyika, is the correspondence between cognition and the object cognised. Thus, he maintains that recognition, though lacking in novelty, is a form of valid knowledge. N.M., p. 21.

therefore, that the Buddhist argues that the contention of the Naiyāyika, viz, recognition will prove the existence of an object cognisable by two sense-organs (*dvīndriyagrāhya*), is hardly tenable. Thus, the subject of the inference advanced by the Naiyāyika turns out to be a fiction and this ultimately involves the fallacy of unproven subject (*āśrayāsiddhi*). As no synthetic judgment (*parāmarśa*) is possible in a fiction the inference is altogether invalidated.

Now the Buddhist examines the inference of the opponent from a different angle of vision. The Naiyāyika seeks to prove the existence of an intelligent agent from the particular arrangement of constituent parts of a contingent whole. It is a fact that if in a dense forest a dilapidated temple or an unused well is discovered, we are led to infer that they were the works of some intelligent author in some remote past. Here the particular arrangement of parts (*avayava-sanniveśa-viśeṣa*) which we observe in the temple or in the well proves an intelligent author. But the Buddhist here turns round to say that the illustration cited above does not justify the position of the Naiyāyika for, unlike the well or the temple, the hill, the sea and such other objects do not appear to possess particular conjunction of parts which will lead us to infer the existence of an intelligent designer. The arrangement of parts which we observe in the well, the jar etc. essentially differs from the arrangement of parts which we observe in a mountain. Hence, what holds good in the case of a dilapidated building and in an unused well does not hold good in the case of such substances as the mountain, the sea and the like. And it is as the intelligent agent of the latter (the mountain, the sea etc.) that God is sought to be proved by the Naiyāyika. So the probans, i.e., the particular arrangement of parts, is seen to be non-existent in the subject affords a case of the fallacy of unproven probans (*svarūpāsiddhi*). Of course, a mountain is a whole (*avayavin*) containing a number of parts, the parts conjoining one another. But a combination of parts does not always lead to the supposition of an intelligent agent. For, there is no universal concomitance between combination of parts as such (*sāmānya-sanniveśa*) and

intelligent authorship.¹ The systematic adaptation in the sense implied cannot be detected by experience.² Thus, it becomes dubious whether the probans is conclusive or not, involving the fallacy of what may be called *sandigdhanai-kāntikatā*.³

Further, the Naiyāyika seeks to prove the existence of God from the teleological character of the construction of the grand phenomena of nature such as the mountain, the sea etc. The effect-character (*kāryatva*) of the earth leads to the conclusion that it is caused by some intelligent agent or agents. Thus, from the peculiar character of the earth we may have a general idea of some agent. But how should we go so far as to affirm that such intelligent authorship should be ascribed to some person other than these individual selves who must possess supreme intelligence and forethought.

In reply to this charge the Naiyāyika has pointed out that the opponent (the Buddhist) has failed to appraise the definite character of the subject-matter of the inference. When a person infers fire on a hill at sight of smoke, the subject-matter of the inference is neither the predicate alone nor the subject alone but the two as coalesced into an intregated whole. Here neither the fire nor the hill in isolation constitutes the subject-matter of the inference but 'the fire as related to the hill' (*parvatīyavahnī*). A special type of probandum follows from a probans of general character. The universal concomitance, which is the very ground and condition of all inference, subsists between fire and smoke as such. Still on the basis of this concomitance of a general character we are led to conclude the existence of fire-in-the hill as characterised by fire-universal (*vahmutva*) and this is

1 Na ca tathābhūta sanniveśa viśeṣa taruguriprabhṛtṣu prasiddhah Kevalam sanniveśa ita pralapamātram prasiddham TSP, p 47

2 Hermann Lotze, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, p 19

3 The Buddhist position finds a striking similarity in the criticism of the teleological proof of the existence of God by Western thinkers. Thus H. Lotze says that a proof of God must start not from the fact of purposive action in things which is doubtful "We cannot therefore ever thoroughly confute one who declares that the whole course of the world is a blind and inevitable result of a given necessary combination of circumstances and things, and who therefore denies that we have any right to believe in the presence therein of design, unless we have direct evidence of it through our senses"

H. Lotze, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, p 20

due to the elimination of possibility of existence of other types of fire, i.e., fire in the domestic oven (*mahānasa*) or fire in the court-yard etc. Existence of any other type of fire in the hill besides the fire-in-the-hill is contradicted (*bādhita*) by perception. And as such a particular type of fire is inferred by means of a general type of concomitance.

To the point in question, the authorship of the mountain, the sea and similar objects can on no account be attributed to the individual selves possessing limited intelligence, and hence such a supposition is directly banned by a bird's eye view of the character of the effect. A designer of these phenomena should possess extraordinary power and intelligence.

But the Buddhist demurs to accept the position set forth above. The whole argument of the Naiyāyika, the Buddhist observes, is vitiated by a misreading of facts. The analogy of fire is pointless. The instance 'fire-in-the-hill' (*parvatīya vahni*), is, in the opinion of the Buddhist, a much too familiar one. Thus, in case of possibility of any contradiction due to other types of fire, inference of hilly fire by means of a general type of concomitance may turn out to be a valid form of inference. But an author other than the individual selves is not known to us and it is for this reason that even if the agency of an intelligent being, viz, individual self, with regard to such object as the hill, the sea and the like stands contradicted, it will never enable us to infer the agency of an intelligent being other than the individual selves, we mean the Supreme Soul, as posited by the Naiyāyika. Further, eternality of intelligence is yet to be proved and as such the Naiyāyika cannot prove that the supreme intelligent principle will possess unimpeded knowledge. Thus, in his attempt to prove the existence of God through inference the Naiyāyika betrays his ignorance of the general nature of inference.

Śāntaraksita, in his *Tattvasaṃgraha*, mentions a view which Kamalaśīla identifies as that of Uddyotakara, the author of the *Nyāyavārttika*, by the strength of which the Naiyāyika has sought prove the existence of God. The

Naiyāyika advances the argument that whatever is continuant and produces an effect requires some intelligent supervision.¹ The parts of an earthen jar which make it a composite whole or, yarns in the case of a piece of cloth, exist in time and space and they are collated for the production of the jar or the piece of cloth. Now, these material causes can turn into a systematic whole only when previous integration and combination of parts have been ably performed by some intelligent maker. It is, therefore, that on the strength of this evidence we can advance the inference that atoms (*paramānu*) or individual deserts (*adrsta*), which are by themselves continuants and productive of respective effects, require some intelligent guidance for the purpose of producing effects. The Buddhist, however, does not accept the validity of the aforesaid inference of the Naiyāyika because it has been pointed out by him that the probans in the inference is unproved. In an inference the validity of the probans must be admitted on all hands. But in the inference set forth above, the probans, i.e., 'those continuants competent to produce an object', is by itself a fiction. To the Buddhist, all real entities are by nature fluxional. Reality consists in causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*), and as no such causal efficiency is predicable of the continuants they cannot be said to exist at all. But these continuants which are nothing but fictions from the standpoint of the Buddhist have been employed by the Naiyāyika as the probans of the inference. This is certainly a case of violation of the exact method of reasoning.

The Naiyāyika, however, may not yield ground on the issue in view of the fact that though the Sautrāntika denies existence to continuants, the Vaiṣṇavika admits that there are three eternal uncaused verities, viz, *ākāśa* (space) *pratisamkhyānirodha* (dissociation of the principle of consciousness from passions and defilements which is effected by transcendental knowledge) and *apratisamkhyānirodha* (non-emergence

1. Uddyotakaras tu pramāṇayati—"Bhuvanahetau aṅg pradhānaparamāṇv adṛṣṭāṅ svakāryotpattāv atisayabuddhūnantam adhūṣhātāram apekṣante sthūtvā pravṛtīś tantuturyādyaḥ" TSP, p 42

of such dissociation).¹ Hence, the Vaibhāsika at least cannot charge the Naiyāyika on the ground of unproved probans.

But, if we pursue the point in detail we may notice that the charge of the Naiyāyika is not properly warranted. It is true that the Vaibhāsika admits *ākāśa* etc. as eternal entities but it should be borne in mind that these verities are not admitted to be endowed with the power of producing effects. But, in the probans it has been stated that continuants must possess casual efficiency. On the other hand, the atoms which are really capable of exercising causal efficiency are, according to the Buddhist, fluxional. To be precise, in the Buddhist's scheme of reality there is no such entity which is both continuant and capable of exerting causal efficiency and as such the probans in the inference of the Naiyāyika turns out to be a fiction thwarting the inference altogether.

The Buddhist does not rest here and goes on to point out that the Nyāya position is self-contradictory. God, according to the Naiyāyika, is no doubt an eternal existent, and is also capable of exercising causal efficiency but the Naiyāyika does not admit that his God requires any intelligent supervision at the time of creation. Thus, in the case of God, the presence of the probans co-exists with the absence of the probandum which vitiates the inference altogether. As a contrary instance is found, i.e., a case of probans being actually observed without the probandum, and as non-observance of contrary is regarded as a support to the determination of universal concomitance, the Naiyāyika is not justified in considering the relation between continuant capable of producing effects and superintendence of an intelligent agent to be an unconditional invariable concomitance.

The Naiyāyika, however, seeks to remedy the defect as pointed out by the Buddhist. In order that his argument does not suffer from the defect of *anākāntikatva*, he introduces a new adjunct to the probans. He says, therefore, that the

¹ Kamalaśīla, however, outcasts these Vaibhāsikas from the followers of the Buddha. Cf. Ye ca Vaibhāsikā ākāsadvastu sattvena kalpayanti, te . . . na Śākyaputriyah TSP, p. 140

probans will not only be a 'continuant capable of exercising causal efficiency', but an 'insentient continuant capable of producing the effect.' As God is a sentient continuant there is no apprehension whatsoever that it would require intelligent supervision. In this way the Naiyāyika answers the charge advanced by the Buddhist. But the latter is hardly convinced by the logic of the former. He points out that the probans, as suggested by the Naiyāyika, suffers from the defect of useless adjunct so far as the Buddhist position is concerned, because the Buddhist does not admit any sentient principle as God, and hence, from his point of view, the futility of the adjunct is quite obvious. Thus, it involves the fallacy of futile reason (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*).

But the Naiyāyika at this stage argues that the Buddhist may not regard a conscious principle like God, but surely he admits fluxional intelligence and self-illuminated entities. It is needless to say that such fluxional entities do not require the aid of any other intelligent principle for the purpose of producing effects. It is, therefore, necessary that the Buddhist should introduce 'unconsciousness' as an adjunct to the probans. And unless he does it, there is just the possibility of discrepancy in the probans. But the Buddhist is not in the least intimidated by this argument of the opponent. He answers the charge by saying that fluxional intelligence is not a continuant, and as such the unqualified probans, viz, 'continuant capable of producing effect', does not exist in the contrary instance, viz, fluxional intelligence, as referred to by the Naiyāyika, and there is no reason why the ground of the inference (*hetu*) should be vested with a superfluous attribute, viz, 'unconsciousness'. Hence, 'unconsciousness' being a needless limitation, the reason involves the fallacy of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*.

The Naiyāyika does not yield ground to the Buddhist position and argues in the following manner to prove the existence of God: 'Whatever products cause pleasure and pain are supervised by some intelligent author.'¹ It is a

1. Mahābhūtādikam vyaktam buddhimaddhetv adhiṣṭitam /
Yāti sarvasya lokasya sukhaduḥkṣaṇamittatām //

TS., fl 52, p 43, Cf NV., p 947.

matter of common knowledge that such objects as an axe and the like, happen to cause pleasure and pain only when some particular intelligent being uses them. It is some intelligent being who uses an axe and the like for the purpose of felling a tree, whereby some people are benefitted or suffer. It is on the analogy of the illustration stated above that we are led to infer in the following manner. Such objects like the mountain, the sea etc. are certainly under the supervision of some intelligent being because they are products which cause pleasure and pain to others. It should be noticed that, in the inference stated above, the probans is a product as determined by the source of pleasure and pain. The subject and the probandum of the inference are intelligible and also we know that the grand phenomena of nature, the mountain, the sea etc. are not produced by any agent of limited intelligence and power. So if it is confirmed that such objects are created by an intelligent person, that sentient being cannot but be an omniscient and omnipotent God.

It is interesting to note that the Buddhists have their say in this matter. According to them the aforesaid inference cannot prove the existence of God on the ground that the probans in the inference is not a real reason but a pseudo-reason. The attribute in the reason, e.g., the 'cause of pleasure and pain', is superfluous. For, as the Naiyāyika upholds the view that causal nexus exists between individual desert and effect as such and as he also believes in the utility of every product the same must contribute to the pleasure and pain of the agent. So it becomes obvious that the attribute in the reason as stated by the Naiyāyika becomes futile. It is quite understandable that universal concomitance of authorship subsists in the effect-character and, so, there is no reason whatsoever why the probans should be qualified with such an attribute, viz, contributory to pleasure and pain. Thus, it turns out to be a case of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*.

If, however, in order to avoid this discrepancy, the Naiyāyika dispenses with the superfluous attribute altogether the inference stands as follows: "The hill, the sea, the tree

and other such phenomena of nature are supervised by intelligent agent, since they are effects". Thus, the Naiyāyika draws a universal concomitance between intelligent supervision and effect-character (*kāryatva*). But, the Buddhist points out that no such universal relation can be established as the reason co exists with the absence of the probandum. The Naiyāyika admits the contingent character of intelligence but it does not require any other intelligent supervision. And, as non-observance of contrary is regarded as an exact method of arriving at a conclusion, nothing can be proved with the help of such pseudo inference. The Naiyāyika may, however, argue that it is not true that knowledge does not require any other intelligent supervision. Unlike the Vedāntin the Naiyāyika does not believe in the self-luminosity of knowledge. He, on the other hand, posits that knowledge is known by a secondary act of retrospection (*anuvyavasaya*). Thus, knowledge, also, depends on another knowledge for the purpose of illuminating an object, and so the contention of the opponent does not hold water. But like the Prābhākara, the Buddhist may further enquire, how the secondary knowledge (*anuvyavasaya*) is itself certified. It will require another retrospection and thus will land us into an infinite regress (*anavastha*). So the Naiyāyika cannot hold another retrospective knowing of the secondary retrospection and, as such, the secondary knowing serves as a contrary instance where the probandum and the probans appear to be incongruous. If, however, the Naiyāyika thinks that such infinite regress does not vitiate the inference as it does not lead us to the fallacy of logical see saw (*anyonya-śraja*) and the inference may turn out to be a valid one, still the inference of the Naiyāyika is not free from other defects also. In fact, the relation between the probans and the probandum has become conditional (*sopadhika*), the extraneous condition being 'precedence of non-eternal living force (*anityaprayatnapūrvakatva*)'. A condition (*upadhi*) is defined as pervasive of the probandum and non-pervasive of the ground of inference. Thus, the probandum of the aforesaid inference is intelligent supervision and whatever

requires intelligent guidance must needs be preceded by non-eternal living force. On the other hand, the effect-character (*janyatva*), which is detected in the sea, the mountain and the like, is not pervaded by 'intelligent supervision' which is dubious in such grand phenomena of nature. Thus, the statement—'whatever is a product requires some intelligent author for its coming into being'—is not a true universal proposition as the invariable relation between intelligent authorship and effect-character depends on the presence of an extraneous condition as referred to above, and, as such, the inference is vitiated altogether.

Like all philosophers of the antitheistic schools, the Buddhist observes that, even if it is held that insentient atoms, *adr̥ṣṭa* etc. are supervised by some intelligent agent there is no escape from further antinomies. It is admitted on all hands that whatever is directly supervised constitutes the body of the supervisor. If the Naiyāyika admits that atoms are directly supervised by the cognitive activity of the hypothetical God, then the Naiyāyika will have also to admit that those atoms, *adr̥ṣṭa* etc. are nothing but physical organisms of God. If the Naiyāyika is prepared to concede to this, as Udayana has done,¹ the difficulty will not be obviated. For it is an admitted fact that a physical organism must be the substratum of sense-organs. Even a tree constitutes the body of its own self, for the simple reason that we admit that it possesses tactual organ. So we may advance the *reductio ad absurdum* in the following manner: If it is admitted that atoms, *adr̥ṣṭa* etc. are directly supervised by some intelligent agent then we are constrained to admit that they should be the substratum of sense-organs, a position which can never be acceptable to the Naiyāyika. The net result of this discourse is that, atoms do not require intelligent supervision as they are not the substrata of sense-organs.

In reply to this charge the Naiyāyika may observe that no such universal relation can be established, for, whatever

is not the substratum of sense-organs does not require an intelligent supervision. We, the Naiyāyikas, do believe that a body must be the substratum of sense-organs. But it is a fact that volition admits of two types, eternal and transitory. Association of physical organism is essential in the case of transitory volitional activity. But God's knowledge, desire, volition etc., being eternal verities, do not stand in need of association with a physical organism. So it will not be wise to contend that atoms which lack sense organs are not supervised by an intelligent being. Had God's volition been transitory atoms would constitute his body and then only the *reductio ad absurdum*, advanced by the Buddhist, viz, if atoms are the bodies of the Supreme Being they must contain sense-organs, would hold good. Thus, as atoms do not constitute the body of the supervisor the existence of God as the superintending agent stands unassailed, and the contrary possibility by *reductio ad absurdum* is ruled out.

But the Buddhist does not stop here. He would further point out that the division of volitional activity into eternal and transitory is not universally acceptable. Indeed the Buddhist has not admitted eternal volitional activity. So long as God is not established it is never possible to prove eternal volitional activity. Eternality of volitional activity is proved only when the existence of a Supreme Being possessing such type of volition is established. Thus, we may draw universal relation between a body character (*sarratva*) and the character of being supervised as such (*sāmānyatah prayatnavacchinna*). For the sake of logical parsimony it will be wise to draw such universal concomitance. Moreover, the attribute 'transitoriness' in the volitional activity has become superfluous, being a debatable one, which will ultimately land us in the fallacy of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*.

Prasastamati seeks to prove the existence of God with the help of an analogy drawn from common experience. It is a fact that the young child learns the use of verbal expressions from its parents or elders. Likewise, in the beginning of creation, the primitive man learns the use of verbal expressions from an enlightened being and this

being is held to be God and none else.¹ It is supposed that this God is omniscient and that his knowledge continues even after the dissolution of the world. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, therefore, the individual soul loses consciousness at the time of dissolution and this consciousness is implanted in it by God in the beginning of creation.²

But the Buddhist does not subscribe to the view that individual consciousness ceases to continue at the time of cosmic rest. On the other hand, it has been asserted by him that at the period of dissolution different units of consciousness are born in luminous regions, with celestial bodies endowed with superior type of knowledge and those who have not enjoyed the residue of their deeds are re-born in other material regions.³ It transpires, therefore, that in either case there is no loss of individual consciousness during the period of cosmic rest. So, from the Buddhist point of view, there is absolutely no justification for recognising God as the introducer of conventionalities in the beginning of creation.

Śāntaraksita contradicts the theory of one eternal omniscient creator and says that the arguments of the Naiyāyika can only prove the existence of many and finite intelligences as creators. He attributes authorship of the universe to the chain of consciousness (*viññāna*) in association with the individual deserts, which from the *raison d'être* of the diversity in the phenomenal world.⁴

Śāntaraksita has again attacked the Nyāya position in the following manner. The gravamen of his attack lies

1 No such view is mentioned by Prasastapāda. That is why it seems justified, as some scholars have suggested, that Prasastamati is different from Prasastapada, the eminent Vaiśeṣika philosopher (Vide Dr B Bhattacharya's edition of TS, Foreword, p LXXXIX)

2. PPBh, p. 23

3 Nā'smanmatena pralayakāle praluptajñānasmytayo vitanukaranah purusah santuṣṭhante, kintv ābhasvaradiṣu spaṣṭajñānātusayayogiṣu devanikāyeṣūtpadyante, ye tu pratinyatanirayādivipakāsamvaritananyakarmanas te lokadhātva antaresūtpadyante TSP, p 53

4 Buddhumatpūrvakatvañ ca sāmānyena yaḍiṣyate /
Tatra nai'va vivādo no vaitvarupyam hi karmajam //
TS, śl 80, p 51

Also, Sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇasubhāsuhakarmajanitam Atah subhāsuhakarmakāranah puruṣā buddhumanto'sya kāranatam āpadyante TSP, p 51

in the charge that such eternal verities as God etc. are idle fictions and as such causal efficiency cannot be attributed to these entities. To the Buddhist, causal efficiency is incompatible with hypothetical permanence. It has been trotted out that why it is that the universe, in its entirety, is not produced all at once, as God, the eternal being, is its creator. A seed in the granary does not produce the sprout for the simple reason that it lacks causal efficiency. If God is sufficient enough to create this universe, he cannot fail to execute efficiency which he is conceded to possess. There is no reason why there should be any delay. If the causal efficiency lies intact in God, it becomes inexplicable why all effects will not come into existence at one and the same point of time¹. What is the reason behind this successive effectuation?

The Naiyāyika will, however, seek shelter under his precious theory of supplementation (*sahakarivada*) and reply that God cannot execute causal efficiency independent of individual deserts. In fact, the necessity of creation lies in the object of providing rewards and retributions of actions done by individual selves. Thus the individual self holds the central position in so far as creation is concerned. God is merely to act as an ordainer of *karman* and succession in effectuation should be explained to be due to these individual deserts.

But the Buddhist would here observe that if it be conceded for argument's sake that successive effectuation is due to contingency of supplementation by *adrsta* etc., the question will inevitably arise whether or not the said supplementation brings into existence any additional potency in the main cause. If the reply is in the affirmative, it will deprive the so called principal cause of its character as such, inasmuch as the causal nexus in that case would subsist between the additional potency brought about by the supplementation itself and the effect. On the other hand, if it is admitted that as God is an eternal self sufficient being and does not

¹ *Av kalakaraṇaṁ ca sarvaṁ śivarahetukam jagad ity yugapad bhavet* TSP
p 54

stand in need of any supplementation, then it will not be understandable why the individual deserts are regarded as auxiliary factors in the beginning of creation.¹ To be precise, if any supplementation is admitted God becomes partially inefficient and his self-sufficient character stands challenged.

The Naiyāyika replies to the objection in the following manner. God is self-sufficient eternal cause, still his very existence is not alone sufficient enough to produce objects. God creates according to his will. He takes to creation only when he intends to create. Had the effectuation of this phenomenal world been dependent on his mere existence the objection of the opponent as to the occasional production would have been legitimate. But as creation is contingent on his desire and will, there should not be any question as to why the universe will not be created at once.²

In reply to this position of the Naiyāyika the Buddhist observes that emergence of the effect does not depend on the sweet will of the causal agent. In fact, effectuation is contingent on the concomitance and non-concomitance of the causal efficiency.³ It is found from our every-day experience that even if we desire to produce something we cannot produce it unless we possess that productive efficiency. On the other hand, a seed germinates sprout when taken out of the granary and sown on the soil. It develops a distinct causal efficiency which is brought about by soil, water, air and the rest. Thus, the basic cause, the seed, which lacks volition, desire etc. fructuates when it is supplemented by subsidiaries. So the sprout is produced only when the seed develops the sprout-producing efficiency. The seed being insentient, desire to create has no part to play in the scheme of creation. What is important is that whether the causal entity has that capacity or not. Hence, when effectuation is

1 Yadi hi tasya sahakāribhūh kascid upakarah kartavyo bhavet, tada tasya sahakārinī vyapekṣa, yāvatā nityatvāt paraur anādheyatsayasya na kiñcit tasya sahakāribhyah prāptavyam asti 'ti kum ita tams tathābhūtanānupakarīnah sahakāriṇo 'pekṣeta TSP, pp 54-5

2 Yadi 'svarasattamātreṇa 'vā 'buddhipūrvam bhāvanām utpadakaḥ syāt tadā syad etac codyam Yādā tu buddhipūrvakam karoti tada na doṣaḥ, tasya svecchayā kāryeṣu pravṛttech TSP, p 55

Cf NV, p 950

3 Kārapagatasamarthyabhāvabhāvanuvidhāvinō bhavāh TSP, p 55

occasional we shall have no other alternative but to admit that the supposed author of the universe is dependent on the subsidiaries which constitute the cause in the real sense of the term. If God possesses unhampered causal efficiency for all times why is it that effectuation will be contingent on that volition which hinders simultaneous production. Moreover, God's knowledge and will are admitted to be eternal. Then if effectuation is contingent on this eternal will, why is it that all these objects will not be produced simultaneously. If his knowledge is said to be transitory then God will not be the controller of future actions due to the absence of his will. The net result of this elaborate exposition is that permanence of any type of causal entity is, according to the Buddhist, an idle fiction. It is incompatible with practical efficiency which is the *conditio sine qua non* of causal character.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE JAINA POSITION ANALYSED

The Jaina, like all other Indian schools of thought, admits the efficacy of individual deserts in determining individual fate. But he does not find any urge to postulate God as the dispenser of reward and retribution—it is *karman* alone which fructuates and determines the course of an individual through different births. According to him Jina is the only object of worship who is free from all attachment and envy, has conquered all passions and removes all ignorance.¹ He is omniscient but not the creator of the universe. Herein the Jaina philosophy marks a striking parallelism to Yoga theism. Vyāsa and other thinkers of the theistic Sāmkhya school advocate that God is omniscient and eternal witness to all right actions and cognisant of the true nature of the universe.

It will be our endeavour now to enter into an elaborate examination of the Nyāya position from the Jaina standpoint. The Naiyāyika maintains that the world is an effect, and thereupon bases his famous causal argument that since the world is an event it must have a cause and that the cause is no other than God. Here the Jaina enquires about the exact connotation of 'effect', and he believes that the Naiyāyika will not be in a position to state in precise terms what he means by an 'effect' when he asserts it as the probans. The Jaina philosopher raises a dilemma which he thinks will prove a hurdle too difficult for the Naiyāyika to cross: Does an effect mean (i) one constituted of parts or (ii) co-inherence in the material cause or (iii) what is held in common parlance to be caused or (iv) what has undergone a change?²

1 Juncendro devatā tatra rāgadvesavivarjitah /
Hatamohamahāmallah kevalajñānadarsanah // SDS, śl 45

2. Yat tāvat kṛtyāder buddhimaddhetukatvasiddhaye kāryatva-sādhanaṃ uktam,
tat kum sāvayavatvam, prāg asatah svakāranasattasamavāyah, kṛtam itī pratyaya-
visayatvam, vikāntvam vā syāt. TRD, p 117.

The first alternative, viz, 'effect is one which is constituted of parts', is not entertainable on the ground that the position involves the horns of a dilemma: Does 'constituted of parts' mean 'existent in parts', or 'that which has been brought about by a systematic combination of parts.'¹ The first alternative will turn out to be a case of overlapping, for in that case the definition will extend to class-concepts as well.² It is admitted by the Naiyāyika that a class-concept inheres in the individuals but as he believes that it is an eternal verity it is impossible to regard it as an effect which is by nature a non-eternal entity.

The second alternative also shares the same fate. The Naiyāyika may declare that 'constituted of parts' means 'that which has been brought about by the collocation of parts (*ārabdha*)'. But the nature of this 'bringing about' or production is yet to be defined. It has been used here as the probans, but remains undefined. The probans must necessarily be an admitted fact by both the contesting parties. Otherwise, the reasoning becomes impossible. When a probans is used in proving a conclusion which is disputed by the opponent, the probans fails to prove the conclusion. Thus, the second alternative involves the fallacy of being equipollent with the probandum (*sādhyaśama*).

The Jaina further asserts that it is difficult, if not impossible, to define *sāvayavatva* as constituting of parts. Since space, which is regarded as having parts in common parlance, would turn out to be an event. But we all know that the Naiyāyika cannot admit space as being caused. The Naiyāyika may, however, plead in defence that in fact space is an ubiquitous and eternal entity, but when it is found to have been described as consisting of parts the implication is that there is some associate adjunct (*upādhi*) which is responsible for such description. Thus, to the Naiyāyika, the ear-drum serves as the associate adjunct (*upādhi*) of space. Hence, the Naiyāyika steers clear of the charge of incongruity as levelled by the Jaina.

1. Yadi sāvayavatvam, tade 'dam api kim avayaveṣu vartamānatvam, avayavair ārabhyamānatvam . . . vā. TRD, p. 117. Cf also, PKM, p. 270.

2. Prathamapakṣe sāmānyādinā 'naikāntaḥ. PKM, p. 270

The Jaina philosopher observes that such a plea of the Naiyāyika does not hold water, since if the space limited by the ear-drum is an appearance and has got no existence on the real plane, then it will lack practical efficiency. What is not real cannot exert causal efficiency. If the space limited by the ear-drum or the jar etc. does not form really a part of ubiquitous space, it becomes a fiction pure and simple, and as fictions lack causal efficiency, auditory perception will not occur. But as the case turns out to be otherwise, we are constrained to admit the reality of the space as limited by the ear-drum, and thus finally it serves as a contrary instance vitiating the inference of the Naiyāyika altogether.

To turn to the other alternative, viz, creation (*racanā*) is nothing but a systematic adjustment of parts (*avaśava-samyoga*). The Naiyāyika presents this as the reason of his inference. The relation which determines its reason-character (*hetutāvaccchedaka-sambandha*) is either *svasamavāyī-kāraṇakatva* or *śasamavāyī-samavētatva*. If mere inherence is posited here as the determinant relation of the reason, the latter would be non-existent in the subject-of-the-inference involving the fallacy of unproved probans (*svarūpā-siddhi*). The reason being that combination of parts inheres in the parts themselves and not in the whole, which is here regarded, by the Naiyāyika, as the subject of the inference. But this combination of parts is the non-inherent cause of the whole. Thus, the relation stands as *svasamavāyī-kāraṇakatva*. Or, it may be that the whole inheres in the parts, and the combination also inheres in the parts; so the relation between the combination and the whole is *śasamavāyī-samavētatva* or inherence in the same locus (*ekārthasamavāyitva*). Hence, the Naiyāyika opines that such relation, which determines the reason, admits of two types.

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which includes in it non-inherent cause, turns out to be a fiction resulting in the fallacy of unproved probans (*asiddhi*). The Anekāntavādin, however, finds no inconsistency in the other type of relation, viz, *svasamavāyi-samavētatva*. But, even admitting the validity of this relation as a determinant, the Jaina retorts that even if such relation is posited as the determinant of the reason it will definitely incur self-contradiction from the point of view of the Naiyāyika himself. The reason, as determined by such relation, will obviously become incongruous with the probandum. The Naiyāyika would never admit 'substance-hood' (*dravyatva*) etc. as being contingent on some intelligent author since they are eternal verities. Thus, in this instance we have the absence of the probandum. But the reason as determined by the aforesaid relation subsists in it. To be more precise, the combination of parts inheres in the parts themselves. Hence, the parts become the loci of the relation of inherence (*samavāyin*) and substance-hood inheres in the whole and as well as in these parts. So the combination of parts subsists in such eternal universals as substance-hood etc. through the relation of subsistence in the same locus (*ekārthavṛtti*). But no sane man would endeavour to detect intelligent authorship in relation to these eternal verities. Hence, the absence of the probandum co-exists with the probans involving incongruity (*vyabhicāra*), which ultimately vitiates the inference. So such a relation would never serve as the determinant to the reason which must always be concomitant with the probandum. Thus, ultimately combination of parts cannot serve as the reason of the inference of the Naiyāyika.

The second alternative also lacks logical precision. In it, the definition of an effect stands as follows: 'An effect is the inherent relation existing between the whole and the parts prior to its coming into existence'. But the Jaina points out the suicidal element inherent in the definition. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher asserts the eternality of this inherent relation (*samavāya*). If, however, it is now regarded as an effect, it violates the fundamental position of the Naiyāyika and thus puts an end to legitimate

discourse.¹ So the definition involves contradiction of the thesis (*pratijñā-virodha*).² If it is contended that co-inherence, though eternal, is an effect, then it could also be postulated that though the world is an effect, it might also be eternal. Then the Naiyāyika would be disappointed in his endeavour to prove the intelligent cause of the universe.

Moreover, the Jaina contends: If the above mentioned definition of an effect be accepted it will involve the logical fallacy of partial non-existence of the probans (*bhāgāsiddhi*). Universal concomitance between the probans and the probandum is determined by spatial and temporal co-presence. In that case only the probans leads to the veridical cognition of the probandum. Now the main principle in determining this relation is that the probans must exist everywhere in the subject of the inference. If the probans, viz, the smoke, exists in one part of the subject, i.e., the hill, then it involves the fallacy of *bhāgāsiddhi*. The probans is really the determinant concomitant (*vyāpaka*) of the delimiting adjunct of the essential nature of the subject (*pakṣatāvaccchedakadharmā*). Where the essential nature of the subject subsists, there the probans exists. The *raison d'être* of the fallacy lies in the fact that the probans exists in some parts of the subject of the inference and does not exist in other parts of the subject which was not known to be possessed of the probandum antecedent to the employment of reasoning.

The definition under consideration is fallacious since the destruction of the jar (*ghaṭa-dhvaṁsa*) is, no doubt, an effect but its existence (*sattā*) is not coherent with its cause. The reason being that post-negation (*dhvaṁsābhāva*) is not related to any object through inherence. Negation exists in the locus by its own intrinsic relation. Co-inherence subsists between to existents only. Thus, the reason in the case under consideration, viz, *svakāranasattāsamavāya*, does not

1. Nā 'pi prāg asatah svakāranasattāsamavāyah kāryatvam, tasya nityatvena tal lakṣanā 'yogāt TRD, pp 117-8

2. It is interesting to note that later philosophers of the theistic schools realised this inherent inconsistency and hence defined 'production' as the relation of the product with the first moment (*ādyakṣana sambandha utpattiḥ*)

exist in the post-negation which may stand as the subject of the inference.

The third alternative is equally unworthy of acceptance. An effect cannot be defined as that which we understand in common parlance as something created. For, we all know that space is not created. Nevertheless, if the aforesaid definition be accepted, we will be constrained to admit that space is created when we dig out a portion of earth or take out water from a place.¹

The fourth alternative also, which defines an effect as 'what is liable to change', does not stand in a better position. An object may be described to have changed only when it has undergone a state different from what it had at any previous point of time. The Supreme Lord, according to the Naiyāyika, does not create at all times. Sometimes he engages himself in the work of creation and sometimes he does not. Now it must be admitted for the sake of argument that at the time of creation his nature had definitely undergone a change from the time when he did not create. Under the circumstances, God of the Naiyāyika would become an effect, and, as such, would require another cause in order to come into existence and so on *ad infinitum*.²

In order to avoid the charge of infinite regress the Naiyāyika may refuse to declare the changeability in the nature of the Supreme Lord. But in doing so he will have to forego the creative activity (*kāryakāritva*) of God.³ God, the Naiyāyika says, creates, but he creates occasionally. Occasional creation is irreconcilable with eternal creative activity. The temporal limitation remains inexplicable. If God were not liable to change and possessed of creative urge at the same time, creation would have always happened. But, in fact, no object is produced at all times. This is an accepted truth that occasional effect must have an occasional cause. An eternal cause of an occasional effect is simply unthinkable.

1 Khananotsecanā 'dinā kṛtām ākaśam ity akārye 'py ākāśe vartamānatvenā 'naikāntukatvāt TRD, p 118

2 Sato vastuno 'nyathābhāvo hi vikāritvam Tac ce 'svaśasyā 'py asti 'tyasyā 'parabuddhimaddhetukatvaprasaṅgād anavasthā syāt TRD, p 118

3 Avikāritve cā 'sya kāryakāritvam atidurghaṭam TRD, p 118

We have seen above how the Jaina examines all the probable definitions of an effect which may be advanced by the Naiyāyika and proves that they are vitiated by one defect or the other. As the reason becomes undefined, the syllogism of the Naiyāyika involves the fallacy of unreality of probans (*hetvasiddhi*). If, however, it is assumed for the sake of argument that the world is an effect, even then there will be no end to difficulties; for, the Jaina will enquire whether his opponent means effect in general or a particular effect. If the Naiyāyika admits effect in general, then it cannot lead to the supposition of an intelligent cause. Necessary concomitance between an effect and an intelligent cause is not endorsed by both the parties. An effect presupposes the existence of an antecedent cause, whether that cause is intelligent or un-intelligent is not proved by the same concomitance.¹ Hence, the supposition that there must be an intelligent cause behind an effect is not warranted by our experience.

The Naiyāyika may, in order to avoid the difficulty, resort to the second alternative, viz, a special type of effect, i.e., a particular arrangement of parts leads to the knowledge of an intelligent being. But the Jaina makes out that the perception of the jar points to an intelligent jar-maker, whereas when we perceive the universe as a whole no idea of any creator flashes in our minds. Inference of intelligence from order and adjustment is available in the case of the jar and not of the world. The Jaina, thus, shows a striking similarity with Comte in this regard when he says that there is no final or efficient cause—no purpose behind this creation of the world. But they are sharply contrasted in other respects. The chief ground on which Comte rejects the existence of God is similar to that of the Cārvāka. Both of them hold that the senses are the sources of all true thinking and we can know nothing except the phenomena which they apprehend.² But the Jaina admits the validity of inference as a source of knowledge.

1 Yady ādyaḥ, tarhi na tato buddhimatkarṭṛvśeṣasiddhiḥ, tena samam vyāptya asiddheḥ TRD, p 118

2 Comte, *Anthéuristic Themes* pp 186-7

Now the Naiyāyika may contend that the Jaina also should hold that a particular type of effect leads to intelligent authorship for the simple reason that there is some similarity which runs through all kinds of effects. Thus, similarity serves here as the leading condition. But the Jaina argues that if it is admitted that what is true of one individual is also true of all individuals belonging to the same class, then the inference of fire from water-vapour would be legitimate because smoke and water-vapour are similar to each other. But the case is otherwise. Moreover, if on the strength of causation noticed on the empirical plane an intelligent author of the universe is postulated, then that cause should also be regarded as imperfect and not omniscient, because it is attested by our experience that the cause of an effect is something which is imperfect and non-omniscient. The underlying principle behind the argument is this: Water-vapour and smoke are similar in one respect and dissimilar in other respects. Smoke creates black coating, but water-vapour does not. That is why water-vapour cannot create fire, but smoke does. A jar and the universe essentially differ in their nature. Cognition of the former suggests that it has been produced by some cause while that of the latter does not raise any curiosity in our mind to enquire about a cause which might have produced it. Thus, the Jaina maintains that the idea that the world is an effect is merely an imposition and as such it lacks validity.

It cannot, however, be maintained that the world is a particular type of effect (*kārya-viśeṣa*). Indeed the world does not appear to us as a particular type of effect. It may be contended that in the case of particular effects, such as a dilapidated building, we are reminded of some intelligent maker behind them. The Jaina would here enquire whether one thinks of any intelligent authorship of wild paddy in a place where there is no human habitation. In fact, we do not think that wild paddy has been produced by an intelligent being. But the Naiyāyika may still hold that so far as the world is concerned, its effect-character is superimposed.

The Jaina again joins issue and opines that if the Naiyāyika is constrained to admit that the effect-character of the world is a superimposition, there should not be any bar to a similar contention that the intelligent authorship is also a case of superimposition, and we know that the Naiyāyika cannot persuade himself to believe as much.

If the Naiyāyika denies the charge levelled against him by the Jaina to the effect that the effect-character of the world is a piece of superimposition and maintains that the world is an effect in the real sense of the term, the Jaina would point out that the position in defence of the Naiyāyika cannot stand logical scrutiny. It may be asked: Does the cognition, viz, the world is an effect, follow from its effect-character or through the help of any other reason. If the first alternative is admitted, we are involved in the logical fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). Cognition that the world is a product is dependent upon the nature of the effect (*kāryatva*) and the cognition of the nature of the effect depends upon the idea that something is produced (*kṛtabuddhi*), for its genesis and subsistence. So, the Nyāya position would involve logical see-saw.¹

The second alternative will also be found in the same predicament. If the cognition of being produced (*kṛtabuddhi*) is derived from any other inference, then that inference will also presuppose another inference. Thus, the series of reasoning will never be completed, and we have the continuity of a chain of inferences without a limit and would be involved in the logical fallacy of vicious infinite (*anavasthā*).²

The Naiyāyika may contend in defence that some portion of earth is dug and then filled up. But afterwards the earth does not appear to be dug at one time and looks like all other undugged portions of earth. In the same way, the world, though produced, does not appear to be such. But a censorious debater may easily pick holes in it and show that the argument is vitiated by fallacies.

1 Ādye 'nyonyāśrayah Tathā hi, siddhāvśesanāddhetor asvo 'tthanam, tad utthāne ca hetor vśesanāsiddhir ity TRD, p 119

2 Dvītyapakṣe 'numānāntarasyā 'pi śavśesanahetor cvo 'tthanam Tatā 'py anumānāntarat tatāddhā anavasthā TRD, p 119

The Jaina further retorts that effects are of two kinds. Some of them are preceded by an intelligent maker while others are not. We know that wild grains grow without any intelligent supervision. Would the Naiyāyika extend intelligent authorship of God to these instances also? If the Naiyāyika maintains that he is prepared to extend intelligent authorship to these cases as well, he will be constrained to subsume the contrary instance, set forth above, under the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference. But the Jainā will point out that this will have far reaching consequences in view of the fact that if all contrary instances are thus subsumed under the subject of the inference, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find a case of contrary instance even in the genuine case of fallacious reasoning. Consequently, all possibility of argumentation will vanish.

Let us explain the point with the help of an illustration. Sumitrā has two sons A & B, one is rather of a dark complexion, and the other is fair. Now the syllogism is employed. B is of a dark complexion since he is the son of Sumitrā. But the nature of being the son of Sumitrā (*Sumitratana-jatva*) is non-concomitant (*vyabhicarin*) with dark complexion (*śyamatva*). But 'fair-coloured son' has to be subsumed under the logical subject. So any attempt to discover the fallacy of the absence of invariableness (*vyabhicara*) must fail. Hence, we conclude that no case of non-concomitance could be subsumed under the logical subject.¹ Moreover, the inconsistency may be detected in the case of divine intelligence. The hypothetical divine intelligence must be caused since, according to the Jaina, there is no absolute unchangeable substance. The nature of being (*sat*) in Jainā metaphysics is that permanent unit which acquires some new qualities and loses some old.² The Jainā declares all intelligence to be non-permanent. After all, eternity of intelligence, which the logician advocates, cannot be proved antecedent to the establishment of God. The syllogism which is employed

1 Tcām pakṣikaranād avyabhicare sah śyamas tatputratvad itaratatputratvad ityāder api gamakatva prasāṅgān na kaśc ddhetur vyabhicari syat vyabh caravisayasya sarvatra p pakṣikartum śakyatvat TRD p 120

2 Utpadavyayadhrauvyayuktam sat Tatva thadh gamasutra V 29

to prove God as an eternal entity also, according to the Naiyāyika, proves eternity of divine knowledge. But the hypothesis of the eternal nature of knowledge violates the verdict of human experience (*dr̥ṣṭaviruddha*). All jars are created, and we do not seem to have any knowledge of a jar which is not created. In the same way, all instances of intelligence are non-eternal. Now, if God's intelligence is regarded as contingent, it would presuppose an accessory cause other than God, the inherent cause of such intelligence, for its coming into existence. If that is admitted to be conditioned by another intelligent being, then that being would be God and not the primary God and then another God and so on *ad infinitum*. The whole array of argument is based on the charge that the existence of an intelligent maker of the universe is vitiated by perception, and any inference based on such contradicted perception would also defy the purpose of the logician. It is fallacious simulation of reasoning (*anumānābhāsa*).

The Naiyāyika may, in order to avert the situation, argue that the sprouting of the seed, which to all appearances is spontaneous, is not really so inasmuch as, according to the Naiyāyika, it is also determined by unseen intelligent maker. This argument, if subjected to scrutiny, transpires to be a case of circular reasoning (*cakraka*). The Jaina may enquire: Is that unseen God proved by the reason which establishes the existence of God himself or through other instrument of knowledge. If the first alternative is accepted, we have a case of vicious circle (*cakraka*). Unseenness of God can be inferred only when God's existence is established and not prior to it, for the simple reason that God is not a self-evident principle. On the other hand, the existence of God will be proved if the unseenness of such intelligent agent has been established before. To be clear, it is only when the unseenness is proved, that the charge of contradiction (*bādha*), advanced by the opponent, is averted. The opponent has shown that the non-existence of an intelligent author in the case of the sprout etc. is established by non-perception (*pratyakṣabādhita*). But if it could be assumed

ted by God due to his love for humanity (*karuṇā*). But the inequalities in moral experience of men and communities and the injustices, the illusions and the ills of life prevailing in the universe militate against this supposition. The Naiyāyika discovers God as the real subject of all actions. Then why did he create the ills and the evils of life? The Naiyāyika may, however, meet the charge by tracing it to moral responsibility of the individual. These inequalities are the outcome of *karman* and not due to any caprice of the creator. But then what is it that God does? Why should we prefer to indulge in such complexities? Let *karman* alone account for the creation of the world. It cannot be, however, maintained that God creates the world not out of any motive but creation follows from his mere sportive impulse. Men of high position have no unfulfilled desire; still they take to recreations. So the activity of Lord is merely due to his sportive mood.¹ Some others maintain that God creates the world to dispense justice according to the actions of the doer. He is the apportioner of happiness and penalties in exact proportion to the moral worthiness of the doer.

The Jaina contends that both the suppositions cannot carry conviction. God creates the universe out of his sportive mood but without any purpose behind them. This assumption would turn God into a mere child who takes to play without any ultimate purpose. Moreover, we engage ourselves in sports only to have joy and relieve our mind of the series of thoughts that burden our thought-faculty. If the second alternative is accepted, God should be charged of all types of favouritism. If it is held that God by his very nature takes to creation, then what is the good of admitting his existence. We would rather dispense with him and posit that the universe has come into existence by its nature.²

1. Lokavat tu līlākaivalyam ŚB on BS, II, 33

2. Atha svabhāvataḥ, tarhy achetanasyā 'pi jagata eva svabhāvataḥ pravṛtthir astu; kim tat kartṛtvakalpanayā. TRD, p 122.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA VIEW

A CRITIQUE OF THE ANTITHEISTIC ARGUMENT

I

The theistic arguments of Śrīdhara are entirely based on the recognition of the essential identity of causality with teleology. That every effect depends on an intelligent cause for its emergence is the position which Śrīdhara upholds against his sceptical opponent. Here Śrīdhara's position coincides with that of Martineau¹ who also maintains that the cosmological argument alone proves both a First Cause of the universe and an intelligent cause as well.

Śrīdhara boldly faces the different polemics of the opponent against the causal argument of the theists. The Naiyāyika, at the very outset, holds that the earth, the mountain etc. are products and it is here that the opponent launches his polemic. The opponent would, however, observe that the proposition, viz, the world is an effect, is unestablished, and as such the theistic argument is based on the fallacy of unestablished ground (*hetvasiddhi*). The invariable relation between productivity (*kāryatva*) and the precedence of an intelligent agent (*sakartṛkatva*) is, here, the real ground of inference. But the propositions, the world is an effect and every effect is the product of an intelligent cause, are yet to be proved. How is it proved that the world is an effect? None was present at the time of creation and nobody can, therefore, certify its effect-character. Thus, the attribution of the nature of being an effect (*kāryatva*) to the subject, viz, the world, is based on a dogmatic assumption.

To this Śrīdhara replies that the very structural composition of the universe justifies its character as an effect.

1. Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, Bk. II.

If we set ourselves to analyse the nature of the earth, its contingent character is sure to arrest our attention. Consequently it becomes an effect like the jar though its actual creation may not have been witnessed by us.

The antitheist may, again, raise the question of unestablished ground in another form. We have already seen that the real ground of the theistic inference is the invariable relation of *karyatva* and *upalabdhimatpurvakatva* (being the effect of an intelligent cause). It leads to the universal proposition, viz, whatever is an effect is the effect of an intelligent cause, which must be materially true in order to lead the inference to a valid conclusion. The inference in the case of a jar is doubtlessly valid, but there are instances which may land us in difficulty. For instance, when the seed sprouts we do not notice any intelligent supervision over this event. The theist may say, as we have already pointed out on a previous occasion, that instances like the one shown above, viz, the sprouting of the seed, will not create any difficulty for him, for such instances may be included within the subject of the inference.

The opponent, however, is not prepared to accept this position of the Vaiśeṣika, in view of the fact that such a contention would do away with the justification of inference in general as an instrument of knowledge. According to the opponent the probandum, the probans and the subject of the inference should be specifically mentioned in all cases of valid inference. If the subject remains unspecified or indefinitely specified, every contrary instance may easily be disposed of by merging it under the subject which is indefinitely mentioned and this will turn all fallacious inference into valid ones.

The Mīmāṃsaka would here contend that no such necessary concomitance can be established between a product and the precedence of an intelligent agent. It is a fact, however, that the jar is a product and is also preceded by a sentient agent. But contrary instance is also available. In the case of the sprout which is an effect no such intelligent being behind its fructuation is seen to exist. Thus, it supplies us with

the contrary instance invalidating the inference altogether.

Śrīdhara, in reply, observes that if it is conceded that the sprout serves as the contrary instance and as such universal concomitance cannot be established, then for the same reason it militates against the Mīmāṃsaka's position on the *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* type of inference.¹ The Naiyāyika, the Mīmāṃsaka and the followers of the Yoga system admit that the motion of a planet may be inferred from its change of place. It is obvious, therefore, that they admit invariable concomitance between motion and change of place. Now, the Naiyāyika would point out that the charge, which the Mīmāṃsaka levels against him with regard to the concomitance between *kāryatva* and *sakartṛkatva*, may be brought against the Mīmāṃsaka with reference to the instance just pointed out, viz, motion and change of place. To make it clear, the Mīmāṃsaka argues that in the case of concomitance between *kāryatva* and *sakartṛkatva* instances may be taken up to show that *kāryatva* agrees with *sakartṛkatva*, and contrary instances may also be taken up to show that there is disagreement between the two. Likewise, in the case of motion and change of place instances and contrary instances may be taken up to show that there is agreement and disagreement between the two. When Devadatta is found to move from one place to another, we can maintain that there is agreement between the motion of Devadatta and his change of place. But in the case of the sun there is disagreement in view of the fact that the movement of the sun cannot be perceived by our sense-organs. It is on the basis of our perception of its change of place that we proceed to infer its motion. The Naiyāyika, therefore, brings the countercharge that the Mīmāṃsaka, who admits the inference of motion of the sun from its change of place, cannot oppose, consistent with his own position, the view of the Naiyāyika, when the latter seeks to infer *sakartṛkatva* on the ground of *kāryatva*.

Arguing on similar lines the theist may contend that

1. Yadi cai 'vañ dvaitā 'nupalambhād vyāptigrahanā 'bhāvas tadānīm Mīmāṃsā-bhāṣyakṛd abhīmatam sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ādityagaty anumānam api na siddhyati. NK., p. 54.

the sprout, like the jar, is also an instance of creation by an intelligent being. But it is required to be said that the author, in the case, cannot be visualised in view of the fact that he does not possess any physical apparatus.

The antitheist may still argue that even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that there is some intelligent author who is responsible for the seed sprouting into a tree, that does not enable his opponent to conclude that the intelligent author is a particular omnipotent and omniscient personality. The point is this: The instance of the jar can only prove that there is some intelligent person who adjusts the parts in such a way that it takes the shape of a jar. But it cannot be maintained on this ground that the maker of the jar is a particular individual and not any other. The sprouting of the seed, therefore, can at best prove that there is some intelligent author who is at work behind the creation of the world. But it will be unwise to assume that the instance will enable us to conclude that the author is one particular omniscient being, viz, God.

Śrīdhara, in reply, points out that his opponent fails to understand the position of the Vaiśeṣika on this point. The Vaiśeṣika does not, at the outset, seek to prove a concrete omniscient being who is responsible for creation, but what he does is to establish, in the first instance, an individual as the author of the universe in a more or less general way, and when this is established he goes on to supplement it by saying that the said intelligent author is a concrete omniscient individual. To be precise, it is an epistemological convention with the Naiyāyika that he proceeds from the general to the particular. Thus, he maintains on the strength of the universal concomitance between *kāryatva* and *sakartṛkatva*, that the universe is preceded by a sentient agent. Subsequently, in conformity with the nature of the subject (*pakṣadharmatābalāt*) the intelligent authorship of a general character, which has been proved before, is particularised.¹ It is not any

1 Vyāptusamarthyāt sāmānyam sādhyatī pakṣadharmatābalena cā 'bhipreto viśeṣah . . . sādhyatī. NK, p. 55

Cf. also, Pakṣadharmatāprasādhāt sarvam cā 'numānam sāmānyena vyāptigrahanabalāt pakṣadharmatābalāt sādhyaviśeṣam sādhyatī 'ti dṛṣṭam. *Sūtra*, p. 302.

intelligent author who creates this universe, but it is an omniscient God who is at the back of creation.

It needs be pointed out here that the opponent is not silenced by the aforesaid argument of Śrīdhara. The opponent will argue that in the case of an inference it becomes possible to proceed from the universal to the individual only when it does not militate against the testimony of experience. Thus, when we infer the existence of fire on hill-top at the sight of smoke issuing from it, the process of inference is as follows: Firstly, smoke is perceived in the subject. Next, we remember the universal concomitance subsisting between the probans-as-such and the probandum-as-such. Thereafter, arises the synthetic judgement (*parāmarśa*) in the form of 'the subject as determined by the probans-as-pervaded-by-the-probandum'. It is then and then only the existence of fire is inferred on a mountain.

Now, if we analyse the whole process, we shall notice that the concomitance exists between the probans-as-such and the probandum-as-such. But in the conclusion we predicate a particular probandum in respect of the subject. This is possible because the particularised probandum is not contradicted by experience. But in the case under consideration, the opponent argues, it will not be possible to particularise the probandum in view of the fact that an omniscient and omnipotent agent, which the Naiyāyika seeks to prove, is contradicted by experience.¹

Let us now proceed to understand the reasons that prompt the opponent to point out that an omniscient agent is contradicted by experience. The obvious reason is that the hypothetical God can neither be an embodied nor a disembodied being. If such an agent were 'endowed with a physical apparatus, he should have possessed of sense-organs too. And in that case it would not be possible for him to have any knowledge of the practical efficiency of the ultimate particles of the universe which are held to be super-sensual.

1. Sidhyaty anumāne viśeṣo 'pi yatra pramānavirodho nā 'sti līvarāṣumāne tu viśeṣo na sidhyati pramānavirodhāt NK., p. 55.

Nor can it be maintained that such an agent is a disembodied being. For, in all cases of agenthood (*kartṛtva*) we find that the agent, at the outset, comprehends the nature of the causes and subsequently desires that he will produce a thing with the aid of those causes. Later on, he exerts and engages his physical organs. Thereafter, he supervises the causes so that the effect is produced. An effect is not produced unless the agent undergoes through the series of activities mentioned above. Thus, on the strength of the concomitance in presence and absence it is said that an agent must not only possess intelligence but should be endowed with a physical apparatus as well.¹

Śrīdhara has brought out the futility of the opponent's contention. He starts by saying that physical apparatus need not be regarded as a necessary condition of intelligent action. It may be asked: Is agenthood (*sakartṛkatva*) synonymous with embodiment (*śarīritva*), or is it the capacity for engaging the different materials for the purpose of producing an effect?² The first alternative is not tenable, in view of the fact that instances might be cited to show that there is no intelligent activity inspite of a physical body. Thus, when a man falls asleep or remains in a vacant mood, he does not act intelligently. Hence, it is quite obvious that intelligent action is not synchronous with physical organism.

Śrīdhara further elucidates the point with the help of an illustration. It is a matter of common knowledge that our body is initiated into activity under the guidance of the self (*ātman*). But the question remains to be answered in this connection is: How is it that the self acts intelligently in guiding an insentient physical apparatus? Surely the self does not require another physical organism to put the body into activity. If, as the opponent insists, in all cases of intel-

1. *Aśarīrapūrvakatvam cā 'śakyasādhnam, sarvo 'pi kartā kārakasvarūpam avadhārayati tata icchatī 'dam aham anena nirvartayāmi 'u tataḥ prayatate tad anukāyam vyāpārayati tataḥ kāraṇāny adhiṣṭhāti tataḥ karoti, anavadhārayan anicchan aprayatamānah kāyam avyāpārayan na karoti 'ty anvayaavyatirekābhyām buddhivat śarīram api kāryotpattāv upāyabhūtam* NK, p. 55.

2. *Paridṛṣṭasāmarthyakāraprajakāvatvam.* NK., p. 56.

ligent activity there should necessarily be a physical organism, it would be difficult for him to explain the situation described above. As none would admit that the soul possesses another body, the opponent would be constrained to hold that the soul does not guide the insentient body—a position, which we all know, is not warranted by facts.¹ Thus, we see that Śrīdhara, with his characteristic ingenuity, steers clear of the difficult situation.

It is worthy of notice in this connection that Śrīdhara does not stop here. He is even prepared, for the sake of argument, to agree with his opponent that 'being embodied' (*śarīritva*) is synchronous with agenthood (*kartṛtva*). It may be rightly enquired by his opponent that what staff that physical apparatus of God consists of. Śrīdhara answers by saying that it is the atoms (*paramānu*) which may serve as the body of God.² God has no other physical body except the atoms which are the ultimate cause of the world. It should be stated in an unambiguous term that the answer, which Śrīdhara makes here by way of reply to his opponents, should not be misunderstood. It is never the view of the Vaiśeṣika that God possesses a physical apparatus. What Śrīdhara has said here should be understood as his reply to shut out the contention of his opponent.

Śrīdhara further points out that it does not stand to reason to opine that desire, effort etc. are necessarily associated with a physical body. It cannot be totally denied that will and effort are inseparably linked to a physical body, but there may be instances where the two are not associated with each other. Thus, Śrīdhara points out that when will and effort are adventitious, a physical body is essential; but when they are natural and innate properties of any particular entity, the same need not have any physical organism. The desire and effort in God are his essential characteristics and, as such, Śrīdhara contends that it is not necessary that he should possess a physical body.

1 *Anapekṣitasārīravyāpārasye 'cchāprayatnamātrasacivasyu 'va cetanasya kadācid acetanavyāpāram prati sāmāthyadarsanāt* NK, p. 56.

2 *Īśvarasyā 'pi preryah paramānūr asti* NK, p. 56

Let us now proceed to examine the position of the theists so far as the question of the 'First Mover' is concerned. God is attributed with the task of moving the atoms so as to create the dyads. But the atheist asks: Why the individual self be not competent to discharge this function? The theist replies that the individual self is not equal to this task, since it is circumscribed within its own sensibilities. Its intelligence is limited and does not travel beyond senses. Therefore, it lacks omniscience which is necessary for the creation of the cosmos.¹

That the intelligence of the individual self is not omniscient is borne out by the fact that it acquires knowledge with the help of its sense-organs. But if it be held that the individual soul also possesses natural consciousness (*sahaja-caitanya*) about every object in the universe, the theist would ask how is it that natural consciousness is impeded in the case of embodied souls so that they seem to have novel experiences. The opponent may, however, argue that the knowledge of the individual is not interrupted at the time of his death, but when the physical body is destroyed it may remain in the soul. But Śrīdhara says that this explanation of his opponent is unintelligible, in view of the fact that to the opponent consciousness is ubiquitous and, as such, its connection with the object can never cease. And, further, if consciousness be held to be eternal, it is never possible that it would cease to reveal objects which happens to be its very nature.

If, however, the opponent argues that when he says that consciousness is impeded he means thereby that the *vyrtti* is obstructed,² the Vaiśeṣika would ask him to explain how the individual soul cognises an object. In answer to the question the opponent will have no other alternative but to say that sometimes the *vyrtti* is obstructed while on other occasions it is not so. Whenever there is contact of the object with the sense-organ, the *vyrtti* flows unimpeded; in case there is no contact of the object with the sense-organ the *vyrtti* stands obstructed. It, therefore, comes to

1. Sarvaṇiṣayā 'vavodhaviṛahāt. NK., p. 57.

2. Vyrttipratibandhaḥ caitanyaurodhānam iti cet. NK., p. 57.

this that the *vytti-jñāna* is caused through the instrumentality of the sense-organ. It is not possible for the individual soul to have any *vytti-jñāna* without the aid of the sense-object contact. Thus, the opponent will be constrained to admit that the individual soul, though ubiquitous, cannot have knowledge of all objects, and if he admits that the individual soul is ubiquitous and possesses knowledge of all objects, sense-organs would stand futile.¹

II

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theism rests on the fundamental principle of causality. This phenomenal world springs out of atoms with God as the contingent cause. But even this fundamental position has been challenged by the sceptics.

These thinkers, Jayanta observes, are obviously labouring under a confusion of thought. In his opinion, neither the Cārvāka, nor the Mīmāṃsaka, nor even the Buddhist can advance this argument consistent with his own position. Thus Jayanta points out that productivity (*kāryatva*) is an empirical fact which the different schools of sceptics, notwithstanding their mutual differences, would be constrained to admit. As for the Cārvāka, he does not admit the authority of the Vedas, but declares that these are works of imperfect human beings. It, therefore, transpires that the Cārvāka accepts productivity as an empirical concept. So far as the Mīmāṃsaka is concerned, so declares Jayanta, he also accepts the empirical value of productivity. The Mīmāṃsaka would either say that a piece of cloth, constituted of yarns, is destroyed either with the destruction of yarns themselves or their conjunction. If that is so, he certainly looks upon a piece of cloth as a product which is produced of the yarns and is destroyed when the constituent yarns are destroyed or their conjunction ceases to exist.

Jayanta steers clear of this difficulty by pointing out that the illustration under consideration enables us to prove the

1. Saty api vyāpakatve sarvārtheṣu vṛty abhāvād indriyavaiyarthya-prasaṅgāc ca sādḥuktam aśāstrinām āmanām na viśayāvavodhab. NK., p. 57.

probandum. It is a matter of common experience that during the rainy season when torrential shower falls on a mountain, a portion of the mountain is often found to be carried away by the current and this proves that just as we have component parts in the case of a jar, there are such parts in the case of a mountain too. Thus, if on the strength of the illustration of a jar we can infer the existence of a potter who creates it, it will not be difficult for us to prove on the strength of the evidence of the mountain and the like that there is one intelligent creator who is responsible for the creation of this stupendous reality.

Jayanta next examines the position of his opponent when he opines that God as the creator of this universe cannot be established on the analogy of the creatorship of such substances as the jar, the cloth and the like. In the latter case the substances are made of parts and the person who conjoins these parts is said to be their creator. To explain this event it may be said that a person, who is prompted by a specific purpose so adjusts the constituents that a whole is produced. Arguing on this line it is asserted that behind this empirical reality, which is a system, we find a purposive adjustment (*sanniveśa*).

This teleological argument is not acceptable to the opponent for he points out that what may hold good in the case of the pot, the cloth and the like, will not apply to the case of such substances as the mountain, the ocean and others. The argument that he advances is this that in the case of the pot etc. one notices the adjustment of parts, but in the case of other substances, viz, the mountain or the sea, no such adjustment is observed. If, therefore, the creatorship in the case of the former is understood it is never so in the case of the latter. In that case it is difficult to prove God as the creator of the universe.

It may be argued, however, that there is some adjustment of parts in the case of the mountain and the sea etc., but the opponent would say that the adjustment of parts in the one case is not identical with that as conceived in the other. In the absence of a more suitable expression we may use the term

'adjustment of parts' in both the cases. But the sense expressed is not identical. As such, the opponent criticises and rejects the teleological argument.¹

The opponent also dismisses further arguments which the Naiyāyika may advance with regard to the point at issue. If the Naiyāyika asserts that the adjustment of parts in the case of the jar and the mountain may not be identical but there is some common adjustment which is noticeable in either of them, the opponent will then point out that an ordinary man does not appear to perceive any such common adjustment of parts among the substances mentioned above.² It is not justified, therefore, to posit one intelligent creator of the universe on the strength of this adjustment of parts. It should be remembered, so says the opponent, that when there are vital and material differences between the two substances, viz, the potter and the mountain, it would not be proper to think of one kind of adjustment of parts in them only on the ground that we have an identical expression to signify each type of adjustment. Mere linguistic expressions do not enable us to do away with vital and material difference. If this is not accepted the opponent would warn us against anomalous situations. We often describe the colour of a flower-bud as yellow and the smoke issuing from the flaming fire is also described as yellow; though in either case the linguistic expression of colour is identical, it will not be correct to infer the existence of fire from both of them for the obvious reason that, notwithstanding the identity of the verbal expressions, there is vital difference between the two. Likewise, in the present case, though the linguistic expression, viz, adjustment of parts, is used in regard to both the jar and the mountain, still the material difference between them will not enable us to infer the existence of a Supreme Designer of the universe.

It is here that Jayanta joins issue. He has boldly and squarely faced the objections of the Mīmāṃsaka and effectively refuted them. The Mīmāṃsaka, as we have seen,

1. NM, p 179

2. Nā'tra sanniveśasāmānyam kū cid upalabhante laukikāḥ NM, p 179

does not believe that the two cases, mentioned above, are similar in character. Thus, the point of discussion centres round the innate diversity in the nature of the middle term (*hetu*). Jayanta avers that the smoke that enables us to infer the fire in the oven is not voluminous but slender in appearance. But when we infer the existence of fire on a hill top, the smoke there, which leads us to the inference, may have a far bigger size and volume than what is noticeable in the kitchen. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the middle term which, to all appearances, is of different character does not stand in the way of the process of inferential knowledge. Just as in the instances cited above we assume a probans as universal (*hetu-samanya*), we will be perfectly warranted in the supposition of a system as-universal (*avayava-sannivesa samanya*) in the case of a pot and the universe.

Let us pursue the point in detail. In all cases of inferential knowledge there is concomitance of the probans and the probandum in their general essence. It is admitted that smoke-as-universal is related through concomitance with fire as universal. Thus, the knowledge of a trail of smoke issuing forth from a hill top invariably and unmistakably leads to the knowledge of fire. The Naiyayika, in the case under consideration, opines that every systematic design or design as universal, irrespective of its inherent diversity is associated, without any exception with the efficient cause as such.¹ There in the mountain etc. a purposive design is found which leads to the postulation of an efficient cause.

The Buddhist may contend that there is no such entity as design as-universal for he, for the matter of fact, rejects universals as fictions. Universals are purely subjective constructions. What the Naiyayika calls 'universals' are nothing but the negation of the opposite. In the case of inference of fire from smoke, what the Buddhist means by smoke is one which is different from ether, time, space and

all other entities which are not smoke. This non-distinct character is the generative efficiency of its invariable identical reference. So fire can be inferred from any kind of smoke. The Naiyāyika replies that in the case under discussion also such entity as design-as-universal may be, for argument's sake, regarded as an ungrounded assumption but the systematic adjustment in the mountain should, in like manner, be regarded as the negation of non-adjustment. The identical concept appears in this indirect way. The cognition of the individual adjustment appears and leads us to the supposition of an intelligent designer. The Realist further contends that if the negation of the opposite be objective, it is better to take the design in the mountain as purely objective. Why should there be any bias in favour of non-admittance of design in the mountain? Thus, as the universe is found to exhibit wonderful harmony, there must be some all-wise designer, viz, God. This is a resumé of the teleological proof as advanced by Jayanta.

III

We have seen in a previous chapter how the Buddhist challenges the argument in favour of the existence of God as advanced by the philosopher of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. We address ourselves in this section to the task of presenting and examining in detail the position of the Buddhist on this issue.

The Buddhist denies the existence of God because no such God is amenable to our perceptual knowledge. In other words, existence of God is directly barred by non-perception. According to the Buddhist, inference of a positive entity is two-fold. In the first place, we can infer a positive entity with the help of a probans which is itself an effect of the probandum (*kāryalingaka*). Secondly, inference of a positive entity may be possible with the aid of a reason which is identical in essence with the probandum (*sabhāva-hetu*). The former is illustrated when the knowledge of smoke leads to the knowledge of fire and the latter when

the oak has the essential attribute of a tree. In case of negative inference one has to depend upon the non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) of the negatum. Thus, in the case under consideration the Buddhist argues that in view of the fact that God is not perceived by us its non-existence has to be asserted.¹

Here the Naiyāyika joins issue with the Buddhist and opines that mere non-perception does not guarantee the non-existence of an entity, but the non-perception of an object fit for perception (*yogyānupalabdhi*) leads to the knowledge of its non-existence.² Negation is intelligible only when it is understood with reference to a negatum (*pratyogin*), which is fit for being comprehended (*yogya*).³ Thus, we can say, 'There is no jar on the table', for the simple reason that the negatum, i.e., jar, if it were existent, could be comprehended by perception. And when it is not perceived it does not exist. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* (*tarka*) which the Naiyāyika applies. But this *reductio ad absurdum* cannot be applied to the case of God. As God is not amenable to perception, its non-existence can never be proved through non-cognition.

But the Buddhist does not yield ground. In his opinion the explanation offered by the Naiyāyika is bound to create anomalies. The rabbit's horn or a square circle is not fit for perception and, as such, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove its non-existence with the aid of non-perception. Thus, if the negation of 'rabbit's horn' or a 'square circle' is sought to be established mere non-perception should have a status of logical ground leading to the cognition of negation of an entity. So the Buddhist hurls the following dilemma at the Naiyāyika. If mere absence is held to be the certitude of negation, non-existence of God will be automatically established. If, on the other hand, negation is considered to be the absence of a knowable fact, that is to say, if the absence of an object fit for perception is said to lead to the knowledge of

1 Tarkena nenā nugr̥h tam pratyakṣam jagatkartur abhavam avedayati
NkuB p 311

2 Yogya nupalambho hi bādhakaḥ NkuB p 311

3 Yogya nupalabdhir badh kā vacya NkuP p 311

its negation, it will be impossible to deny that rabbit's horn exists. The Buddhist thinks that the Naiyāyika cannot escape from the clutches of this dilemma and he will have no other alternative but to accept the position that mere non-perception of the negatum is the guarantee of its unreality. In the circumstances, the Naiyāyika will be constrained to admit the unreality of God from its non-perception.

However much the Buddhist may be sure of the strength of his reasoning and indulge in self-complacency with regard to the weakness in the position of the opponent, the latter does not yield ground so easily but argues in the following manner. Mere non-cognition cannot lead to the knowledge of non-existence.¹ Non-cognition can yield the judgement of non-existence only when it is non-cognition of a perceptible object (*yogyānupalabdhi*). If the Buddhist does not accept the position of the Naiyāyika he will have to deny the existence of all infra-sensible entities on the ground of non-cognition. But in fact the Buddhist admits the existence of such supersensuous entities as the ether (*ākāśa*), the atom (*puṅgava*) etc.² So the Buddhist cannot regard mere non-cognition as the determinant of the knowledge of non-existence. And as God, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is imperceptible, we cannot judge his non-existence from the fact that he is not perceived.³ The position may be made clear through an illustration. When a jar is not perceived on the ground, the Naiyāyika would argue: 'Had there been a jar, it would have been seen'. This points to the fact that competency or appropriateness (*yogyatā*) is the essential factor in determining the non-existence of an object on the basis of non-perception. Such fictions as the rabbit's horn or a square circle are not existents, and, as such, the *reductio ad absurdum*, viz, 'if the rabbit's horn were existent it would have been perceived', does not apply.

The opponent may here retort that if the Nyāya view

1. Anupalabdheḥ svāntaryena prāmāṇyā 'nabhyupagamān na bādhakatvam NKuPM, p. 311.

2. Anupalabdhiṃ āśraya bādhakatāyām ayogyo 'cheda iti yogyā 'nupalabdhiḥ bādhikā vācya. NKuP, p. 311.

3. Yogyādṛṣṭiḥ kuto 'yogyo . . . NKu. III. 1. Cf. also, Ayogyatvāt paramātmāmanas tasmin yogyā 'nupalabdhiḥ kuto bhavet, na kutaś cit. NKuB, p. 312.

be accepted, it would not be possible to determine the non-existence of such fictions, as they are not fit for perception. But it is observed in reply that the opponent is misled when he says that the rabbit's horn is negated. We should have a clear conception regarding the negatum (*pratyogin*). What is understood here is either the absence of the horn in the rabbit, the absent object is not the rabbit's horn, but the horn itself, the existence of which is negated in the rabbit, or the absence of relation of the horn with the rabbit (*saśyatva*). Now, in the present case the horn is a perceptible entity in other animals such as the cow, the buffalo etc. So the judgement, 'There is no rabbit's horn', should be explained as 'there is no horn in the rabbit' or 'the absence of the relation of the rabbit with the horn', and hence there will be no difficulty in determining the absence of a fiction.¹

It would, however, be an interesting study to discuss the status of non cognition (*anupalabdhi*) in determining the non existence of an object. According to the Naiyāyika non-existence is amenable to perception, but unlike the Bhātta and the Vedāntin, the Naiyāyika does not regard non cognition as an independent means of cognition. Non-cognition merely facilitates (*sahakarīn*) the competent sense organ in determining the non existence of an object. Thus, when there is no jar on the ground, it is the visual organ that being assisted by appropriate negation (*yogyānupalabdhi*) determines the absence of the jar on the ground.

The Bhātta school of Mīmāṃsā² opines that negation cannot be perceptible. Unlike the Prābhākara and the Samkhyāite, he does not think that non-existence is nothing but the existence of the bare locus (*adhisthana svarupa*). When we say, 'there is no jar on the ground', what we mean thereby, according to the Prābhākara, is nothing but the bare ground. But the Bhātta and following him the Advaitin also do not think that non-existence can be perceived as adjectival to the locus, for the simple reason that it is not understood

1 Śṛṅgasya rupavattvamabattvabhyām pratyakṣayogyatvena gavādisṛṅge vyāpti darśanād asyā pi śṛṅgasya sato yogyataya bhav tavyam tasmāc chaitaśśṛṅgasya yogyā nupalambho sū u. NkuB p 311

2 *Saṁt ad'pikā & Manameyodaya* Chapters on Abhara

how the sense-organ, being something existent, is related to what is non-existent. It is a fact of common experience that relation subsists between two positive entities. The Naiyāyika, however, asserts that the relation of absence to the locus is 'adjectivity' (*viśeṣaṇatā*). Here the Bhāṭṭa contends that such adjectival relation is indirect, i.e., it depends upon some other relation apart from itself.

To be precise, in the judgement 'The book is on the table', the 'book' is adjectival to the locus, viz, the table, by being related to it through contact (*saṁyoga*). The adjectival relation in this case, therefore, presupposes a primary relationship, viz, conjunction between 'the book' and 'the table'. Let us take another illustration too. The universal is related as an adjective to the individual which is the substantive. But we all know that there is the relation of inherence between the two. It is this inherence which makes it possible for the universal to stand as an adjunct to the individual, the substantive. But it may be pointed out that no such relationship exists between the absence of the book and the table. It is, therefore, that we can hardly think of the absence of the book as related as an adjunct to the table. Thus, *viśeṣaṇatā* cannot be a relation on its own account. When two objects are related through contact or through inherence, one of them is called the adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*), while the other is the substantive (*viśeṣya*). But in the case of the supposed relation between the absence of the jar and the locus, viz, the ground, no such intervening relation is seen to exist. A negation and the respective locus can neither be said to be related through contact, as the relation of contact holds between two substances only. Nor can it be said that negation and its locus are related through inherence. Thus, in the absence of any mediating relation negation can never be related to the locus. And as in the case under consideration adjectivity (*viśeṣaṇatā*) cannot be said to be determined by a mediating relation the perceptive organ cannot be related to negation through the relation of contact-cum-adjectivity (*saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇatā*). And as *viśeṣaṇatā* undetermined by any relation is a fiction, the Bhāṭṭa has made out that negation cannot be apprehended

by the sense-organ. The Bhāṭṭa admits non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) aided by competency (*yogyatā*) as an independent source of knowledge. The Bhāṭṭa and the Vedāntin hold that *abhāva* cannot be apprehended by perception. But it is surprising that Dharmarājādhvarīndra, who owes his allegiance to the monistic school of the Vedānta, says it in so many words that the apprehension of *abhāva* is perceptual in character, even admitting that the instrument for the perceptual knowledge of negation is not *pratyakṣa* but *anupalabdhi*.¹

It should be noted that like the Bhāṭṭa the followers of the Advaita Vedānta do not believe in the direct perception of negation. It is, therefore, a very well-known fact that in monistic Vedānta nescience (*ajñāna*) has not been described as a negative concept, i.e., negation of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*), but a positive entity which is directly perceived. Had *ajñāna* been recognised as mere *jñānābhāva*, it would have been difficult for them to explain how it is directly perceived.

Udayana next examines the argument by which the Buddhist seeks to infer that God is not the creator of the universe. According to the Buddhist, God is as much a fiction as the rabbit's horn. If that is so, the subject-of-the-inference is not a reality but a fiction, pure and simple. And, as such, the inference is vitiated by the fallacy of unreality of the subject (*paksāsiddhi*). Therefore, absence of agenthood in respect of God, which is a fiction, cannot be inferred.

The Buddhist, however, may continue to say that though God is a fiction, yet it may appear as a reality at times. The Buddhist, as an advocate of *asatkhyātivāda* (mistaking a non-existent as an existent), points out that in the case of an error a fiction appears as a reality. Thus, when an oyster is mistaken for a piece of silver, the silver, in the context, is a fiction, pure and simple, but still it makes its appearance and is felt as such. Likewise, in the case under review though

1. *Abhāvapratiṭeḥ pratyakṣatve 'pi tatkāranasyā 'nupalabdher mānāntaratvāt.* VP, p. 253.

God is a veritable fiction, yet at the time of inference it may very well appear as the subject of which negation of agenthood is predicated. Hence, the Buddhist refuses to admit the charge of unreality of the subject (*pakṣāsiddhi*) levelled against him by the Naiyāyika. The Buddhist, therefore, concludes by saying that whatever unreal is presented as real through misapprehension, does not exist. God is presented through this misapprehension (*asatkhyāty-upanīta*), and, therefore, it does not exist.

It would be an interesting study to bring out in this context the implications of the different theories of error. All the different theories of error as held by the different schools of Indian philosophy may be summed up into four main branches, viz, *satkhyāti* (objective error, in which, for the time being, a real counterpart of illusion is presented to the mind), *asatkhyāti* (mistaking a non-existent as existent), *sadasatkhyāti* (apprehension which is partly real and partly unreal), and *sadasat-vilakṣaṇakhyāti* (neither real nor unreal). Now, the upholders of all these theories agree on the point that in illusory experience there must be a locus of ascription and the character ascribed. Excluding the upholders of *asatkhyāti*, all other theorists maintain that in illusory experience a false character is attributed to a perceived real fact. But the difference lies regarding the nature of the ascribed element. If it is real it is *satkhyāti*. Thus, *anyathākhyāti* of the Naiyāyika, *akhyāti* of the Mīmāṃsaka and *ātmakhyāti* of the Yogācāra may easily be subsumed under *satkhyāti*.¹ For, the upholders of *anyathākhyāti* and *akhyāti* maintain that the projected character is existent elsewhere. So when we mistake a shell for a piece of silver, the Naiyāyika, the Mīmāṃsaka and the Yogācāra opine that the element of silver is perceived elsewhere. The followers of *ātmakhyāti* hold that there is no extramental reality and that error consists in the projection of subjective ideas as objective. Thus, according to this view, also the element of silver,

1. Anyathākhyātir akhyātir ātmakhyātir iti trayah /
Satkhyātipakṣa nai te 'pi vinā sidhyantī māyayā /
Ītāradhī, II. 2. (Mysore ed.).

which is ascribed to the mother-o'-pearl, is subjectively real.

Asatkhyāti also admits of two types. According to some, the presentative factor is existent, whereas the representative element is unreal. The Mādhva upholds this view. But according to the theory of *asatkhyāti* as held by the Mādhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy, the presentative as well as the representative element are both unreal fictions.

The third type of *khyāti* as recorded by Udayana in his *Tātparyāpariśuddhi*,¹ is called *sadasatkhyāti*. According to this view the representative element, i.e., the character of silver, is real in so far as it comes to the content of perception and also unreal inasmuch as the cognition of the silver is found to be erroneous when such cognition is contradicted (*bādhita*), i.e., when it fails to lead up to the expected result. Vijñānabhikṣu accepts this theory of error. Udayana has rejected this view. For, he argues, that even an erroneous cognition leads to volition (*pravṛtti*). We perceive a silver in the mother-o'-pearl and desire to have it for the simple reason that, even for a moment, we cognise it as silver. The object of the erroneous cognition appears as something existent. And our volitional activity results from such cognition in the form 'The piece of silver exists' (*sad rajatam*). Thus, if it is held that the object of erroneous knowledge appears to be existent and non-existent as well, volitional activity in erroneous cognitions remains to be accounted for.

The Advaita Vedāntin advocates the doctrine of *sada-sadvilakṣaṇakhyāti*. He argues that in such illusory cognitions as 'this is silver', the object, i.e., 'silver', must not be non-existent (*asadvilakṣaṇa*), since, in perceptual cognition the object is required to be present. Thus, 'silver' cannot be non-existent. Moreover, 'silver' cannot be said to be existent (*sadvilakṣaṇa*), as the cognition of 'silver' is contradicted (*bādhita*) by a sublating cognition. What is really existent

cannot be sublated. So, the object of an erroneous cognition is something different from existent and non-existent, and, as such, it is stated to be indeterminable. Hence, according to the Advaita Vedāntin, apprehension of an indeterminable object constitutes erroneous cognition.

We have so far dealt with the different theories of error in Indian philosophy and have found that the Mādhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy advocates the theory of *asatkhyāti*, according to which illusion is nothing but the apprehension of a non-existent object. Thus, the Mādhyamika admits that a non-existent object is at times fit to be perceived. The Mādhyamika would here argue that God though non-existent (as held by the antitheists) is fit to appear as the object of apprehension (i.e., in error). So God who is fit to be cognised may stand as the subject of the inference of the antitheist which seeks to negate the existence of God. Further, the advocate of *asatkhyāti* asserts the possibility of proving the non-existence of an unreal fiction (*alika-pratīyogikābhāva*). And, hence, though God is admitted as an unreal fiction, negation in the form 'God does not exist' may be predicable. When the absence of agency (*karṣṭvābhāva*) is predicated of God, he becomes the substratum (*anuyogin*) in which the non-existence of agency is cognised. And if, on the other hand, we say 'God does not exist', then God becomes the object of negation (*pratīyogin*). Thus, the Mādhyamika opines that the negation of God may be intelligible from two aspects.

We started from the Buddhist position and it will be our endeavour now to see how the Naiyāyika succeeds in overthrowing it. It has been pointed out before that the Mādhyamika says that God happens to be both the *anuyogin* and the *pratīyogin* of negation. Now, Udayana opines that no fiction or unsubstantial datum can be looked upon as the *anuyogin*.¹ Serviceability being the *sine qua non* of a substratum, a fiction cannot be treated as the *anuyogin* of negation. Whatever happens to be the substratum cannot be unreal. It is only a real which, in the fitness of things,

1. Abhāsapratipannam ita cen na, tasyā 'īrayatvā 'nupapatteh. NKu, p. 329.

can act as the locus.¹ If the character of real is admitted in the case of an unreal, the latter loses its individuality.²

Udayana also denies the possibility of a fiction being a *pratyogin*; for, whenever a negation is known and interpreted, it is invariably determined by a negatum (*pratyogin*). Thus, when we perceive the negation of a jar on the ground the negatum, viz, the jar, must be a real and existent fact. Now, how are we to explain the character of the negatum (*pratyogitā*)? What is negated is the *pratyogin* of a negation. Udayana says that it would appear on a careful analysis that the character of the negatum is nothing but the negation of non-existence.³ Whenever we comprehend a negation we always comprehend and express it through the medium of the appellation of its negatum. Negation of non-existence of the jar is of the nature of the jar. Now this negation of non-existence subsists in the jar and this is what is exactly meant by *pratyogitā*—the character of negation. As we have already discussed, in the illusory experience of the silver in a shell, the silver as such is a real entity. Whenever the knowledge of the silver is contradicted by another sublating cognition of shell, what is sublated is not the reality of the silver but the wrong spatio-temporal relation.

So far we have discussed that in the perception of negation, the negation and the negatum both appear as the content of knowledge. And whatever is known (*jñeya*) is capable of being known to be real. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, knowability (*jñeyatva*) and verifiability (*prameyatva*) of knowledge are universal subsistents (*kevalānvaṣṭu*). The Naiyāyika believes that everything on earth is knowable and verifiable, and, as such, when it is said that at the time of comprehension of negation both negation and the negatum are comprehended, it stands to reason to admit that both these elements are verifiable. That being so, it comes to this that the negatum, when admitted to be knowable,

1 Vyavarttyā 'bhāvavattai 'va bhāviku hi viśesyata /. NKu, III 2

2 Ābhāsapratipannasya 'pi vastutvabhyupagamē vastutvā 'vastutvasamkarapattih NKuPM, p 329

3 Abhavarāhātmatvam vastunah pratyogitā // NKu, III 2 Also, Abhavarāhātmatvam vastunah pratyogitā ityācāryah Mathuri on *Vyāpṭipañcaka*, p 6 (ed Jivananda Vidyasagar, Calcutta)

must also be verifiable. But the Buddhist, as we have seen, says that God, though admitted to be the negatum of its non-existence, does not regard him as verifiable—a position which, in the opinion of the Naiyāyika, is quite untenable. What is not verifiable cannot be the negatum. And if God happens to be the negatum, which the Buddhist also does not hesitate to accept, he must be a verifiable entity. This clinches the issue in favour of the Naiyāyika.

CHAPTER SIX

THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW

I

In the foregoing chapter we have studied at length the criticism of the antitheistic arguments as attempted by Śrīdhara and Jayantabhaṭṭa. Now we propose to study the arguments of Udayana, who with his trenchant logic and sharp critical acumen succeeded in an abundant measure in strengthening the theistic position against the onslaughts of the opposition.

That causality is an empirical fact has already been proved, and it is on the strength of this fact of causality that God is postulated as the final cause of the universe. 'The world is determined by some intelligent agent since it is looked upon as an event to all intents and purposes'—to this causal argument of the Naiyāyika the opponent has dealt a smashing blow. Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* has surveyed the position of the opponent in a most comprehensive manner and exposed its weakness as precisely as possible.

Now the opponent may advance the following argument: 'God is corporeal, since he is the author of the universe.' Or, he may say that 'God is not the agent, since he lacks physical apparatus.' But both these counter-inferences are vitiated by the fallacy of the non-existence of the subject (*āśrayāsiddhi*). The opponent does not believe in the existence of God. But in either of the arguments of the opponent, God is presented as the subject-of-the-inference.

The same argument also suffers from the fallacy of contradiction (*bādha*). Neither the Naiyāyika nor the opponent would hold that God is corporeal. But if that God is presented as the subject of the opponent's inference, he can no longer seek to prove non-agency in that God, because

that would involve the fallacy of self-contradiction of the thesis. When the theist seeks to prove the existence of God, he does so with the aim in view that God is the creator. So in any attempt to prove the non-existence of God with the help of any inference where God is posited as the subject, the opponent will commit the fallacy of diviation from accepted tenet (*siddhānta-vyāghāta*).

In order to obviate the discrepancy set forth above, the opponent may aver that God is not the subject of the inference. It is the earth, the sprout etc. that stand as the subject. Then the process of reasoning stands as follows: The earth, the sprout and the like are produced by some corporeal author, since they are effects. In this counter-argument the opponent draws a universal concomitance between effect-as-such (*kāryatva*) and precedence of corporeal authorship. But Udayana here points out that if any such universal relation could be established, there would have been no bar to the acceptance of the cogency of the opponent's argument. But the fact is that these two are in no way related through concomitance in presence and absence. The earth would here serve as the contrary instance (*vipakṣa*), which is, after all, a product, as the opponent also admits, but it is not preceded by some corporeal author. Hence, the inference involves discrepancy (*vyabhicāra*).¹

The opponent may, however, endeavour to prove that the earth and other grand phenomena of nature are not products at all, for the simple reason that they do not stand in need of any corporeal agent. But such a position would stand contradicted by perceptual knowledge.

It may be further contended that the earth, the sprout etc. are not produced by any agent since they are not produced by a body. But Udayana retorts that the reason here employed suffers from the defect of superficial attribution. 'Not being produced' would be sufficient to prove that the earth and the like are not produced by any agent. Thus,

1. *Trtīye tu vyāptau satyām ne 'dam anisṭam, asatyām tu na prasangah.* NKu., P. 485.

the adjunct in the reason is superfluous, involving the fallacy of futile adjunct (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*).¹ If, however, the opponent agrees to do away with the adjunct in the reason, then also there is no escape from the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi*, as the reason of the inference would then stand as 'not being produced' (*ajanyatva*), which does not necessarily subsist in the subject. None is prepared to admit that the earth, the sprout etc. are not produced at all.

It is worthy of notice that Udayana, after weighing the counter-inferences advanced by the opponent, proceeds to enquire about the purpose in view with which the opponent employs these counter-inferences. They may be advanced either for the purpose of contradicting the inference of the Naiyāyika or for citing a rival inference with a view to counterbalance it. But both these attempts would certainly fail for the simple reason that the counter-inference of the antitheist suffers from the absence of *pakṣadharmatā* (subsistence of the probans in the subject), through the knowledge of which the validity of inference is invariably determined.

The first counter-inference of the antitheist, as suggested before, is that 'God is corporeal since he is the author'. Thus, invariable concomitance is drawn between agency and embodiedness. Now, *pakṣadharmatā* consists in the subsistence of the probans, as pervaded by the probandum, in the subject. Here the probans, viz, agency, does not exist in the earth, the sprout etc. which constitute the subject of the inference. The invariable concomitance may be set forth in the negative way: Whoever is not corporeal is not the author. Here non-corporeality, i.e., the *hetu*, is pervaded by non-agency, i.e., the *sādhya*. But non-corporeality does not exist in the subject, viz, the earth etc. Thus, the contrary invariable concomitance suffers from the essential condition of *pakṣadharmatā* and as such any inference based on this weak foundation lacks the capacity of counter balancing the argument of the Naiyāyika. The second, the third and

1. Janyatvamātrasyai 'va gamakatve śarīram vyartham vyāpyatā 'navacchedakatva-rūpam. NKuP, p. 485.

the fourth inferences have already been examined and proved to be fallacious.

Now, the opponent may further reply that the fifth inference, viz, 'the earth and the like, are not produced by an intelligent agent since they are not produced by a corporeal being', does not suffer from the defect and as such the charge of non-existence of the reason in the subject cannot be levelled against it. It is true that the inference, as we have already seen, suffers from the defect of needless attribution (*vyartha-viśeṣaṇa*) and in such cases positive concomitance (*anvaya-vyāpti*) becomes an impossibility. The positive concomitance in such cases would be: 'Whatever is not produced by a body, 'is not produced by an intelligent agent'. If, however, such concomitance is given a negative form it stands as follows: 'Whatever is produced by a sentient being is produced by an embodied being'. In this negative concomitance, however, the reason is not invalidated on the charge of superfluous attribution (*vyartha-viśeṣaṇa*). When an inference is thus pivoted upon the observation of agreement is absence alone it becomes an exclusively negative inference (*kevala-vyatirekin*). Such inference holds good only when homologue (*sapakṣa*) is not-available. A positive instance is that in which the probandum is known to exist. But in the inference of the opponent ether (*ākāśa*) serves as the positive instance. Ether is not produced at all and as such it follows automatically that it is not produced by a sentient being. Thus, the probandum, e.g., 'not being produced by a corporeal being', exists in it and hence, it forms the positive instance. Thus, finally, the inference of the opponent cannot be an exclusively negative inference.¹ Nor is it a positive inference, as in the reason, viz, 'not being produced by a body', the element 'body' may easily be deleted. Hence, the reason loses all its probative value as the 'blue-smoke' is no proof of the fire. Concomitance may easily be understood with 'not being produced' and not

¹ Gaganādēh sapakṣabhāgasyā 'pī sambhavāt kevalavyatirekitvā 'nupapattēh.
NKu, p 486

with 'not being produced by a body'.¹ The inference, whether positive or negative, does not turn out to be a valid one. .

With a view to obviate the charge of futile attribution the opponent may do away with the reason mentioned above and argue that the earth, the sprout and the like, are not produced by an intelligent being since they are not pervaded by the precedence of sentient authorship.² In this positive inference there is, however, no possibility of the fallacy of futile adjunct (*vyārtha-viśeṣana*), but it remains to be found out what precisely would pervade the precedence by an intelligent agent. That is to say, the *vyāpaka* is to be pointed out in this particular reason, and unless it is not determined, the reason would stand defective and the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi* cannot be avoided in view of the fact that the absence of being a product (*janyatvābhāva*) does not exist in the earth and the like. If it, however, be maintained that the precedence of body would serve as the determinant (*vyāpaka*), it would yet fail to satisfy a critical realist. He will turn round and enquire of the exact meaning of the term *vyāpaka*. If the absence of B is determined by the absence of A, A is the determinant (*vyāpaka*) and B is the determinate (*vyāpya*).³ Where A is absent, there B must be absent. The absence of smoke is invariably determined by the absence of fire and as such fire is the determinant of smoke and smoke is the determinate. Thus, in the point in instance the absence of the precedence of a physical body (*śarīrapūrvakatvābhāva*) cannot invariably lead one to prove the 'absence of the precedence by an intelligent maker'. The earth and the like are preceded by intelligent authorship but not by physical organism. So the nature of being produced by a body does not serve as the determinant. Hence, we notice that the opponent fails to find out a *vyāpaka* in the present context and as such the Naiyāyika may very well claim to dismiss his counterbalanced reason.

1 Anvaye tu viśeṣaṇā 'sāmarthyāt' NKu, p. 486

2 Kṛtyādy akartṛkaṁ kartṛvyāpakarahitatvāt NKuP, p. 486

3 Na hi yad vyāvṛttir yad abhāve 'nvayavyatirekābhyām upasamhartum aśakyā, tat tasya vyāpakam nāme 'u' NKu, pp. 486-8

Now, the opponent may further contend that the universe, as a product, cannot necessarily presuppose the existence of an intelligent agent behind it, for the reason that the inference is vitiated by the logical fallacy of opposition (*virodha*). The jar and the like are similar instances (*sapakṣa*) where the probandum, the nature of being preceded by an intelligent maker, and the probans, the nature of being an event, co-exist with each other. Now, the instance simply entails that each and every product is preceded by a sentient agent. Precedence of such agency is admitted in the case of each and every product and so it is proved in the case of the earth and the like. Thus, so far as the general character of the probandum in the case of the jar and the earth is concerned, there is no possibility of any vitiating condition. But the difficulty will arise when this general character of the probandum will lead us to some special feature to which the probandum is essentially attributed. That is to say, the reason which attempts to prove the existence of an intelligent author of the universe also proves that the same intelligent author must be no other than an omniscient and omnipotent being. Here the opponent argues that the reason, the nature of being an event, by virtue of its subsistence in the subject (*pakṣadharma*) may at best establish that the agent will be a non-omniscient and embodied being, as in the case of the instance of the jar etc. Thus, in the inference, viz, 'the jar and the like are caused by some intelligent maker, since they are events', the special characteristic with which the probandum is attributed differs essentially from that of the inference through which we prove an intelligent maker of the universe. The self-same probans, viz, *kāryatva*, justifies, in one instance, the existence of an embodied agent of limited intelligence and, in the other case, omniscient and non-corporeal being is proved. The position, therefore, involves the fallacy of *virodha* so far as the particular feature of the probandum is concerned.

Udayana and Śaṅkaramiśra have carefully studied the view-point of the opponent when the latter notices the fallacy of *virodha* in it and meets the charge of the antitheist in the

following manner. In the self-same object we perceive colour and taste with the help of visual and gustatory sense-organs respectively. So also the identical reason, viz, the smoke, proves the existence of the fire-on-the-hill and the fire-in-the-oven. In these cases, diversity of the probandum owes its origin to that of the subject and the reasons are not said to be vitiated likewise by the fallacy of *viśeṣa-virodha* for the simple reason that such special feature of the probandum follows from the character of the subject (*paksadharmatā*). In the case under review the minor premise (*paksadharmatā*) guarantees the existence of different types of probandum, viz, omniscient and eternal being in the case of the universe and an individual soul in the case of a jar. Thus, the charge of *virodha* is answered.¹

It should be pointed out in this connection that *viśeṣa-virodha* is not universally admitted as a logical fallacy. Since Jayanta states in precise terms that if *viśeṣa-virodha* is considered to be a vitiating factor, then the possibility of argumentation would die out altogether. *Viśeṣa-virodha* only mutilates the character of the probandum but the inference is not vitiated by it.²

The opponent may further contend that the attempt made by the theist to support the existence of a Supreme Being is unwarranted. It is a fact of common experience that the particular type of event testifies to the existence of a particular type of cause. The jar and the like are particular events which guarantee the existence of a particular corporeal efficient cause. But the universe, in its entirety, does not justify the existence of an embodied intelligent being behind it. We start from a particular product and proceed to establish the existence of an efficient cause. Hence, the Naiyāyika's attempt to draw up a universal relation between effect-character and cause-character is futile.

1 Bhaved evaṃ yadī kārṇatvāyā 'sarvajñakartṛkatvena vyāptir abhyupagatā syāt, kin tu sakartṛkatvamatenā vyāptāt kārṇatvāddhetoh paksadharmatābalād abhīmatavisesasiddhir itī kva virodhah NIK, p 248

2 Viśeṣa virodhas tu viśeṣasiddhau saho 'palambhena tad asiddhau mūlādharmi-parihārā 'nupalambhena nirasto nā 'śamkāṃ apy adhirohati 'u NKu, p 480 Cf also, Sarvā 'numāno 'cchedaprasaṅgāt NM, p 182

But this charge of the antitheists, Udayana rejoins, is a most futile attempt to evade the obligation of belief in God. It simply betrays ignorance of the logical basis of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*). We assert an uniformity of co-existence of scented smoke and scented fire or when we are conscious of darkness in smoke we are automatically led to infer a special type of fire. But the logical ground of induction is the generalisation regarding co-existence. Universal relation subsists not merely between a particular instance of smoke and a particular instance of fire but between fire-as-such and smoke-as-such. When we infer fire from smoke on the hill, we infer fire *qua* fire-universal (*vahnitva*) and then by virtue of elimination of all types of fire (e.g., fire in the yard or in the kitchen etc.), fire-in-the-hill stands as the exact probandum which has so long been sought to be proved. Thus, particular and general inferences may be applicable to prove the self-same probandum. One does not counteract the other.¹ If the antitheist demurs to accept this truth as unchallenged, he would be charged with self-contradiction. The antitheist has shown his consent to the unqualified acceptance of universal concomitance between two particular instances, e.g., hilly smoke and hilly fire. The possibility of eternal co-existence of all instances of smoke and fire has been completely thrown overboard by him. But such an assumption would directly contradict his own thesis. Acceptance of such a position would eliminate the possibility of affirming the uniformities of co-existence even between two particular instances. It is true that the inference with which the opponent attempts to draw up a universal concomitance is particular in respect of the inference with which the Naiyāyika proves the existence of fire. But that particular inference of the opponent may, at times, turn out to be of a general nature in respect of the inference which is based on the universal concomitance of the particular smoke and the particular fire in that kitchen

1. Na hi vuseṣo 'stī 'ti sāmānyam aprayojakam NKu., p. 490 Cf. also, Yād vācayoh kāryakāranabhāvaḥ, tat sāmānyavor apī bādhakam vūṣā tathātvaniyamah NKuP., p. 490.

(*tad mahānāsiya dhūma*).¹ Thus, if we were to accede to the position of the opponent that all general inference is futile and unwarranted, the so-called particular inference of the opponent would have shared the same fate. But as the case is otherwise, it is reasonable to hold that the universal concomitance of a general type (*sāmānya-vyāpti*) must be accepted as valid, even if co-existence amongst individual instances subsists in such cases. Thus, finally, there is no bar to accept the universal relation between event-in-general and intelligent antecedence.

To be explicit, the existence of the seed-in-general is warranted by the sprout-in-general. In spite of this general type of inference between causes and effects there is no bar to the inference of a particular kind of seed which is related through concomitance with a particular sprout. Likewise, in spite of the eternal relation subsisting between the jar-as-product and corporeal agency behind it as the efficient cause, universal concomitance subsists also between the product-as-universal and the nature of being preceded by an intelligent agent. In this way it is only when an agent of the universe is established, the possibility of the contrary being eliminated, disembodied authorship of the universe is established once for all.

The opponent may, however, raise a note of protest on the issue and say that it is a fact of common experience that effect-hood (*kāryatva*) does never co-exist with what is produced by a disembodied being (*aśarīrikartrjanyatva*). The opponent (i.e., the Cārvāka) admits perception as the only means of knowledge. Inference being altogether disregarded as serving any useful purpose for the emergence of veridical cognition, the Naiyāyika's attempt to prove an uncorporeal author of the universe by means of reasoning does not carry much weight.

In reply to this contention of the opponent the Naiyāyika observes that he is not prepared to yield ground to to the opponent's view point. He asserts that the denial of inference as a means of knowledge is tantamount to self-

1. Tasyā 'pi viśeṣa 'ntarā 'pekṣayā 'kiñcitkaratvaprasaṅgāt. NKu., p. 490.

contradiction. The opponent is constrained, by his metaphysical commitments, to postulate the existence of atoms or eternal colour, which serve as the material cause of gross bodies or the colour inherent in them. What serves as the guarantor of the existence of such unseen entities? It needs be admitted that it is inference which serves this useful purpose. So also the Naiyāyika banks upon the universal concomitance of cause and effect as the pivotal basis for the inference which justifies the existence of God as the creator of the universe.

The opponent may further retort that the inference of the Naiyāyika is vitiated by the presence of condition (*upādhi*) in it. It is a matter of common knowledge that the very arrangement of parts in the jar or in any other gross body leads us to conclude that there is some intelligent mind behind it; but no such conception of any creator flashes in our mind with regard to such natural objects as the earth, the mountain, the river etc. We cannot even think of any conscious mind working behind the creation of those objects. The opponent makes out that this very special character of the effect serves as the condition (*upādhi*) vitiating the reason altogether. A disturbing condition is non-pervasive (*avyāpaka*) of the reason (*hetu*) and is pervasive or equipollent (*samavyāpta*) with the probandum (*sādhya*). Validity of inference depends on the unconditionality of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the probandum and the probans. But here the probandum, viz, the character of being produced by some intelligent agent, is pervaded by the divergence in the nature of the effect (*kāryagata-vailakṣanya*). Whatever is the product of some intelligent agent is characterised by that speciality. On the other hand, whatever is a product does not necessarily imply that it possesses that characteristic feature which imparts in us the idea of some intelligent agent. Say for instance, the mountain is admitted on all hands to be a product but the idea of any intelligent agent never flashes in our mind. Thus, the speciality in the nature of the effect turns out to be a condition (*upādhi*) and as such the reason stands vitiated.

The Naiyāyika, in reply, says that it cannot be denied that there is a possibility of the existence of some vitiating condition in the case of particular instances. But invariable concomitance does not relate to individual instances only. Each and every instance of smoke is related eternally to each and every instance of fire. Likewise, the Naiyāyika establishes universal concomitance between product as such and intelligent authorship as such and he does not seek to establish such relation between two particular instances only. Conditionality of probans in a particular type of reason is not competent enough to nullify a universal concomitance subsisting between two classes.¹

It must be noted here that the opponent does not yield ground in spite of the convincing logic advanced by the Naiyāyika and points out further difficulties in the reason, viz, productivity (*kāryatva*), of the theistic inference. Thus, though he does not succeed in laying the charge of conditionality, yet he points out that the theistic argument suffers from the fallacy of doubtful negative (*sandigdha vyatirekin*). In all cases of affirmative cum negative inference it is required to be shown that there is concomitance in presence of the probans and the probandum in the homologue (*sapak-sasattva*) and their agreement in absence in the heterologue (*vipaksasattva*). Thus, it is to be noted that in such an inference we must prove that both the probans and the probandum should be absent in the heterologue. But when concomitance in absence is not definitely known or in other words, when there is doubt as to their absence in the heterologue the validity of the reason stands uncertified.

The opponent will try to point out that the case under consideration involves the fallacy of doubtful negative (*sandigdha vyatirekin*). For, 'what is a product is conditioned by some intelligent agent'—this is concomitance in presence. But it cannot be definitely proved that whatever is not conditioned by some intelligent agent is not a product. That is to say, concomitance in absence stands doubtful.

¹ *Kāryatvasamanyasya kartṛsamanyena vyāptau vīcēṣo no padhīh* NkuP
p 490

In view of this the opponent contends that it will not be wise to accept the theistic inference. But if the Naiyāyika does not stop here and continues to argue that what the opponent has said does not give a complete picture of his viewpoint, the opponent will carefully examine the position of the Naiyāyika and point out its weakness. The Naiyāyika may say, so the opponent anticipates, that concomitance in absence is available as ether may serve as the heterologue. Thus, the Naiyāyika may argue that what is not conditioned is not a product and the instance in the case is ether. But the opponent would here say that what the Naiyāyika proves by the aforesaid concomitance in absence is that 'whatever is not conditioned by a cause is not a product'. But the same cannot prove concomitance in absence between 'what ever is not produced by an intelligent author, is not a product'.

The logician in defence avers that the absence of authorship (*sakartrkatvabhava*) may guarantee the absence of productivity (*karyatvabhava*). As a matter of fact, authorship also is a kind of cause and the absence of any type of cause, material or efficient, may certify that the object is not a product. Or, in other words, necessary concomitance of non-productivity (*karyatvabhava*) and the absence of any type of cause (*yaṅkiñcītkaranabhava*) can securedly be established. Thus, where there is the negation of an efficient cause there is also the absence of at least one type of cause and so the effect will not necessarily come into existence. The opponent will be constrained to admit this also. Otherwise, if the effect is said to be produced even in the case of the absence of the cause, causality will turn out to be a myth.¹ Hence, the Naiyāyika asserts that the charge of *sandigdha vyatirekin* levelled against him turns out to be groundless.

It has, however, been admitted that the certitude of concomitance between the ground and the consequent can be achieved only when it satisfies the test of unconditionality (*anaupadhika*). The opponent, here, contends that the theistic inference 'whatever is a product is conditioned by

1 Kāranesu ca nyatamavyatirekasya p karya nūtpatū prati prayojakatvad anyatha karanatvavyāghatat Nkū p 492

some intelligent author' is nullified by the presence of this vitiating condition (*upādhi*). The character of being preceded by non-eternal creative urge (*anityaprayatnapūrvakatva*) serves as the vitiating condition. It pervades the precedence of intelligent authorship (*buddhimatpūrvakatva*) which is, after all, the consequent of the inference. Whatever is conditioned by some intelligent author must also be preceded by a temporal urge (*anityaprayatna*). On the other hand, it is not the determinant of the reason (*hetu*). That is to say, we cannot say that whatever is a product must be preceded by non-eternal creative urge. Evidently, the earth and the sprout etc. are products but not preceded by such temporal urge. Thus, it becomes the non-pervisor of the reason. Hence, finally the inference is vitiated by the presence of this condition. The Cārvāka has sought to prove that the ascription of universal concomitance between a 'product' and the 'determination of intelligent agent' depends on another concomitance, viz, whatever is preceded by intelligent being is determined by temporal creative effort. So the concomitance turns out to be an artificial or indirect one, being based on a further concomitance.¹ Such a type of indirect concomitance, the Cārvāka contends, transpires to be bereft of all practical value.

The Naiyāyika, in reply, observes that when the opponent seeks to vitiate the inference on the ground that concomitance between the probandum and the probans is conditional, he does so on the acceptance of universal concomitance between the condition (*upādhi*) and the determinant (*sādhya*). Thus, to the opponent 'precedence of intelligent authorship' is determined by 'the precedence of temporal urge (*anityaprayatna*)'. But the Naiyāyika here avers that the two are in no way related through concomitance. Intelligence is dependent on physical apparatus as its cause, but it is in no way contingent on any temporal urge.² Knowledge is possible only in a physical body

1 *Anityaprayatnapūrvakatvaprayuktām vyāptim upajivat kāryatvaḥ na buddhimatpūrvakatvena svabhavapratibaddham* NKu, p. 494

2 *Buddhyā śarīram yathā kāraṇatayā 'pekṣyate, na tad vad anityaḥ prayatnaḥ kāraṇatayā* NKuP, p. 494

possessed of sense-organs. Thus, the 'precedence of sentient authorship' is pervaded by the 'precedence of a physical apparatus'. The body serves as the determinant of the 'precedence of intelligent authorship'. So the precedence of intelligent authorship is not pervaded by the precedence of any temporal urge and hence, the latter does not stand as the determinant of the probandum. Thus, it lacks the capacity of being a condition.

But this defence of the Naiyāyika paves the way for further criticism by the opponent. It is true that a universal relation cannot be admitted between the facts as mentioned above, but the Naiyāyika has also admitted that such universal concomitance obtains between the precedence of an intelligent authorship and that of a physical apparatus. In other words, the Naiyāyika is constrained to admit that whatever is determined by some sentient agent is also preceded by an embodied being. But as the hypothetical author of the universe is not corporeal, it necessarily follows that such natural phenomena (e.g., the earth, the sprout etc.) are not at all conditioned by an intelligent agent.

In reply to this charge the Naiyāyika enquires: What, according to the opponent, is the nature of a body (*śarīratva*). It may be said that what is directly supervised by some sentient being (*sākṣāt-prayatnavad-adhiṣṭheyatva*) constitutes a body. Supervision by a potter, which we notice in the case of a lump of clay, is indirect. Direct supervision is only possible in the case of one's own body. The opponent may feel tempted to enquire whether the Naiyāyika is prepared to accept atoms as the body of God for that reason. To this the Naiyāyika will reply that for the sake of argument he will not feel embarrassed if he is constrained to admit that atoms constitute the body of God.¹

If, however, body is defined as the locus of the sense-organ (*indriyāśraya*), the question will naturally arise as to the exact purpose which a sense-organ serves. Sense-object contact serves as the condition for the emergence of cogni-

1. Yadi sākṣāt prayatnavad adhiṣṭheyatvam tad isyata eva. NKu., p. 494.

tion. Creative effort (*prayatna*) is generated by this cognition. But when God's knowledge and volition are held to be eternal, it does not stand in need of any sense-object intercourse.¹ Limited volition (*avacchinna-prayatna*) is determined by the sense-organ. But God's knowledge is held to be eternal and is not limited by any space-time factor. It relates to all objects. Thus, the physical apparatus, as in relation to divine knowledge, should not be defined as the locus of the sense-organ.

It may further be argued that body may be defined as the receptacle of enjoyment (*bhoga*).² But it may be observed in reply that volition is an essential factor in enjoyment. Enjoyment is generated by merit and demerit which are, in their turn, conditioned by attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dvesa*) etc. All these defects mentioned above are due to error (*bhrama*) or misapprehension. Error is due to the non-apprehension of the specific character of the object (*viśeṣadarśanājanya*). When a nacre is perceived as a piece of silver, the resultant perceptual knowledge takes the form—'this is silver'. Now, every object has got two aspects: the object as something (*idantvena rūpeṇa*) and the object as determined by certain adjuncts, e.g., nacre as determined by nacreness. In the case of error we simply perceive the object as 'this is something'. But we do not cognise 'this' as determined by 'nacreness', which is the particular characteristic. If we cognise 'this' as possessed of nacreness, the resultant knowledge will be veridical. Thus, in error we fail to cognise the peculiar character (*viśeṣa*) of the object which differentiates it from other objects. It is evident, therefore, that error results from non-apprehension. But God, being omniscient, is cognisant of every object with all its peculiarities and as such there is not the remotest possibility of erroneous knowledge on his part. So if body is defined to be the locus of enjoyment, it needs be admitted that God does not stand in need of any body.³

1. Akāryau tu jñānaprayatnāv indriyāśrayatvam vinā 'pi syātām NKuP, p. 495

2. Enjoyment is the cognition of pleasure and pain (*sukhaduḥkhasatkāra eva bhogah*)

3. Na ca nityasarvajñasya bhogasambhāvanā 'pi Viśeṣa 'darśanā 'bhāve muthyā-jñānā 'navakāśe doṣā 'nutpattau dharmādharmaḥ asattvāt NKu, p. 495

It appears from what we have elaborately discussed above that the opponent would make out the charge that the atoms would become the physical organism of God as they are directly supervised by the Lord himself. It is, therefore, evident that the opponent is not prepared to take atoms as constituting the divine body. The opponent here contends that the atoms are not directly supervised by any intelligent agent (*saksat cetana'nadhisthita*) as they are neither directly nor indirectly supervised by any intelligent volition. Suppose, when a potter makes a pot through physical exertions, it is his body which is directly supervised by him, but the auxiliaries (*sahakarīn*) which he uses, viz, the thread, wheel etc., are indirectly supervised. But the atoms do not stand in need of any such exertion (*prayatna*) on the part of the agent, be it direct or indirect.

Udayana, in reply, observes that the reason (*hetu*) applied by the opponent is vitiated by the fallacy of 'being equipollent with the predicate' (*sadhyasama*). In a veridical reasoning the ground is known to exist in the subject, but the existence of the predicate (*sadhyā*) in the subject should be dubious. The opponent has tried to make capital out of the fact that atoms are not supervised directly or indirectly by intelligent volition, which he cites as the reason in the present case. But it is a matter of common knowledge that unless the reason is admitted by both the contesting parties it cannot function as a logical ground. It is a fact that the reason as advanced by the opponent does not find favour with the Naiyāyika and, therefore, the argument of the opponent is vitiated by the fallacy of *sadhyasama*. Had the Naiyāyika believed that atoms are not supervised directly or indirectly by an intelligent volition, it would have been quite in the fitness of things of the opponent to cite it as the reason of his inference¹. Thus, on the supposition that the body should be what is supervised by intelligent volition, the opponent cannot level the charge that the

¹ Svavyāpāre śaksatprayatnadhīstheya paksatvam eva parampara dhīstheyaivatmā itī sadhyāviśah. NkūPM p. 495

atoms would then turn out to be the body of the Lord.

Further, it is not always true that whatever happens to be the locus of sense-organs is a body. No universal relation can be established between the two. The contention of the opponent would have been tenable if the two were related through concomitance. It is merely a case of repeated observation that usually associates a body with a sense-organ. But it would not be safe to assert an invariable connection between the two. Thus, it is found from experience that snakes have no tympanic membrane. But it can never be maintained on that ground that the snake has not any body. If physical organism is possible even in the absence of one kind of sense-organ, would it be idle to expect that there may be physical organism in the absence of any sense-organ. So it is not wise to assert any necessary connection between the body and the sense-organ.

It may be contended here that the sense-organ is the *raison d'être* of cognition and as such its existence in the body is a desideratum. But it may be pointed out that each and every knowledge is not contingent on the sense-organ. Perceptual knowledge only is conditioned by the sense-organ. Instinct in Western philosophy does not stand in need of any sense-organ. Thus, it becomes evident that the association of the body with the sense-organ is purely accidental and so the contention of the opponent on the basis of this interpretation of body does not appear to carry much weight on a critical observation.

We have seen above that the position of the opponent is hardly convincing. But even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that atoms are not directly or indirectly supervised by intelligence since they are not the loci of sense-organs, the Naiyāyika would turn round and say that what is not the locus of a sense-organ may still stand in need of intelligent supervision. When the wood-cutter cuts a log of wood, the axe is supervised by the intelligent agent, though the same is not the locus of his sense-organs. On the other hand, when anything is just on the point of becoming active, it is not required that the

same should be under the guidance of some embodied intelligent agent. An object is sometimes set into motion by air (*vāyu*), i.e., it is directly guided by air but nobody would admit that air is possessed of any physical organism. Hence, the contention of the opponent that an insentient object should necessarily be guided by some embodied sentient agent, does not carry conviction. On the other hand, it is admitted by a general consensus of opinion that unintelligent objects are supervised by some intelligent being and not necessarily by an embodied sentient being, and as such atoms being insentient should be guided by some sentient agent and that agent is God.

Thus, in fine, it may be observed that when the opponent levels the charge of conditionality on the Naiyāyika he has in his mind merely the non-eternal character of knowledge and not its eternal character. The charge would be applicable against those philosophers who draw up universal concomitance between intelligence-as-such and the association of psycho-physical organism.¹ But the Naiyāyika would never admit that the physical apparatus is a desideratum to the emergence of knowledge.

The opponent may further uphold that such grand phenomena of nature as the earth, the sea, the mountain etc. are not directly produced by some intelligent author (*na cetanādṣṭhitahetukam*) and they are not directly conditioned by any volitional activity (*sākṣātprayatnādhīṣṭhitetarajanyatvāt*). But such an antitheistic inference is thwarted for the simple reason that the predicate (*sādhya*) does not subsist in the subject (*pakṣa*). That a product is not contingent on intelligent authorship is an absurdity and so the probandum in the inference suffers from the defect of the unreality of the probandum (*sādhyaḥprasiddhi*).

The opponent may still argue that the earth, the mountain etc. do not stand in need of any intelligent supervision (*cetanādhiṣṭhitahetukatvābhāvāh*) as they are caused by one who is not an embodied being (*śarīretarajanyatvāt*). But

1. Cf. Karttjanyatve lāghavāt janyatvarjāyā '3 'vacchedakatvāt na tu śarīrajanyatvasya NL, p. 256.

such an inference is vitiated on account of the fallacy of uncommon inconclusive probans (*asādhāraṇa*). Concomitance in agreement (*sapakṣavṛtti*) is a necessary condition of inference. In the syllogistic reasoning under consideration 'ether' stands as the positive instance (*sapakṣa*). Ether is an eternal verity and as such it forms the locus of the probandum, viz, absence of an intelligent authorship. But it is not possible to ascertain the probans in this subject. On the other hand, the probans, viz, being contingent on something other than a corporeal agent, does not exist in the positive instance. The positive instance, viz, ether, being eternal, is not contingent at all and as such the ascertainment of the concomitance in agreement is thwarted, turning the probans as uncommon inconclusive.

Let us now study various other objections put forward by the opponent against the theistic argument of the Naiyāyika and see how the Naiyāyika steers clear of them and finally establishes his own standpoint.

The Naiyāyika holds that the world as a whole, like the jar, is an effect. As the order and arrangement in a jar or in a piece of cloth depends upon the potter or the weaver, in the same way God is the supervisor of atoms which constitute the ultimate cause of the universe and that the relation between God and creation is ultimately the same as between the weaver and a piece of cloth. The point of enquiry of the opponent on this issue is whether the Naiyāyika would take God as a condition of the universe or as the cause thereof. Conditions may be of two types: *kāraka*, that which produces the effect and *jñāpaka*, that which makes an object known. It is the former that is looked upon as cause while the latter is not so.

If the aforesaid distinction between a cause and a condition be upheld, it may legitimately be enquired whether God is merely a condition or a cause of his creation. The Naiyāyika states in an unambiguous term that God is not a condition of his creation but a cause thereof, in the same way as the pot-maker happens to be the cause of the pot that he produces. But the Naiyāyika goes further and

maintains a difference between a direct and an indirect cause. A direct cause, in the opinion of the Naiyāyika, is the constituent of an effect. In the case of the cloth they are the yarns which, when arranged in a particular order, give rise to a piece of cloth. An indirect cause is one, possessing the urge to create and endowed with desire and volitional activity, which are necessary for the emergence of an effect. And God is an indirect cause of his creation, for it is he who possesses the urge and volitional activity for creation. God, according to the Nyāya, is omniscient and omnipotent. But the jar and the like which are human productions, stand also in need of divine supervision. Supervising capacity in God should on no account be limited.

The opponent may here contend that when the thread and the yarn etc. are guided by God himself, then what is the utility of supervision by the weaver. What the weaver will do? It is better that God be the only supervisor.¹ As a result, the postulation of a human efficient cause in the production of an effect turns out to be altogether superfluous.

Before he answers this question the Naiyāyika points out that his opponent entangles himself in a dilemma from which he will find it difficult to escape. The Naiyāyika asks: Does the opponent mean that his animadversion will ultimately prove the futility of human efforts in the production of an effect? Or, does he endeavour to negate the existence of God? Or, if in spite of divine supervision the voluntary activity on the part of the weaver is held to be essential, the necessity of yet one more supervisor, who will be other than God and man, would be unavoidable and, thus, the fallacy of *ad infinitum* will be evident.

Udayana maintains that causality is determined between two phenomena when an agreement in presence and absence (*anvaya-vyatireka*) holds between them. The weaver and the piece of cloth are so related. It has been corroborated by experience that the presence of a piece of cloth presupposes supervision by the weaver and the absence of the weaver

proves the non-production of the cloth. Thus, the necessity of the weaver in weaving out the cloth is an observed fact and, therefore, the importance of the practical efficiency of the weaver can on no account be ruled out.¹

The second charge is also unfounded. The existence of God is not proved on the ground of supervision of the yarn. God has been postulated by the logical mind of the Vaiśeṣika for the simple reason that eternal atoms cannot combine to create the molecules and the universe out of them, unless they are regulated by some presiding mind. Individual selves possessing limited knowledge lack the capacity for supervision and as such the postulation of a supreme regulating principle is felt to be a necessity. It is, therefore, obvious that as soon as God is proved to exist it also becomes evident that he is omnipotent and omniscient. And as a result it is possible for such a Supreme Being to regulate the process of creation of a piece of cloth also. To be precise, if the existence of God were proved simply on the basis that he is the regulator of the yarn etc., then the criticism of the rival school would have been satisfactory. For, in that case the weaver would have been the efficient cause through concomitance in presence and absence and admission of God as a further supervising agent would turn out to be futile. But as there are other reasons for inferring the existence of God, it can on no account be invalidated.²

Another question was raised by the opponent that even if in the case of God's supervision of the activities in the production of a piece of cloth the weaver is further postulated as the supervisor, the necessity of postulation of another supervising agent would be evident, and the process continuing would land us in *regressus ad infinitum*. But, it may be observed, that the opponent has failed to understand the position of the Naiyāyika. Omniscience and omnipotence are the consequential attributes of God. The effect-character of the universe presupposes an agent, not like

1 Na prathamah Anvayavyatirekasiddhatvāt NKu, p 496

2 Na dvitīyaḥ Paramānv adṛṣṭādy 'adhusṭhātṛtvasiddhau jñānā 'dīnām sarva-viśayātve vemādy adhusṭhānasya 'pi nyāyapṛāptatvāt Na tu tad adhusṭhānartham eva 'śvarasiddhiḥ NKu, pp 496-7.

ourselves having limited knowledge and power but an all-powerful and all-knowing agent. The Naiyāyika means to say that God is competent to supervise the process of creation of all phenomenal objects including a jar, and a piece of cloth. He possesses the supervising capacity. But it does not necessarily follow that he actually supervises. A professor teaching the post-graduate students can teach as well a school student. But that does not necessarily mean that he really teaches the latter. A competent man may or may not exercise his power. God being all-powerful and all-knowing can create all phenomenal objects. But the fact is that in spite of this capacity he does not necessarily take to creation of all objects.

The theists have postulated that God is powerful enough to create a piece of cloth. The opponent here retorts that if it is held that God also supervises the process of creation of all temporal objects such as a jar or a piece of cloth and if he actually exercises his power, the necessity of human endeavour would be meaningless. To this we may reply that the contention of the opponent is practically unfounded. Supervision by a potter in the case of a jar is rather temporal and the result is that the effect is produced in succession. The production of a jar is absolutely determined by the will of the potter. But if the opponent, in spite of the absence of any universal relation between the two, holds God to be the supervisor of a jar also, then such temporal objects would have sprung into being all at once, as God does not require any accessory assistance. Thus, the objection of simultaneous production leads us to set aside the opponent's contention. In fact, jars are made by an intelligent potter and the volitional urge of the potter for the creation of a jar springs from his desire of enjoyment (*bhoga*). Cessation of activity (*karmanāśa*) results from enjoyment.¹ Supervision by the potter is a perceived fact and so it cannot be negated. If, for argument's sake, God is held to act also as the supervising agent of such phenomenal objects then the

unite with another atom of its own class. An earth-atom can on no account combine with a water-atom to form a dyad. Logical absurdity inherent in the combination of heterogeneous atoms is borne out only when we remember that gross bodies created out of these atoms serve the purpose of enjoyment of finite selves. And this is why the Naiyāyika considers metemperical force (*adrsta*) of the finite self as the accessory cause of cosmic emergence (*srsti*). Thus, if two heterogeneous atoms come together to produce a dyad (*dyānuka*), the dyad would not have a definite colour or taste and as such no purpose will be served by it. It should also be noticed that individual moral deserts *do not produce an action which does not contribute* to the creation of an object enjoyable by the finite self. And this is why two heterogeneous atoms do not combine to produce a dyad.¹

Further, the atom and the dyad both lack gross magnitude (*mahatva*). How, then, would the Vaiśeṣika explain the emergence of gross magnitude in a triad. The Vaiśeṣika steers clear of this difficulty by postulating that three such dyads combine to make a triad. Kanāda avers in an unambiguous language that gross magnitude in a compound results either (i) from the gross magnitude of its constituent causes (*kāranamahatva*) or (ii) from the plurality of their number (*kāranabahutva*) or (iii) from the looseness of their conjunction (*pracayaviśesa*).² The first and the last alternative are wanting in the case of a dyad. The atom and the dyad neither possess gross magnitude nor are capable of loose conjunction. Thus, if two dyads combine to produce a triad, that compound would certainly be lacking in magnitude. So the choice goes to the third alternative, viz, the plurality of constituents.³ Hence, the Vaiśeṣika is constrained to admit that three dyads unite to make a triad. And when a compound of gross magnitude is produced, enjoyment of the embodied self becomes possible.

1 Vide NVTT, on NS III : 28 30

2 VS VII : 9, PPBh, pp 56-8

3 VS VII : 9 Kāranabahutvam tryānūke mahatvādirghatve janayati. VUp,

Praśastapāda, in course of his deliberations on cosmic creation and dissolution, maintains that motion tending to the formation of gross bodies starts at first in aerial atoms (*vāyaviya paramāṇu*) and gross air is produced through air-dyads and air-triads. Thereafter, through these respective courses of dyads and triads the air, the water, the earth and the fire are produced in due order¹. Now, it should be noted in this connection that these four gross materials are produced in a series. Simultaneity in production is contradicted by experience. At the beginning of creation, when God desires to bring this cosmos into existence, motion tending to creative conjunction is produced in all atoms so that dyads may be created out of them. Thus, all atoms are active and the conjunction resulting from them should necessarily be regarded as due to the action of both of them (*ubhayakarmaja*).

Now, during cosmic rest these four types of atoms lie inactive and as such do not come in contact with one another. So creation of the world-order demands that atoms must be active so that they may conjoin to produce a dyad. But as atoms are insentient they stand in need of intelligent guidance so that they may be set into motion. Motion in insentient entities is contingent on the guidance of some sentient principle. As, for example, an axe requires the guidance of the cutter so that it may be set into motion. Udayana points out that this conscious principle through whose guidance atoms are made active is God.

It cannot be gainsaid that the finite selves may well serve as the guiding principle; for, during cosmic rest, they do not possess any physical organism without which guidance is not possible. According to the Naiyāyika, consciousness is an accidental quality of the individual self and knowledge is held to be contingent on the body and the sense-organs. And as during the period of cosmic rest individual selves have no physical body, they cannot have consciousness too. It is, therefore, that they are not expected to have the

capacity to set atoms into motion. So it becomes necessary to assume some intelligent principle which may stand behind the process of creation. Such an intelligent principle must possess eternal and unimpeded knowledge. Eternality of such knowledge is proved by the fact that it is in no way contingent on the body and the sense-organs. If such eternal conscious principle is not admitted, creation of the universe cannot be satisfactorily explained and this would land us in chaos as individual moral deserts would remain impotent, with the result that the individual self would find nothing to enjoy.

We may *en passant* refer to Dinakara Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated commentator of the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, who not only agrees with Udayana on this point but also advances some original arguments to strengthen his point of view. The learned commentator brings out the cogency of this proof for the existence of God and reiterates that this argument is rooted in the causal argument as set forth above. He argues that motion is contingent on volitional effort (*prayatna*) and whosoever possesses this volitional effort is God.¹

The opponent may decline to admit that motion in atoms is produced due to the effort of some external intelligent principle, which is declared to be God and aver that atoms, prior to the creation of the universe, may be active and come into contact by themselves without any extraneous instrumentality. But such an assertion would involve self-contradiction. For, in that case, atoms would turn out to be conscious entities, a view which contradicts the accepted positions of both the proponent and the opponent.²

We have discussed in a foregoing chapter the necessity of postulating individual deserts (*adṛṣṭa*) of actions for explaining the diversity in the phenomenal world. And when God takes to creation he is assisted by these individual deserts. He creates according to the individual deserts of

1 Kāryapakṣakā 'numānam co 'palakṣanam Sargā 'dy akālīnadvyānukaprayojakam karma prayatnajanyam karmatvāt Din., p. 39

2. Yadi svaprayatnād eva teṣām syāt, tadā paramānūnām acatanyā 'nupapatnāh. NKuP., p. 503.

actions. Thus, the individual deserts serve as the necessary condition for all products. Hence, it is admitted that the primary actions in atoms leading to the creative conjunction are also contingent on *adrsta*. Here the Prābhākara contends that all effects may be explained to be due to *adrsta* alone and it would be superfluous to postulate a conscious supervisor of these merits and demerits (*adrṣṭa*).¹

Udayana, in reply, observes that the opponent has missed the view-point of the Naiyāyika in the present case. The Naiyāyika does not demur to accept *adrsta* as the necessary condition of all products. But that does not necessarily mean that the perceived causes should not be taken into account.² Moreover, if unseen merits would alone suffice to produce objects, then creation would have turned into an useless assumption. For, if no other cause besides individual merits be acknowledged, then there would have been no necessity of the body (i.e., receptacle of enjoyment), the external objects to be enjoyed and the sense-organs (i.e., instruments for enjoyment). But, it is a fact that without the locus of enjoyment no enjoyment is possible by virtue of *adrsta* alone. Thus, the locus, the objects and the instruments are the observed conditions for enjoyment and as such it is never judicious to deny their practical efficiency. Likewise, when the supervision by an intelligent agent in the case of a product is attested by perception, it would hardly stand to reason to repudiate the causal efficiency of such an agent.

The foregoing dissertation will make it clear that each and every product is determined by an agent. If this general rule is applied to particular cases, we may draw up a necessary concomitance between activity which is a product and agenthood. Eating in the absence of any eater is not conceivable. Thus, the primary activity in atoms must be determined by some intelligent agent and that agent is God.

The opponent may, however, join issue at this point.

1 Though the Mīmāṃsaka does not admit simultaneous creation and destruction of the universe, yet he argues in the above manner only for the sake of logical debate (*abhyupagama*)

2 Nā 'dṛṣṭam dṛṣṭaghatakam / Nku, V 4

He may say that he does not agree that there is any concomitance between activity-as-such and volition-as-such. He may, however, accept the position that in special cases there may be concomitance between a particular type of activity and a particular type of volition, if such concomitance is supported by empirical evidence. To illustrate: In so far as the volitional activity in human body is concerned there is invariably intelligent supervision. But this would not strengthen our hands to maintain a concomitance between the activity in atoms and the intelligent supervision. The reason is not far to seek. For, the volitional activity in human body is different from the activity in atoms, which, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher maintains, are the ultimate constituents of matter and not any physical organism. It is, therefore, that the opponent maintains that what holds good in the case of human bodies will not be so in the case of atoms. Nor even divine volition be regarded as the volition of an enjoyer (*bhoktṛ-prayatna*), for, God has nothing to enjoy. Thus, divine volition sharply differs from the volition of an embodied self. Hence, it may be safely argued that the activity in atoms does not stand in need of any intelligent supervision.

Udayana, here, points out that the contention of the opponent betrays slipshod thinking. Induction entails that what happens to be true in particular cases is also true in all cases. To take a concrete example: We observe in several instances that a stick determines the origin of a jar, i.e., one particular stick produces one particular jar. But it is induction that enables us to posit that all individual sticks and all individual jars are so causally related, i.e., each stick is quite competent to produce one jar. Likewise, in the point at issue, if a particular instance of activity is determined by a particular instance of volition, a general concomitance may safely be drawn between all individual activities and all individual volitions. This generalisation is logical and is endorsed by empirical observation.¹ Thus

1. Viśeṣasya viśeṣam pratī prayojakatayā sāmānya-vyāptim praty avirodhakatvāt. Anyathā sarvasāmānyavyāpter ucchedāt. NKu, p 505.

it is established that the activity in atoms is due to some intelligent volition and that agent is God.

Udayana sets forth yet another proof for the existence of God. It is a fact that every substance having weight drops down and it is only volitional urge (*prayatna*) that can prevent the material substance from falling downward. When I try to hold a piece of stone in my hand I feel that my hand drops down and this downward motion is checked by my volitional urge. Thus, the conscious self is the supporting agent. Now, this support may be either direct or indirect. It is direct when a flying bird does not drop down—it is the individual self of the bird which prevents its body from dropping down.¹ It is indirect when a piece of grass is carried by a bird and does not drop down. Here it is not the grass which prevents itself from falling down but it is the volitional activity of the bird which checks its downward motion. That luminaries and planets evolve in their respective orbits and do not collide with one another must necessarily be explained in the same way as due to some sustaining will and volition of some agent. And that supporting conscious agent of the universe is held to be God.² Udayana in support of this proof alludes to the following text of the Śruti: "Oh Gārgi, the earth and the heaven are supported by this Eternal Being."³

Udayana posits that God is not only the creator but also the destroyer of the universe. Prāśastapāda has amply dealt with the creative and destructive nature of God.⁴ The entire universe including the dyads are destroyed by the Lord. Destruction of dyads results in the wake of the disjunction of atoms and such disjunction cannot be effected by finite selves since the atom lies beyond the ken of limited perception. Hence, some agent of unimpeded knowledge must be postulated and that agent is God.

1. Gurutvatatām patanābhāvah patanapratibandhakaprayatnaprayuktah dhrtvāt pakṣipatanābhāvavat Dīn, p. 39.

2. Jagat sāksāt paramarajā vidhārakaprayatnā 'dhr̥ṣṭitām gurutve saty apatanadharmakatvāt. NKu., p. 506

3. Etasya vā 'ksarasya prāśasane Gārgi dyāvāprthivyau vidhṛte tiṣṭhataḥ. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, III. viii. 9

4. PPBh, pp. 19-23.

Another argument for the existence of God is advanced by making him the agent for introducing convention between a word and its meaning. The Mīmāṃsaka, as we have already discussed, do not believe in cosmic rest (*pralaya*). He, of course, admits day-to-day creation and destruction, but he contends that it would be unwise to admit total annihilation and creation of the universe. The Naiyāyika believes that the universe has a origin and as such the usages and conventions do not exist from eternity. At the end of a cycle conventions are destroyed¹ and it may be in the fitness of things to enquire about the identity of one who was responsible for introducing these conventions in the beginning of a cycle.

In ordinary parlance relation between a word and its meaning is determined by convention (*saṃketa*) and this convention is understood by a junior person when he finds that one senior person seeks to convey a meaning through the medium of a word to another senior person. To be precise: A junior person associates a meaning with a word which he has observed to have been associated with it in the course of his experiences. Thus, the volition of an elderly person is essential in determining the sense that a word conveys. Unlike the Mīmāṃsaka the Naiyāyika does not admit the natural relation of a word and its meaning. So an agent responsible for determining the denotation of a word in the beginning of a creation must be postulated and that agent is God.

God not only introduces conventions regarding word and its meaning, but the different arts also originate from him. The art of creating different material objects, the art of writing and language etc.—all these arts have been ushered into existence by some independent individual being and that agent is none other than God. As in our everyday experience we find skilful instructors, so in the beginning of creation there was an individual being possessed of the highest skill who introduced all these arts and crafts. Thus,

1. Janmasamskāravidyādeh sakteh svādhyāyaka-manoh /
Hrasadarśanato hrāsah sampradāyasya miyatām // NKu, II. 3.

the *Śuklayajuh Samhitā* declares: Salutation to the potter, to the blacksmith.¹ The person who is responsible for introducing convention at the beginning of creation must be free from all previous conventional methods. He does not stand in need of any previous usage to guide him in learning the meaning of words and herein lies his freedom.²

Here a question may be asked. The theist does not admit the existence of any physical apparatus in God. And in the absence of any physical organism how does God introduce any convention or show any artistic skill. Udayana here definitely asserts that whenever there is an occasion God is competent enough to assume physical forms and impart instructions to human beings and thus exhibits his paramount power.³

But this reply of Udayana cannot silence the opponent, for he may argue that a physical body being recognised as the receptacle of enjoyment it does not stand to reason how God, who has no unseen destiny and nothing to enjoy on that ground, assumes any physical form. Vardhamāna anticipates this anomaly and seeks to explain it away by saying that even though God does not possess any unseen destiny of his own which compels him to assume a physical form, he is required to assume it on account of the unseen moral force of individual beings.⁴

The Naiyāyikas are the zealous advocates of the authority of the Vedas. But unlike the Mīmāṃsakas they do not believe them to be revealed literature which was not created by any being human or divine. The Naiyāyika holds that the Vedas are not self-evident principles. Authority of verbal testimony depends on the veracity and infallibility of the speaker. The words of authoritative persons are distinct sources of valid knowledge. Now, as the Vedas after all comprise of words and are verbal on that account, their authority, if any, would, therefore, also depend on the

1. Namah kulālebhyaḥ karmārebhyaś ca vo namah XVI. 27.

2. Tajjātiyavyavahārā 'nupajivtvam puruṣasya svātantryam NKuP., p. 508

3. Grhnātu hi 'īvaro 'pi kāryavafāt sarīram antarā 'ntarā, darśayati ca vibhūtim. NKu., p. 508.

4. 'īvarasyā 'drśtābhāve 'pi tac charīrasādhyahetukā 'smadādibhogasampālakā 'drśtād eva 'īvarasya sarīrotpattiḥ. NKuP., p. 508.

nality of the Vedas. In his opinion the Vedas are the creations of God, the super-intelligent being.

Moreover, the Vedas are not anything but a number of sentences strung together and as a sentence is the composition of an intelligent being, the Vedas must have been composed by an intelligent person who is God. The philosophers of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school do not admit absolute annihilation of the universe. In their opinion the universe is a continuous flow. In that case there is no beginning of the universe also. As such they do not hold like the Naiyāyika that in the beginning of creation it was God who created the Vedas. The Veda, in their opinion, is something which is eternal. Now, if that is so, the letters which comprise them must be held to be eternal. But this view will lose much of its strength if it be held that the world has a beginning and an end. And this is why Udayana has sought to prove cosmic creation and dissolution. He also holds non-eternity of words and as the Vedas are verbal in essence they are also transitory. According to him God, in the beginning of creation, composed these Vedas and imparted instructions to the seers.

Let us now close this section by referring to yet another, i.e., the last of the eight arguments by which Udayana proves the existence of God. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher avers that all sensible bodies, i.e., the earth, the water, the fire and the air, are ultimately composed of infra-sensible particles called atoms (*paramāṇu*). These four types of ultimate units respectively form four types of composite bodies. The Vaiśeṣika opines that two atoms combine to form a dyad (*dvyāṇuka*) and three such dyads constitute a triad (*tryāṇuka*). Thus, atoms are the ultimate constituent elements of gross bodies. The magnitude of a dyad is atomic. As the dyad is a product, its magnitude and other qualities must be non-eternal. Attributes of non-eternal objects can never be eternal. So the magnitude of a dyad must have a genesis. The Vaiśeṣika must answer this question as to how a dyad derives its magnitude.

It has been asserted by the Vaiśeṣika that the magnitude

of a composite body is necessarily determined by one of the following:—magnitude of the constituents (*avayava-parimāna*), or, their number (*saṃkhyā*), or, looseness of their texture (*pracaya*).¹ Now, the magnitude of a dyad cannot be held to be due to the magnitude of the component atoms, since atomic magnitude is devoid of any causal efficiency.² The fact is that a magnitude can only produce a magnitude of superior type of the same category. Thus, gross magnitude (*mahat-parimāna*) gives rise to grosser magnitude. Now, magnitude of atoms and that of gross bodies are of divergent character. Hence, if it is held that the magnitude of the dyad has its genesis in the magnitude of the atoms which are its constituent elements, then the magnitude of the dyad would be minuter than the atomic magnitude. But a minuter magnitude than that of the atom is inconceivable in view of the fact that the magnitude of an atom has been declared to be the minutest magnitude. It is, therefore, that the atomic magnitude is held to be bereft of all causal efficiency.³

The third alternative is not also tenable, that is to say, the magnitude of a dyad cannot be due to the loose texture of the atoms inasmuch as such looseness of texture means that some parts of the composite whole are conjoined together while others are not so. But as atoms are held to be partless entities it is not understandable if looseness of texture is sought to be explained with reference to its parts. Thus, we are constrained to admit that the genesis of the atomic magnitude of a dyad is due to the number, i.e., the duality (*dviṭva*) of the constituent atoms.

Now, the Vaiśeṣika thinks that all integral numbers higher than one are derived from enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*). When two objects are presented to our visual sense what happens is this: We have a complex cognition (*samūhālabhāna*), which we express as 'this is one' (*ayam ekaḥ*) and 'that is one', and the said cognition serves as the

1 *Samkhyataḥ parimānāc ca pracayaḥ apī jāyate* / *BhP* 31 p 814

2 *Na ca tasya paramānuparimānam dvyanukaparimānam vā karanam* Nitya parimānatvāt, apuparimānatvāc ca *NKu*, p 514

3 *Parimānasya svāpekṣayotkrśṭaparimānajanakatayā dvyāṇukatryanukayor apu-
tamatvāpattya nā 'nuparimānam parimānajanakam* *NKuPrā*, p 516
Cf also, *NKuP*, p 517

accessory cause for the emergence of duality which inheres as a quality in the two objects on a collective basis (*pariā sambandha*). To come to the point, in ordinary parlance the notion of duality results from the complex cognition of individual beings. But as during cosmic rest (*pralaya*) individual selves remain unconscious, magnitude in the duality cannot be held to be due to the enumerative cognition of individual self. Thus, it is posited that just on the eve of cosmic creation there must be some intelligent being whose enumerative cognition creates the notion of duality. This being is no other than God who, as such, is held to be possessed of unimpeded cognition.¹

On a careful perusal of the eight-fold arguments enumerated by Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, which have been stated in the foregoing paragraphs, it will appear that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher has sought to persuade us to believe in the law of causality, in the theory of atoms as the material cause of the universe, in the theory of cosmic rest and creation and in the authority of the Vedas as the utterances of an infallible being.

Firstly, the Naiyāyika has argued that every effect must be preceded by an intelligent cause which gives rise to it and as the world happens to be one such effect, it must have an intelligent cause too. And this cause is none other than God. Secondly, every material substance is found to be dissolvable into parts which constitute it. Now, we must stop at one stage where no further dissolution into parts is possible. Such unanalysable entities are, in the philosophy of the Vaiśeṣika, called atoms. If it were held that these atoms also could be divided into further minuter parts, the process still continuing, would land us in insurmountable difficulties.

1 *Īśvarabuddhum apeksotpanna paramānu-dvyanukesu vahutvasamkhyā* PPB pp 56-7

Ratnakīrti, the astute Buddhist logician, attributes this view to Trilocana, the preceptor of Vācaspati Miśra. Vide *Dvyanukesvarasiddhau Trilocana eva prāl Vivādaspadibhūtam dvitvam ātmapattau kasya cid ekaikaviśayām buddhum apeksa Dvitasamkhyatvat Yat yat dvitvam tat tathā Yathā dve dravye Tathā ce 'dvi dvyanukagatadvitvam Tasmāt tathā Yasya cī 'tra buddhur apeksate sa eva Bhagavan Īśvarah Īśvarasādhanaśūrangam, Ratnakīrtinibandhanatī, p 36 (Mithila Research Institute)*

Compare also *Na ca 'smādādinām apeksābuddhiḥ paramānusu sambhava Tad yasya 'sau sarvajñah* NKu, p 518

CHAPTER SEVEN

NATURE OF GOD

I. *Motive of creation.*

We have seen in the foregoing chapters that the theistic inference of the Naiyāyika turns valid only when the world is proved to be a creation. The antitheists including the Mīmāṃsaka make capital out of this theory of creation as held by the Naiyāyika and attempt to repudiate the theistic standpoint in the following manner.

Thus, the opponent points out that it is difficult to understand the reason why there should be any creative urge at all in God and why should he exert himself for the creation of the universe? Every creative urge is motivated.¹ It is a fact of experience that our creative urge presupposes some unfulfilled desire. We exert ourselves either for the attainment of some desired object or for avoiding something which is detrimental to our self-interest. But God, as posited by the theist, has neither anything to achieve nor anything to avoid (*heya*).² He has no unmerited desire. As God is held to be self-satisfied and self-sufficient he has nothing to gain and nothing to lose.³ As an omniscient being he controls all. Hence, God's impetus to creation remains inexplicable.

This point has not been touched upon by Vātsyāyana and it appears that Uddyotakara is the earliest Naiyāyika, who, while discussing the question, has referred to the standpoint of his predecessors. According to some thinkers God exerted himself for the creation of the world simply out of his sportive mood. It is his sportive yearning that stands

1 Prayojanam vinā na preksavatām pravṛttih NVIT, p 944

2 Na punar Īvarasya heyam asti duḥkhā 'bhāvāt, no 'pādeyam vaśtvāt NV, p 949

3 Na ca prāptasakalaprapṭavyasyā 'sti prāpanīyam kuñcid Īvarasya NVIT, p 944

at the back of this stupendous creation. Uddyotakara refuses to lend his support to this view for the reason that the sportive mood is discovered whenever an individual is afflicted with pain and seeks to overcome it. As God is absolutely immune from any kind of misery and affliction the creation of the universe cannot be looked upon as a sportive activity on the part of God.

There is another school of thinkers who opine that God has created this universe only to exhibit his unlimited majesty and glory. According to this view, God, might possibly think that this stupendous variety of the universe, which he creates, would add to his greatness and glory. In European philosophy Herman Lotze subscribes to this view when he says that God's motive in creating the world was to communicate his holiness to us.¹ But this explanation does not commend itself to us. It may be enquired why he should be so keen on displaying his own glory. Does such self-publicity add anything to his eternal and unalloyed glory? Certainly not. He does not lose anything if he stops demonstrating his infinite power.² If he succeeds in gaining anything he feels no advantage; if he loses anything he is not in the least embarrassed. As he is always self-content and self-fulfilled the creation of the world cannot be said to be motivated by his desire to communicate his own powers. Thus, no satisfactory explanation can be offered except positing, as Uddyotakara does, that desire for creation is innate to divine nature.³ This has been asserted in the *Māndukyakārikā* and in Śamkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*.⁴ It does not appear to be an intelligent

1 Herman Lotze, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, p. 99

2 Na hi bibhūtikhyāpanena kaścīd atisayo labhyate, na cā 'syā 'khyāpanena kīncid biyate NV, p. 949

3 Kim artham tarhi karoti? Tat svābhāvyāt pravartata ity aduṣṭam NV, pp. 949-50

Cf. Svabhāva evaī 'ṣa bhagavato yat kadācit sṛjati kadācit samharati viśvam NM, p. 186

Cf. also, "God is the creator of the world, it belongs to his being to his essence to be creator" Pringle Pattison, *Idea of God*, p. 304

4 Bhogārthā sṛjati ity anye kīṇārthā itī cā 'pare /
Devasyaī 'ṣa svabhāvo 'yam āptakāmasya kī sṛjā //
Māndukyakārikā, 1. 9

Cf. also, ŚB on BS, II. 1. 33

question to ask why is it that God possesses such creative urge in his nature, for in that case one may enquire as well why the sun rises in the east and sets in the west.¹

But here one may argue: If God is held to be a dynamic principle by nature and if his nature is to create, then this process of creation would never come to a stop. For, the nature of an eternal unitary principle, viz, God, should necessarily continue for ever and as such this cosmic activity would combine since there is none to oppose him and his activities. The result will be that universal dissolution or creation at intervals would have to be accounted for. If the omniscient and omnipotent agent is there, why should there be any recess in the creation of the world-process.² Moreover, such a position would ultimately lead to simultaneous creation of all objects—a position which will not stand the test of our experience. Thus, the same objection that the Naiyāyika advances against the Sāṃkhya, who holds *Prakṛti*, an ultimate unitary principle, as the cause of the universe, would undermine his (Naiyāyika's) own position.

In reply Uddyotakara has pointed out that the charges are too weak to carry any conviction. Unlike the Sāṃkhya, the Naiyāyika does not conceive the ultimate cause of the universe as an insentient principle. Such a cause, the Naiyāyika opines, possesses intelligence and power of discrimination. He has to depend on individual moral deserts (*adṛṣṭa*) for bringing out this cosmos. Thus, though God is held to be creative by nature, yet he does not always engage himself in creative activity. Only those objects are created by him of which the conditions have been collocated. Simultaneous collocation of all conditions is an impossibility and is contradicted by experience. God's creative urge depends on spatio-temporal relations. He will have to wait until individual deserts (viz, *dharma* and *adharma*) become com-

1. NM., p. 186.

2. Cf. Na hi ekarūpāt kāranāt kāryabhedam paśyāmah. NV., p. 950.

Cf. also, Ekasya na kramah kvā 'pi vaicitryam ca samasya na / NKu, I. 7.

petent to fructuate.¹ Thus, the contention of the opponent turns out to be groundless.

II. God's Will and Effort.

We have said in the preceeding pages that the Naiyāyika describes God as the intelligent agent of the phenomenal world. Now, one may enquire as to the nature of his agency (*kartrtva*). What is exactly meant by the term 'agency' or 'creativity' with which God has been qualified.

The older school of logicians including Uddyotakara observes that God possesses direct cognition and will (*aparokṣajñānacikirsāvattva*) which explain the origin of the phenomenal world. It is, therefore, that when the Naiyāyika conceives God as the author of this universe, he means that God possesses direct intuition and desire to create. Uddyotakara does not find any necessity for postulating God's volitional effort. He simply asserts that God has unimpeded and unbounded desire (*aklistā icchā*).² That is to say, God's will is free from error (*kṛśa*). According to the Naiyāyika, such error may be due to attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and stupor (*moha*).³ As God is immune from all these types of error he has an unbounded (*apratihata*) will which encompasses all—he can do whatever he desires. From a perusal of Praśastapāda's observation on the creation and destruction of the world it will be evident that he, like Uddyotakara, admits the existence of knowledge and will in God. And God's creative nature means his direct knowledge and will.

But Vācaspati and Udayana assert that agency (*kartrtva*) on the part of God is nothing but volitional activity (*kr̥tīmatva*) generated by direct cognition and desire. They

¹ Sa khalu pravartamāno dharmā 'dharmayoḥ paripākakalam apekṣate NV. p 950

In the Yoga system of Patañjali this competence of individual deserts to fructuate is technically called *vipāka*. When these merits fructuate, birth, life and enjoyment happen Cf *tad vipāko jaty āyurbhogah* YS, II 13

Cf also, *Karmavipakam* itī Praṇinām yāni karmāni teṣāṃ vividham pakam phalo 'padhānakalam viditvā etc *Sūkti* on PPBh, p 282 also, *Praṇinām karmavipako palambhat*, VV, p 299

² NV, p 952

³ But according to Patañjali such error (*kṛśa*) admits of five types nescience (*avidyā*), self-conceitdness (*asmīta*), attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and fear (*abhī-
veśa*) Vide YS, II 3

have gone so far as to discover Uddyotakara's approval regarding the existence of volitional effort (*kṛti*) in God.¹ It is worthy of notice that later writers of this school, coming after Udayana, have almost unanimously accepted this view.

Whatever may be the merit of the suggestion of Vācaspati and Udayana regarding Uddyotakara's view on the volitional effort in God as the determining condition for creation, we would submit that Uddyotakara had special justification for not positing volitional effort in God. The reason is this. Uddyotakara has pointed out the divergence underlying the nature of agenthood in God and in the embodied soul. It is obvious that creativity in embodied soul springs from his volition. But when God is conceived as destitute of any psycho-physical organism, his creative nature is not contingent on volition. This is why Uddyotakara does not find any necessity of postulating volition in God.

During cosmic rest (*pralaya*) the ultimate units of the universe, i.e., atoms, lie separated from one another and when God creates, they are made active so that they are conjoined and dyads etc. are produced. Udayana here points out that divine volition generates motion in these atoms. Thus, Udayana clearly asserts that the atom serves the same purpose in regard to God, which a physical body accomplishes in regard to the embodied soul. In other words, the atom may be looked upon as the physical apparatus of God. It must be remembered here that the Naiyāyika does not believe in any physical organism of God. Udayana's suggestion, that the atom may be conceived as the divine body, is only to meet the contention of the opponent that *kṛti* is understood only with reference to a physical body.

It may, however, be contended that Udayana's position stands in contradiction to the accepted dogma of the Nyāya-

sense-organs.¹ It is also the locus of enjoyment. Here effort means volitional activity for enjoyment. But motion which is generated in the atom does not contribute anything to the enjoyment. Enjoyment is the experience of pleasure or pain. God has no enjoyment of pleasure or pain and as such motion generated by him in the atom should not be explained as an effort (*ceṣṭā*) on the part of God. As God does not possess any sense-organ the atoms are not the loci of divine sense-organs. The atoms are not also the loci of enjoyment, for God has nothing left to enjoy. Hence, it would be unwise to consider atoms as the body of God.

In reply to this charge of the opponent, Udayana observes that he does not admit the definition of body as advanced by Gotama. According to him, body is that which is directly supervised by the volition of an individual.² If we take up this definition of body, atoms will inevitably turn out to be the body of God as they are directly guided by divine volition. Creative motion in atoms is generated by God's volition in the same way as activity in an individual body is generated by the volition of the individual. Uddyotakara does not admit atoms as constituting the divine body. And as such he does not feel any necessity to postulate divine volition in order to explain his creative nature. In Uddyotakara's opinion God is a disembodied being. But Udayana reluctantly postulates a divine body and as such he has to admit divine volition. The later Naiyāyika is in complete agreement with Udayana when he also seeks to aver that God is possessed of eight attributes including volition.³

III. *Metaphysical Attributes of God.*

Though God occupies an exalted position in the architectonic plan of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, still in the early literature of this school there is no explicit statement of

1 *Ceṣṭe 'ndriyārthasrayah farīram* NS, I 1. 11.

2 *Saksāt prayatnavad adhustheyatvam* NKu, p. 494

3 *Maheṣvare 'ṣṭau manasas tathai 'va ca* // Quoted in Dīn, p. 176

Cf also, *Aṣṭagunadhikarano bhagavān īśvara iti kecit* NK, p. 57.

divine attributes. Thus, the texts of the *Vaisesikasutra* and the *Padarthadharmasamgraha* are absolutely silent on the point. From a study of the dissertation of creation and dissolution as presented by Prasastapada it is evident, however, that God possesses will and desire. But in the enumeration of general and particular attributes of the self, God's attributes have not even been mentioned. Śrīdhara the author of the *Nyayakandali*, however, thinks that God is not an unqualified identity and he sums up the opinion of his predecessors on the issue and advances his own viewpoint. The eight divine attributes as held by the later Naiyāyikas are not met in the works of the early Vaisesikas. Śrīdhara, on the other hand, refers to the view point of a section of early Vaisesikas who hold that God is possessed of six qualities, viz, number (*samkhyā*), magnitude (*parimāṇa*), separateness (*prthaktva*), conjunction (*samyoga*) and disjunction (*vibhaga*) as the general attributes (*samānya-guṇa*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) as the special attribute. Those Vaisesikas do not ascribe desire (*icchā*) and volition (*prayatna*) to God. They aver that God's intuition is his unassailed creative activity and the purpose of desire and volition is served thereby. Indeed Śrīdhara also seems to accept the same position.¹

It is in the commentary of Vatsyayana that we, for the first time, come across a list of divine attributes. According to Vātsyayana, God is a special type of self possessed of attributes.² Though Vacaspati avers that the position of Vatsyāyana on this issue is not explicit, still it seems that according to the latter God has six qualities. He recognises only one special attribute of God and that is knowledge, but not desire, volition and the like. On the other hand Vatsyayana attributes God with merit (*dharma*) and absorption (*samādhi*). He is also possessed of eight *aśvarya*, viz, *anīma*, *laghīma* etc.³

1 *Īśvaro p buddh gunatvad atmaī va Na ca śaḍguṇādh karanāḥ caturdaśa guṇādh karanād guṇabhedena bhī dyate muktātmabhiḥ vyabhī cārat* NBh p 10

Cf also *Anye tu buddhī eva tasyā vyāhata kī yātiakur ity evam vadanta icchā prayatnāḥ apy anābhīkura anāḥ śaḍguṇādh karanā yam ty āhuh* NBh p 57

2 *Guṇavīṣṭam atmanāntaram Īśvarah* NBh on NS IV : 21

3 *Dharmajñānasamādhisampada ca vīṣṭam Īśvarah tasya ca dharmasamādh phalam anumady aṣṭavidham aśvaryam* NBh pp 943-4

Uddyotakara, however, does not accept the position. He does not think that God is possessed of merit.¹ According to Uddyotakara God has seven attributes—five general attributes common to all substances and cognition and desire as two special attributes. God's desire is unaffected and unhindered and relates to every object² in the same way as God's intuition in the Pātañjala system relates to all.³

Vācaspati, however, adds a novel attribute, i.e., eternal volition, to God,⁴ later on accepted by Udayana and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Jayanta does not follow the beaten track of the Naiyāyika when he admits merit and bliss as attributes of God. That is why Jayanta has been referred to as an *ekadeśin*. Raghunātha Śiromani also admits God as the seat of eternal bliss.⁵

IV. *Eternity of Divine Knowledge and Will.*

The opponent, as we have seen, charges the Naiyāyika that bodily organism is a necessary condition for the emergence of will, volition etc. and as God possesses desire and volition, he must be an embodied being. The Naiyāyika here observes that when desire, volition etc. are transitory events, physical organism of the agent may be a necessary condition. But as volitional urge and desire in God are held to be eternal, there is absolutely no ground for postulating a divine body. Omniscience in God is not incompatible with the absence of a divine body.

It has, however, been contended that even if it be granted that God does not stand in need of a physical organism, there is no escape from other antinomies. God's volition is eternal. As the presence of physical organism is not regarded as the necessary condition of eternal desire,

1. Eke tāvad bruvate—dharmaññānavaurāgyaṣvavyāny atśayavanti tasmin iti etat tu na buddhāmahe NV, p. 951.

Vācaspati, however, thinks it not to be really the position of Vātsāyana Vātsāyana refers to this view in course of logical dispute (*abhyupagamatāda*)

2. Śridhara and Jayanta are of opinion that in spite of the fact that God's desire is eternal in character, its manifestation is contingent on time. It does not relate to all objects at all times

3. Icchā tu vidyate 'kṣiṣṭā 'vyāhatā sarvārthesu yathābuddhiḥ. NV, p. 952.

4. NVTT., p. 956

5 Cf Akhandā 'nandabodhāya pūrnāya paramātmanc // ĀTVD, p. 6.

similarly, the opponent argues, knowledge and desire should not be regarded as the necessary condition of eternal volition. In fact, God is held to possess volition, eternal and uncaused. And this supposition would ultimately lead us to hold complete absence of knowledge and desire in God—an absurd position which the theist would hardly admit. The Naiyāyika holds that God's knowledge, desire and volition are all eternal verities¹ and as such uncaused volition in God is not conditioned on knowledge and desire. It should be pointed out, however, that agenthood (*kartrtva*) consists in the possession of knowledge, desire and volitional urge.² And when God is held to be the sentient agent behind this creation, he must possess volition in order to justify the emergence of his creational activity. The net result of this discussion is that if God possesses eternal volition, he must be insentient and consequently the very attempt of the Naiyāyika to prove an omniscient God, having knowledge of all objects, turns futile.

In reply to this charge the philosopher of this school has pointed out that the opponent has failed to appraise the relation of desire and volition to cognition. It is an admitted fact that cognition is an essential condition of desire and volition. And when God's desire and volition are admitted to be eternal verities, they are not contingent on God's knowledge. But it should be noticed that desire and volition are, by nature, specified by an object (*saviṣayaka*). When I desire, I desire to have something. Volitional activity even if it be eternal, stands related to a certain object. It is here that the Naiyāyika points out that desire and volition, though eternal, require the assistance of knowledge in order to be specified by a particular object.³ It may be objected, however, that knowledge specifies an object. It is the very nature of cognition that it is

1 *Buddhavad icchāprayatnāḥ api tasya nityau* NVTT, p. 956
kartrtvasya NVTT, p. 956

2 *Jñānacūṣṭhāprayatnasamavāyalaṅkānatvāt kartrtvasya* NVTT, p. 956

3. *Na ca prayatnā 'unalābhārtham eva matum apেকṣate* *Viṣayālābhārtham apy*
apekṣanāt NKu, p. 499

always qualified or characterised by an object.¹ In the same way it might be posited that desire and volition may be by nature specified by a content and as such it does not require the assistance of any knowledge to specify it. Thus, God's knowledge stands, as before, as an unnecessary assumption. Udayana here points out that desire and volition stand as distinct qualities of the self from knowledge. This distinction presupposes an inherent divergence in their character. Whereas knowledge is by nature directly related to an object, volition and desire are not so. If they were intrinsically related in such a way, they could certainly be brought under the category of knowledge²—a position which the opponent would hardly find it convenient to admit.

It may, however, be contended that as God's volition is eternal what is the use of its being related to an object. It may happen that the world is created through the volition of God, though such volition is unrelated to an object (*nir-viṣaya*). Here Udayana observes that volition unspecified by an object can never be creative. For, the purpose which is served by volition is that it generates activity in its own content (*svaviṣaya-niṣṭha-vyāpārasya janakaḥ*). Herein lies the efficiency of volition. If volition be held to be directly unrelated to an object, wherein would it generate an activity?

We have already discussed that knowledge, desire and volition are always associated with an object and that volition requires the assistance of knowledge in order to bring out its relation with the object. The opponent may here further contend that the Nyāya position is based upon a wrong conception of the nature of volition. Volition of the individual self is circumscribed and does not embrace all objects. Hence, such volition would certainly require the aid of knowledge in order that the former may be specified by an object. But it is not understood why God's volition which is all-comprehensive (*sarvaviṣayaśāla*) should require the

1. Ayam eva hi jñānāt prayatnasya bhedaḥ yad ayam arthāpravānaḥ. ĀTV., p. 836

2. Na cā 'sya svarūpenai 'va viṣayaprvānatvam jñānatvaprasaṅgāt. ĀTV., p. 836.

assistance of knowledge at all. Eternal volition being all-embracing it is not understood what assistance would be rendered by knowledge to it. Knowledge serves the purpose of specifying a certain object to volition and when the object of volition is unlimited, postulation of knowledge as a mediating principle stands ungrounded.

It reply to this charge the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school have observed that even if it is admitted that God's volition is all-comprehensive, it cannot be derived that cognition is specified by its object. But as volition can never be directly specified by an object it requires the assistance of knowledge in order that it may be so specified.

The opponent, here, raises another objection. He maintains that it is not essential that volition would require the assistance of knowledge in order to be related to an object. Volition which regulates the activity of our life (*jīvanayoni-prayatna*) certainly relates to an object, but during the state of deep slumber (*susupti*), consciousness does not inhere in the individual soul. Consciousness, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is only an attribute but not the essence of the soul. In the state of deep sleep the individual soul remains unconscious but respiration and beating of the heart continue as usual. This activity of our vital organs is due to volition, though, in order to create activity, such volition does not require the assistance of knowledge. Likewise, it would not be unwise to hold that God's will and volition do not require the aid of knowledge in order to be related to an object. But Udayana refuses to accept the condition of such vital activity as a type of volition.¹ He argues that if it were volition it would certainly require the assistance of knowledge and desire.

The opponent may ask: If the movement of vital organs is not due to volition, i.e., if *jīvanayoni-kṛti* is not admitted to be a type of volition at all, then how does the respiratory

1. *Jīvanayoniprayatnavad vṛjayavyavasthā bhaviṣyati 'tu cet, na, jīty antaravāti.* ATV., p. 837.

Cf. Nā 'sau kṛtjātīyo yena taj jñānam apekṣeta. ATVK, p. 838.

Cf also, Navyās tu jīvanayoniyatne mātābhāvaḥ Dīn, p. 959.

system function? Effort (*ceṣṭā*) originates from volition (*kṛtī*). And as such the vital function should be regarded as due to a type of volition. The position of Udayana, the opponent remarks, seems to be of an autocrat who demands unquestioning acquiescence in his ruling. Udayana, however, in reply, appeals to experience. He observes that it is an empirical fact that the activity in the external air springs from the individual deserts of the enjoyer (*bhogādr̥ṣṭa*), and the functioning of the internal air, viz, *prāṇavāyu*, may also be explained as due to the unseen potency (*adr̥ṣṭa*) of the individual and as such vital function would not require volition as an essential condition of it.¹

From the above observation eternity of God's knowledge, will and volition is established, but Udayana's defence of the Nyāya position is inconsistent with the accepted dogma of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Later exponents of this school have pointed out that volition admits of three types, viz, desire (*pravṛtti*), aversion (*nivṛtti*) and vital function (*jīvanayonikṛti*).² But Udayana arbitrarily rejects the third type from the realm of volition.³

V. Plurality of God is a metaphysical impossibility.

All theistic philosophical systems assert at the outset that the Supreme Being is one and one alone. There is no reason behind the presumption of a plurality of Gods. Monotheism is the true conception of God. Two or more supreme beings of unlimited powers is a contradiction in terms. If one god is not enough to bring about the world-order and to maintain the system, postulation of many gods would have been logically valid. But prior to that we should determine whether those gods are omniscient and all-powerful.

1. Vāhyasyev āntarasyā 'pī pavanasyā 'dr̥ṣṭavad ātmasamyogād eva kriyotpattisambhavāt. ATVD., p. 838

2. Evam prayatnatraividyam tāntrikāḥ parikṛtām / BhP, śl. 150.

3. It is worthy of notice in this connection that the antitheistic arguments, which Udayana has refuted in his *Ātmataṭṭvavēka*, are from the pen of Vācaspati Miśra who has elaborately thrown overboard the theistic arguments in his *Nyāyakanīśa*, the commentary on the *Vidhivēka*. Śaṅkara Mūṛa has taken notice of this fact in his commentary on the *Ātmataṭṭvavēka* and, therefore, he dares say that without an acquaintance of the commentary of his father Bhavanātha and that of his own, it is hardly possible for one to understand the logical subtleties inherent in it. ATVK, p. 948.

nobody's opinion. The line of action would not be under one individual guidance and then nobody will be God.¹

It may, however, be held by those who suggest a plurality of gods, that the gods do not simultaneously engage themselves in the task of creation but they do it in a order. In that case there is hardly any possibility of conflict or chaos. But it should be remembered that God's desire and volition being held to be eternal verities it is not understood why one god should withdraw himself from the work of creation when another god is going on with his work.

We have seen that the Naiyāyika asserts that the intelligent agent responsible for the creation of the universe is a unitary entity. If God is held to be a unitary principle his omniscience and omnipotence are thereby proved. Omniscience and omnipotence of God follow as necessary corollaries from his unitary character. If God be held to be a

If they are not omniscient and omnipotent they cannot create the universe and maintain its order. Thus, omniscience and omnipotence in God must be admitted, otherwise it will be well-nigh impossible to explain the origin of the world. And if the members in the galaxy of gods are omniscient and omnipotent, it is more logical and precise to postulate one God instead of so many omniscient and omnipotent beings. Besides, the assumption of many omniscient and omnipotent gods will involve us in the web of insurmountable logical intricacies. Is there any certitude that they will always concur with one another in respect of their individual whims and thus will not thwart the possibility of any creation at all ?¹ Where is the guarantee that the gods will act in perfect unison for all times? As a result, there will arise conflict and anarchy resulting in the absence of any creation. If it is postulated that in the Republic of Gods there will be a chosen *primus* or the President and he will be the guide and the creator of the world-order and thus no conflict of opinion will hinder the process of creation for all other Gods would obey his direction and orders, then it has to be admitted that other gods are subordinate or at least inferior to him in quality and that the Speaker of the House of Gods will be the virtual ruler. If it is supposed that the omniscient Gods will be guided by a single principle of action by their eternal wisdom and thus there will be no occasion for any conflict of opinion, then it may be reiterated that we do not find any logical necessity in asserting a plurality of gods.

It may, however, be replied that even if there may be many gods there will not be any difference of opinion among them, since they are free from attachment or envy. But in that case, it will be more wise and logical from the point of simplicity that one God should be postulated instead of many. If this is contended that in the parliament of gods, the Speaker's personal opinion should on no account prevail, then the opinion of the House would turn out to be

1. Na ce 'svarānām anekatvam, tesām tulyatve bhinnā 'bhūprāyatiāt kīryasāi 'vā nupapattēh Bhojadeva's *Vṛtti* on YS, I 24, p 9

enables us to reach certitude of knowledge and it should not be understood that it serves to lay emphasis (*auktatya*) to any one of the alternatives that are in question. In the case of erection of sky-scrappers it would be absurd to seek the service of logical parsimony for in that case it would go against the verdict of experience. But when in the case of the grand phenomena of nature where doubt persists between monotheism and polytheism, the theistic inference, supplemented by the reason ensuring logical parsimony, would prove that the supreme agent of the universe is one and not many.¹

But the Vedāntin next proceeds to show that when the Naiyāyika insists upon reasoning (*tarka*) in the form of logical parsimony (*kalpanā-lāghava*) as an auxiliary factor which strengthens the instrument of knowledge, he is caught in his own trap. Appaya Dīksita has taken elaborate pains to demonstrate that what the Naiyāyika thinks to be a case of logical simplicity transpires, on critical observation, to involve cumbrousness (*gaurava*). In fact, in the case under review, what is regarded as reasoning ensuring simplicity entails cumbrousness in so far as the content of the inference is concerned.

Let us now pursue the point in detail. The Naiyāyika proceeds to infer that there is one creator of the universe on the ground that it is a product. Now, it may legitimately be enquired of the Naiyāyika what he wants us to understand by the term 'one creator'. If by the expression 'one creator' it is meant that the creator is determined by the number 'one', it may be pointed out that in the case of polytheism where plurality of agents is upheld, each individual creator being as well determined by number 'one', there will be no difficulty in opining that the creator of the universe is one. In order to avoid the anomaly that crops up in case the aforesaid explanation of the expression 'one creator' be accepted, the Naiyāyika

¹ Kāryatvalingakā 'numānād bhavanti sakartṛkatvā 'numitir eva lāgbavatarko 'panītakartā 'katvam api viśayīkurvāna satye kartṛkatvā 'numūh sampadyata ity eva yuktaṁ VKP, p 88

nature of truth Thus, in the case under consideration, the reasoning can at best lead us to conclude that there is a greater degree of possibility for monotheism But it does not unmistakably and categorically lead us to monotheism The Vedāntin thinks that when there is any logical deadlock, the service of reasoning is called into requisition In the present case, the reasoning could have served the purpose of eliminating doubt, if the possible alternative, viz, monotheism, would not be in conflict with the empirical observation of mankind Thus, in the case of construction of big mansions plurality of agents is an observed fact This contrary instance will surely deprive our reasoning of its capacity for reaching one of the two alternatives, viz, monotheism and the possibility of the contrary is not, therefore, totally eliminated

To be precise In the case of alternatives reasoning helps us to light upon one of them, only when such reasoning is not contradicted by perceptual knowledge In case empirical observation is in conflict with such reasoning, we can at best assume that one of the alternatives is highly probable But we can by no means assert its certitude

The Vedāntin points out that in such cases where reasoning is contradicted by perceptual knowledge leading to the possibility of one of the alternatives and not its certitude, the Naiyāyika is deluded into thinking that it enables him to assert its certitude The Naiyāyika does not here count the innate difference between possibility and certitude of knowledge and therefore he thinks that the syllogism, advanced by him, being strengthened by reasoning, contributes to the positive finding of truth ¹

It is worthy of notice that Appaya Dīksita is in complete agreement with the Naiyāyika with regard to the status of logical parsimony as an auxiliary factor to the inference He asserts that the removal of doubt and determination of truth are always effected by reasoning Reasoning (*tarka*) in all cases lends assistance to our inferences and thereby

plurality of agents is an observed fact in the case of high mansions etc. Reasoning is not an independent means of knowledge and as such it lacks that capacity of generating certitude of knowledge by strengthening respective inference.

The Vedāntin himself, in reply to this formidable array of objections, observes that the alleged difficulty may be solved from another point of view. It cannot be denied that the logical simplicity, as set forth, does not facilitate the operation of theistic inference so as to prove unitary character of God. But the fact is that the Vedic utterance certainly supports the unity and omniscience in God and these Vedic texts very well strengthen the reasoning in the form of logical simplicity, which in its turn paves the way for the smooth operation of the theistic inference in question.

With the growing logical insight in the problem of God and the world many gods must melt into one. Polytheism is a theory of metaphysical impossibility and certainly a hypothesis which should be overruled without any scruple or question. Critics have often failed to understand the real significance of the Indian mind and charged it to be polytheistic, but by such allegation they betray their ignorance. India never favoured polytheism. The vast range of philosophical literature in India demonstrates this truth. The key-word of Indian theology is not plurality but unity and oneness. Monotheism is the cream of Indian thought.

vartiyāṇā) But when our cognition does not correspond to the object, i.e., when we take a nacre to be a piece of silver, the followers of *akhyativāda* observe that it would be logically simple and, therefore, preferable to assume that non-discrimination stands as the determinant of causality and it would be unwise to assume a distinct knowledge where the determinant of knowledge (*prakara*) does not co exist with the determinant of its content (*vyadhikaranaprakarakajñāna*) Non-discrimination is a complex concept for it entails three distinct concepts—discrimination, assertion of that discrimination and its negation. All these would stand as determinants of causality (*karanatavacchedaka*) in the case of emergence of erroneous knowledge and so it would ultimately involve complexity. But in spite of this complexity in respect of the content the Akhyātivādin would prefer it for the simple reason that a distinct type of cognition, viz, error, can be eliminated. Mere non-discrimination is competent enough to explain all cases of error and as such there is no logical necessity for postulating a distinct type of cognition known as error.

Now, the Vedāntin contends that if the Nāyāyika's conception of monotheism is analysed, it would be evident that a plurality of agents has been condemned on the ground of complexity but his own definition of 'oneness' makes him liable to the same charge of complexity which he levels against the Prābhākara and seeks to dismiss the Prābhākara theory of *akhyativāda*.

Now, in the case under consideration the logical simplicity as advocated cannot be really regarded as a case of simplicity, since it involves complexity in respect of the content. Hence, this type of reasoning (simplicity) cannot have preference as it has no bearing on the elimination of doubt and consequently on the respective instrument of knowledge, viz, theistic inference. Such a type of reasoning as logical simplicity generates an amount of probability (*utkatatvasampadana*) in the one alternative which seeks to establish monotheism. But it cannot totally remove doubt regarding the other alternative, i.e., polytheism, since a

plurality of agents is an observed fact in the case of high mansions etc. Reasoning is not an independent means of knowledge and as such it lacks that capacity of generating certitude of knowledge by strengthening respective inference.

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APPENDIX—A

IS KANĀDA AN ATHEIST ?

Indian philosophical systems have not always received fair and unbiased treatment at the hands of modern scholars. They very often ascribe queer hypotheses to the old philosophers and this is not unoften due to a fascination for originality sometimes bordering on a journalistic scoop. Let us take a concrete case to establish our point. The Nyaya system, though mainly epistemological the Vaiśeṣika system is nevertheless comprehensive in its metaphysical speculations. God (i.e., an intelligent creator) and the attainment of the *summum bonum* of human life constitute the key note of the Nyaya Vaiśeṣika system of thought. But some modern scholars¹ are inclined to believe that Kanada, the propounder of the Vaiśeṣika system, was an atheist and God has been subsequently introduced in this system. This hypothesis rests upon weak logic from the very outset. The propounders of it have failed to show under which type of atheism Kanada's attitude is to be subsumed. It may be either dogmatic or sceptical or critical. Thus they do not dive deep into the matter and take simply a superficial view of things. It has been maintained that God has no part to play in the Vaiśeṣika conception of the universe as enunciated by Kanada, since Kanada does not directly refer to God. This mere absence of the name of God does not guarantee a negative conclusion on a matter which forms the corner stone of the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. This much may be said in favour of the modern scholars that the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, a commentary on the *Samkhyakarika*, endorses the same view that the *Sutrakara* does not believe in the existence of God since he is silent on the problem.² The opponent contends that the Vedas are said to be composed by the seers. The competent minds realised the eternal truths and laws and communicated them to us through the channels of the Vedic lore. Thus the authorship of the Vedas is attributed to the perfect souls of the seers. The term '*tat*' in the famous *sūtra* '*Tad vācanād amṇasya pramāṇyam*'³ bears no reference to God. *Tat* here stands for *dharma* (duty) and not for God. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* *Sanjñakarmatīasmadīṣṭānam lūgam*' (VS, II : 18) and "*Pratyakṣa pravṛtta tvad sanjñakarmāṇaḥ*" (VS, II : 19) have often been regarded as the proof for the existence of God. But those scholars find it difficult to accept this view without any positive ground of such assumption.

We now address ourselves to an evaluation of the Vaiśeṣika standpoint

1 The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras originally did not accept the existence of God
Garbe *Philosophy of Ancient India* p. 23

2 Ācāryeṇa tu naktam tasmāt sutrakāramate nāsti śvaraḥ YD p. 83

3 VS I : 3 Gaddegon asserts that the *sūtra* gives impression of being an insert on
Vide *Vaiśeṣika System* p. 334

of the physical order and its constitution which raise many intricate problems that can be solved only through the assumption of a transcendental eternal being and thus try to examine how far the contention of modern scholars stands logical scrutiny.

The protagonists of the theory, that the Vaiśeṣika, in its early stage, was atheistic, endorse the view that 'tat' in the above mentioned *sūtra* refers to *dharma* as follows from the previous *sūtra*—"Tato 'bhyudayanīhśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah'" (VS. I : 2) Thus, the validity of the Vedas is contingent on its being the exposition of *dharma*¹ But is it logically admissible? The Vedas may reveal the path leading to welfare and Supreme Good (*abhyudaya-nīhśreyasa*), but how do they entail the authority of the Vedas? It cannot be gainsaid that *dharma* is authoritative and as such the Vedas establish it, the validity of the Vedas is also irrefutable² For, wherefrom does the authoritativeness of *dharma* come? Unlike the Mīmāṃsaka, Kanāda does not believe in the uncreated nature of the Vedas. The self-validity of its truth is also contravened. Nowhere in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* the author has subscribed to the thesis that the truth of the Vedas is also self-validated. The Vedas are an aggregate of sentences and hence they presuppose an intelligent author³

It may, however, be contended that *dharma* or the path leading to the accomplishment of welfare and Supreme Good has been propounded by the seers. Seers are the intelligent authors of the Vedas. But we are here confronted with two such alternatives which exclude a middle. Is that *ṛṣi* an *āpta puruṣa* or not? If he is not *āpta* or trustworthy, the contention of the opponent falls to the ground. Who does care to pin his faith on the utterances of a person not infallible? The direction of the Vedas is unhesitatingly followed by the men of light and leading. Therefore, the Vedas are composed by an *āpta puruṣa*. He must have intuition of welfare, Supreme Good and the like supersensuous objects. Moreover, in Kanāda's opinion, the air (*vāyu*) is an object of inference and not of perception but the nomenclature is borrowed from the Vedas. Kanāda emphatically asserts that no ordinary person is competent enough to set up the convention of naming an invisible object⁴. Moreover, the person must have perceived all the objects in order to name them⁵. Ordinary persons cannot perceive the objects lying beyond the range of senses. Thus, the person is distinguished from ourselves. He can be no less than an omniscient being. Omniscience involves unimpeded knowledge⁶. Cog-

1 Śaṅkara Miśra offers an alternative explanation in this way *dharmasya vacanād pratipādanād amṇayasya vedasya prāmāṇyam* VUp, I : 2. But Jayanārāyaṇa, takes the term as exclusively referring to God. *Vīṛṭi*, p. 4, Cal 1888.

2 Yaddhi vakyam pramāṇikam artham pratipadayati tat pramāṇam eva VUp on VS, I : 3.

3 Buddhīpurvā vakyakṛtīr Vede VS, VI : 1.

4 VS, II : 18.

5 VS, II : 19.

6 NKu, Chap. III.

nation of past, present and future must coincide in an omniscient person, otherwise his omniscience falls to the ground Śrīdhara, however, quotes "*Asmad viśiṣṭasya lingam ṛṣeh*" as the concluding *sūtra* of Kanada which is conspicuous by its absence in the present editions of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* *Rṣi* means the revealer of eternal truths contained in the Vedas (*ṛṣayo mantradrāṣṭārah*) Thus, as soon as Kanāda disowns the eternal nature of the Vedas and takes them to be the compositions of an intelligent being, he must have to confess that the intelligent speaker of the Vedas can be no other than an omniscient being

Again Kanāda seeks to explain the origin of the universe as due to the combination of atoms which are real and eternal This atomistic pluralism of Kanāda presupposes the existence of a Prime Mover in the Aristotelian sense of the term Motion in gross body is due to the motion in atoms Cosmic rest (*pralaya*) is over and creative motion is produced in atoms The opponent sets out to demonstrate that Kanāda traces this primal activity in atoms to the operation of an unseen moral force, viz, *adrṣṭa*¹ Variety in gross body can be traced to this guiding principle of personal destiny But this explanation does not satisfy a critical realist The principle of *adrṣṭa* is, by itself, unconscious and thus cannot be the guiding principle of this supreme design *Adrṣṭa* must be guided by an intelligent agent for its materialisation *Adrṣṭa* itself, cannot be conscious since it is a quality No quality possesses a quality A quality resides in a substance only Thus, *adrṣṭa* remains ever unconscious But an action presupposes a conscious guide So atoms are only moved by some conscious agent Hence, the lacunae in Kanāda's system can only be filled up by such a postulation Otherwise, *svabhāvavāda* should be thrust upon Kanāda's system which would vitiate the fundamental assumption of the Vaiśeṣika²

Next the question arises, if Kanāda does not deny existence to God, why has he not expressly adverted to the problem? In reply to this contention of the opponent it may be stated that the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama unambiguously mentions God and the Vaiśeṣika shares the same view on many fundamental issues, because both the parties belong to the same school One merely supplements the other As Gotama has paid special attention to this problem, Kanāda may pass it over assuming the conclusion of the sister school, the Nyāya

Again Kanāda has never directly confuted the theistic thesis If he does not hold discussion on this issue, negative conclusion (i.e., he denies existence to God) does not necessarily follow It is also very difficult to account for the deliberate and studious avoidance of the supreme problem on the hypothesis that Kanāda's attitude was either atheistic

1 Anunam manasas ca dyam karma drṣṭakar tam VS V u 13
Vide also *sūtras* IV u 7 V u 15 V u 7, V u 17, VI u 2 12
2 Cf Kārana bhavād karyā bhavaḥ VS, I u 1

or antitheistic Kanāda never speaks of *Jīva*. Would it, therefore, be justified to think that *Jīva* has no place in his scholium? Moreover, the trend of discussion goes to show that the assumption of God is a metaphysical necessity. It has not been imposed upon Kanāda's work by the ingenuity of later commentators. If we do not subscribe to the hypothesis that Kanāda is a theist, there is no end of difficulties. Thus, Kanāda's atheism has been set forth as a conceptual figment of later scholasticism.

Śamkara¹ also avers that the Vaiśeṣika believes in God as the efficient cause of the world. Although he criticises the Vaiśeṣika theory along with other theories which do not assert God to be the material cause, he does not criticise the Vaiśeṣika on the ground of his denial of God which he would have done if atheism had been an accepted principle of this school. Besides, an abrupt introduction of the topic of God by Prasastapada and the subsequent philosophers of the school would be an unwarranted and irrelevant interpolation—a position which cannot be accepted to be a true estimate. The argument of the *Yuktidīpika* is almost based upon the silence of the author, and an *argumentum ex silentio* cannot be regarded as a strong and convincing proof. The entire tradition in this school is against this supposition and Kanāda's text cannot be supposed to lend countenance to the atheistic interpretation without recourse to violence of the accredited canons of exegesis.

It is painful to observe that the Vaiśeṣika position has received unfair treatment at the hands of Keith and others. Keith supposes² that the *Vedāntasūtra* II 11 12 (*Ubhayathā'pī na karmatas tad abhavaḥ*) and also Śamkara's commentary thereon imply the denial of God in the Vaiśeṣika system and he makes Śamkaracārya a party to this charge. Unfortunately Śamkara's commentary on the *sūtra* II 11 27 (*Pañcāśāmañjasyāt*) escaped his notice where the scholiast expressly asserts the Vaiśeṣika to be a theist.³ We have already drawn attention to this text and it is certain that Śamkaracārya's support cannot be enlisted by modern exponents of an atheistic Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

¹ ŚB on BS, II u 37

² Keith *Indian Logic & Atomism* pp 265-6

³ Vaiśeṣikādayo 'pī kecit kathañ cit svaprakṛtyā 'nusārena nūn itakīraṇam
 Īvara ita varṇayanti ŚB on BS II u 37

APPENDIX—B

THE NYĀYA AND THE PĀTAÑJALA CONCEPTIONS OF GOD—COMPARED

Let us now make an attempt to unfold the essential points of difference between the Nyāya and the Pātañjala theism. It is admitted by some that most of the early exponents of the Sāṃkhya philosophy were atheists. The Sāṃkhya avers that the existence of God cannot be established by logical proofs (*Īsvara'siddheh*). Vacaspati Miśra while commenting on the verse "*Vatsavarddhinimittam*" etc. in the *Tattvakaumudī*, refuted the theistic arguments with logical subtleties. He does not find any necessity for the postulation of God as an agent for the fruition of *karman* which remains as an unseen potency. According to him individual deserts are alone competent to produce the effects. They are automatically manifested. Thus, Vācaspati repudiates the idea of God posited for explaining the creation of these grand phenomena of nature. The Yoga also does not regard the existence of God as essential for the fruition of *karman*. Nor, according to the Yoga, God is the creator of the world. The non-intelligent (*jada*) *Prakṛti* is evolved in the form of this mundane world only to serve the interest (i.e., enjoyment and salvation) of *Puruṣa* (embodied soul). *Prakṛti* is independent (*svatantra*) and un-influenced by anything foreign and as such God cannot act as the guiding principle (*prerayitā*) of *Prakṛti*.¹ (Thus creation and dissolution are the functions of *Prakṛti*. God is the 'initial point of all lines of teachers') God, according to the Yoga, is the earliest teacher of the world,² because he is not limited by time and also the supreme advisor of truth. Though he is not the creator of the world, the Vedas are created out of him. The Vedas are the words of God. He dictates the path leading to the good to all and this is not possible unless he is omniscient. He is unaffected by troubles (*klesha*), actions and their merit and demerit. The philosophers of the Yoga school have advanced ontological argument to establish an omniscient God. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not advance a separate syllogistic argument to prove omniscience of God. According to him the same syllogistic process which proves God as the creator of the world, also proves omniscience in that agent. Thus, the two modes of proving omniscience in God are different.

The Yoga observes that whatever admits of degree must have an upper limit. Thus, whenever there is higher and higher, there must be highest. The magnitude of a jar implies a greater magnitude, and

¹ *Nimittam aprayojakam prakṛtinaṃ Varāṇabhedas tu tatah ksetrikavat*
YS, IV 3

² *Purveṣāṃ apī guru kalena 'navacchedāt* YS I 26

as it admits of increase, there is a substance of maximum magnitude, i.e., an ubiquitous substance. Likewise, as my knowledge is excelled by the knowledge of some other individual, knowledge must reach a highest limit of pre-eminence for the simple reason that it admits of degree.¹ And in whom this highest limit of knowledge is reached is God. Such pre-eminence of knowledge reaches its zenith only when knowledge of that individual self encompasses all objects separated by time and space without any exclusion. Such a type of knowledge excels all. Supremacy of knowledge depends upon the denotation of objects by which knowledge is specified. This super most excellence in knowledge is known as *kaṣṭha*. As knowledge is a type of attribute it must inhere in an individual and that individual is God. Thus, in God omniscience is unlimited (*niratisaya*). Some scholars think that there is no assertorial certitude that this infinity of knowledge is an individual. It is simply proved on the testimony of the Śāstra.²

From what we have stated above it is easily understood that according to the Yoga philosophy God is omniscient where knowledge reaches its zenith but he is not the creator of the cosmos. The Naiyāyika also asserts omniscience in God, but the two modes of proving omniscience are diametrically opposed to each other. Though God's omniscience and omnipotence as the creator of all is established on the strength of testimony of the Vedas, still it should be borne in mind that according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga empirical self or *Puruṣa* is by nature passive, it is *Prakṛti* who serves as an agent and when God is a special kind of self, he is also passive and as such cannot be attributed with the responsibility of creation. Vacaspati Mīśra has admitted that God has the desire for destruction (*samyāhṛṣa*),³ though God according to the Yoga, is not responsible for dissolution. Though he is the teacher (*upadeśa*), still is not the creator of the universe. Teachership is not real but superimposed (*aharya*). It may be asked, if the nature of being the teacher is a superimposition, creativity in God may also be so imagined and when creativity, whether real or accidental, is once posited in God, he may also be said to be responsible for creation and destruction of the world.

But it should be noticed that in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system *Prakṛti* naturally undergoes modification—homogeneous and heterogeneous. For this modification it does not require any external guide. It has been explicitly stated in the *Vyāsabhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra* II 18 that *Puruṣa* cannot be the creator.⁴ *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are the two ultimate realities and

¹ Jñānatvam niratisayam kṛcid aśritam sūtasayavṛttijātutvāt parimāṇatvavat Bhamati and Kālpāra on BS, I 1 5

² Cf also the *Vyāsabhāṣya* and the *Tattvaśāradī* of YS, I 25 (*Tatra niratisayam sarvajñābhiṣam*)

³ K. C. Bhattacharya *Studies in Philosophy* p 319

⁴ *Tattvaśāradī* on the *Bhāṣya* of YS, I 24

⁵ Triṣu guṇeṣu kartṛeṣu akartā ca puruṣe tulya 'tulyajātiye Vyāsabhāṣya on YS, II 18

no third factor is possible. But Vacaspati seems to have misunderstood the position of the Samkhya-Yoga, when he asserts that the evolution of *Prakṛti* in the form of this empirical reality is not simply due to its desire to fulfil the interest of *Puruṣa*. God is the superintending agent (*pravartaka*). Vacaspati further asserts that as merit and demerit of embodied soul are insentient by nature they cannot fructuate unless guided by some intelligent principle and this intelligent guide is God.¹ Thus, the position of Vacaspati seems to be tantamount to the Nyāya position and is hardly the position of the Samkhya-Yoga. This introduction of God as the dispenser of merits and demerits, as admitted by Vācaspati, seems to be due to the influence of the Śaivas. It is a fact that the Samkhya-Yoga could well work without a God.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika asserts general and special attributes in God. Thus, God is attributed with eternal and unimpeded cognition, will and volition. But according to the Samkhya, *Puruṣa* is bereft of all attributes and as such God cannot be attributed with such qualities. According to the Sāmkhya *sattva* is transformed naturally into the form of knowledge. Knowledge is the consciousness reflected in the modification (*vṛtti*) of *buddhi*. Modification is the transformation of *cittasattva* in the form of objects. Unqualified (*nirguna*) and unattached (*asaṅga*) consciousness, viz., *Puruṣa*, cannot be directly related to objects. *Citta* is associated with the object through this modification or *pramāṇa* and as such *citta* is transformed into the form of objects. Pure essence (*prakṛṣṭa sattva*) is the *citta* of God. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not find any necessity of postulating *citta* of God, since cognition etc. of God are eternal. But, according to the Pātañjala, cognition, desire etc. of God are not eternal verities. Divine cognition, according to the Pātañjala, is nothing but the transformation of God's *cittasattva*. This Divine pure essence (*Īśvara citta-sattva*) is merged into *Prakṛti* at great dissolution and when a fresh evolution begins, pure essence (*prakṛṣṭa sattva*) is transformed into the form of *citta* of *Īśvara*. The quality of *sattva* is modified and divine consciousness is reflected in this modification. This is the cognition of God. Thus, we have seen that if this Samkhya-Yoga theory of emergence of knowledge is admitted he will also have to admit that God lacks cognition during the universal dissolution.

¹ *Īśvarasya 'pi dharmā dharmādhūṣṭhānāṣṭham pratibandhāpanaya eva vyāpāro vedutavyaḥ*. *Taittirīyabrahma-sūtra* on YS, IV 3.

INDEX

- abhāva* 96
abhiniveśa 143
abhyupagama 129
abhyupagamacāda 147
adharmā 16, 19, 142
adhiṣṭharasārūpa 94
adṛṣṭa 1, 2, 22-28, 32, 33, 35-41, 54, 59, 126, 128, 129, 142, 151, 162
Advaita Vedānta 96
Advaita Vedāntin 98
agrāhya 44
aīcārya 77, 146
ajanyaiva 104
ajñāna 96
akāśa 1, 54, 55, 93, 103
akhyātī 97
akhyatīnāda 156, 158
Akhyātīnādin 158
alīkapatrayogika abhāva 99
Amalānanda 153
amśatah pakṣāsuddhi 47, 48, 49
anāikāntikatva 55
anarambhaka 125
anauṣādhika 113
anavasthā 12, 58, 73
anekāntavāda 67
Anekāntavādin 68
anumā 146
anuvācānīya 99
Antithetic Theories, Comte 71
anu 125
anumānābhāsa 75
anupakhyā 5
anupalabdhi 47, 92, 94, 96
anuyayasāya 58
anuyogin 99
anāya vyatireka 2, 121
anvaya-vyapti 105
anvāthākhya 97, 157
anyonyāśraya 35, 58, 73
apeksabuddhi 136
Appaya Dīksita 154
apratīsamakhyāntrodha 54
āpta 134, 161
arthakriyājanakatva 7
arthakriyākāritva 54
asādhāreṇa 120
asādhīlakṣaṇa 98
asādhāryavāda 17
asātkhyāti 96-99
asuddha 68
asmitā 143
āstīyāsiddhi 51, 102
ālmakhyāti 97
Ātmataṭṭarīveka 151
atīkatya 155
avādhi 78
avayava 45
avayavin 45, 46, 51
Aviddhakarma 43-45, 47
avīdya 19, 143
avyāpaka 111
āyurveda 134
bādha 75, 102
bādhita 53, 98
bhāgāsiddhi 69
Bhāmata 165
Bhāskara 16-19, 20
Bhāṣita 94, 96
Bhattacharya, B 61
Bhavanītha 34, 35, 38, 41, 151
bhedabhāda 19
bhoga 116, 123, 145
bhogādṛṣṭa 151
bhogāyatana 133
Bhojadeva 152
Brahman 17, 19
Brahmasūtra 141
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 131
Buddha 55
Buddhist 21, 38, 59, 96, 97, 139
cakṛa 75, 76
Cārvāka 1-8, 9, 11-16, 19, 21, 71, 87, 110, 114, 139
cāttasattva 166
Comte 71
dhanurīda 134
dharma 8, 16, 19, 142, 146
Dharmakāya 43
Dharmakīrti 44, 47
Dharmarājādīvarīndra 96
dharmin 8
Dharmottara 47
Dhūrta Cārvāka 12
dhamasabha 69
Dīnakara Bhāṣita 128, 156
dṛṣṭanta 23, 24
dṛṣṭavīrudha 75
dīcā 116, 143
dvīta 136
dīyanuka 44, 125, 126, 135
ekartha samavayīta 67
ekarthavīrti 68
ekatra 156
Empiricists 9, 10
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume 10
Faddegon 160
gandharvīda 134
Garbe 160
Gārgi 132
gaurava 155
ghraṇaja vījñāna 48
Gopināth Kavīrāja 6
Gotama 76, 134, 144, 145, 162

- Herman Lotze 52
hetu 45, 56, 104, 111, 114, 117
hetusāmānya 90
hetutāvachedakasambandha 67
hetvasiddhi 46, 71, 79
heya 140
Hume 9, 43
- icchā* 76, 143, 146
Idea of God, Pringle Pattison, 141
Indian Logic and Atomism, Keith, 163
īṣṭapurovartī-jñāna 157
īṣṭasiddhi 97
- Jaina 38, 65, 139
Jayanta 11, 88—91, 102, 108, 147
Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana 161
Jina 65, 77
jiva 25, 33, 163
Jivānanda Vidyāsāgar 100
jivanayonikṛti 150, 151
jivanayonībhāratna 150
jñāpaka 120
Joint Method of Agreement and Difference 2, 11, 15, 18, 43
- kāḍācikatva* 7, 8
kalpa 138
Kamalaśīla 42, 44, 53, 55
Kāṇāda 126, 160, 161, 162, 163
kāraṇa 120
kāraṇatāvachedaka 158
karma 26, 37
karman 62, 65, 78, 164
karmanāśa 123
karṭṛtva 84, 85, 143, 148
karṭṛtvābhāva 99
karuṇā 78
karyābhūmukhya 37
karyakāritva 70
kāryalingaka 97
kāryatva 15, 52, 58, 73, 79, 80, 81, 82, 87, 103, 107, 110, 112
kāryavācya 72
kāsthā 165
Keith, A. B. 163
kevalānvayin 100
kevalānvayireka 105
lāghya 98
kleśa 143, 164
kṛtobuddhi 73
Kṛti 144
kṛtimatva 143
- laghava* 153, 155
Law of Karman 42
- Mādhva 98
Mādhyaṃka 98, 99
mahat 16, 136
mahattva 126
Mīmāṃsā 29, 31
Mīmāṃsaka 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 80, 81, 87, 90, 97, 129, 132, 133, 134, 138, 139, 140
- manana* 1
- Mandukyakārikā* 141
Martinue 79
Mathurī 100
Mithila Research Institute 137
moha 143
mokṣa 1
Mādhva 98
- Nandīśvara 41
Nayavivēka 29-31
nirātulaya 165
niṣṭi 151
nyeta 12
Nyāyakandalī 146
Nyayakamkā 151
Nyayakusumajālā 4, 8, 88, 102, 132, 134, 137
Nyayasiddhāntamuktīvalī 128
Nyayasūtra 76, 162
Nyayavārttika 53
- pada* 132
Padārthadharṃasamgraha 146
pakṣa 23, 24, 74, 119
pakṣadharṃatā 24, 35, 82, 104, 108
pakṣasiddhi 96, 97
pakṣatāvachedakadharmā 69
paramanu 54, 85, 125, 135
parāmarśa 51, 83
paramārtha sat 49
parimāṇa 124, 146
paryāpti sambandha 137
Pātañjala 147, 164
Pātañjali 143
Philosophy of Ancient India, Garbe, 160
Prabhākara 18, 30-33, 38-40, 50, 129, 157, 158
Prabhākaravijaya 41
pracaya 124, 126, 136
prāgabdhāva 11
prakāra 156, 158
Prakṛti 16, 17, 18, 19, 142, 164-166
pralaya 34, 132, 137, 144, 162
pramā 156, 157
prameyatva 100
prāṇa-vayu 151
Prasastamati 60
Prasastapāda 26, 61, 127, 131, 143, 146, 163
pratyāñāvirodha 69
pratisamkhyādvirodha 54
pratyagin 3, 92, 94, 99, 100
pratyabhityā 48, 49, 50
pratyakṣa 96
pratyakṣa-bādhita 75
pravṛtti 98, 151, 157
prayatna 76, 116, 117, 128, 131, 146
Pringle Pattison 141
prithaktva 146
pudgala 93
Puruṣa 164-166
Pūrvamīmāṃsā 135
- rāga* 116, 143
Raghunātha Śiromaṇi 147
raja 16

- rāsana vyāṇa* 48
Ratnakīrti 137
Ratnakīrtibandhaśālā 137
Ravideva 31
reductio ad absurdum 47, 59, 60
regressus ad infinitum 12
- sadasatkhya* 97, 98
sadasatvilakṣanakhya 97, 98
sadhya 23, 104, 111, 114, 117, 119
sādhyaśraddhā 119
sādhyaśama 66, 117
sādhyaśraddhā 23
sadrśakṣana 98
sahakarī 94, 117
sahakāruḍā 20, 62
sahaja-caitanya 86
sahartīkātā 79, 81, 82, 84
sakti 18, 22
Śalikanātha 29, 31, 38 41
samadhā 146
samanajātīya 17
samānya gūṇa 146
sāmānyanūmana 32, 40
sāmānyasānniṣṭa 51
sāmānyato dṛṣṭa (inference) 81
samānya vyāpti 110
samāyaya 35, 68
samāyaya 68
Śamkara 141, 153, 163
Śamkara Mīśra 107, 151, 161
samketa 132
Sāmkhya 6, 17, 18, 60, 121, 142, 164, 165, 166
samkhyā 136, 146
Sāmkhyāite 16-19, 138, 139
Sāmkhyakarikā 160
samskāra 50
samūhālambana 136
sambādī pratyūti 157
samyoga 25, 95, 146
samyogaya samyoga 125
samyuktasamāyaya 26
samyukta vīṣṇanā 95
sandigdhanāikāntikatā 52
sandigdhaçyātirekīn 112, 113
sānniṣṭa 83
sānniṣṭa vīṣṇa 43
Śāntaraksita 42-45, 53, 61, 105, 107, 120
sapakṣasattva 112
sapakṣarūpī 120
Śāntaraksita 153
śāntaraksita 6
śāntaraksita 74
śāntaraksita 6
śāntaraksita 16, 166
Śāntaraksita 54
śāntaraksita 148
śāntaraksita 103
śāntaraksita 49, 157
śāntaraksita 58
Śāntaraksita 79-87, 102, 146, 147, 162
Śruti 134
- Studies in Philosophy*, K. C. Bhattacharya, 165
Study of Religion, Martinuc, 79
Śuklayajuh Samhitā 133
Sukti 143
Susukṣita Cārika 13
susukṣita 150
svabhāva 8, 21
svabhāva alingaka 91
svabhāvanūpalabdhi 47
svabhāvarāda 8, 9, 10, 162
Śvabhāvavadin 8
svārūpa 22
svārūpalabdhi 41
svārūpaśraddhā 51, 67, 104, 106
śāntaraksita 67
śāntaraksita 67, 68
svātātā 34
- tamas* 16
tarka 47, 92, 153, 154, 155
Tatparjāparisuddhī 98
Tattvakaumudī 164
Tattvārthadhigāna sūtra 74
Tattvasamgraha 43, 53
Tattvavivāda 165, 166
Teleological Argument 88
time 26, 27
trasareṇa 125
Tridandīn 16
Trilocana 137
truti 125
tryanuka 135
- Udayana* 46, 8, 10, 11, 18, 19, 42, 91, 96, 98-100, 102-104, 109, 117, 124, 127, 128, 130, 135, 137, 143, 145, 147, 150, 151
udbhutarūpa 44
Uddiyotakāra 22, 26, 37, 43, 45, 141-145, 147
upadhī 19, 58, 66, 111, 114
- Vācaspati* 43, 45, 134, 137, 143, 144, 146, 147, 151, 153, 164, 165, 166
Vaiśeṣika 47, 49, 54, 55
Vaiśeṣikasūtra 146, 160, 162
Vaisesika System, Gaddegon, 160
Vardhamāna 11, 15, 133
vastulagha 156
Vātsyāyana 22, 140, 146, 147
Vedānta 96
Vedāntakālpārā 165
Vedāntasūtra 163
Vedāntun 58, 96, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159
Vibhāga 146
Vidhivāda 151
vyāṇa 61
vīpaka 143
vīpaka 103
vīpakaśānti 112
vīpaka 107, 109
vīpaka 157
vīpaka 156
vīpaka 116

<i>viśeṣaṇatā</i> 95	<i>vyartha-viśeṣaṇa</i> 105, 106
<i>viśeṣānurmāna</i> 32, 40	<i>Vyāsa</i> 65
<i>viśeṣa-virodha</i> 108	<i>Vyāsabhāṣya</i> 153, 165
<i>vṛtti</i> 86, 87, 166	<i>Vyavṛttitva</i> 45
<i>Vṛtti</i> (of Jayanārāyaṇa) 161	
<i>vyabhicāra</i> 68, 74, 103	<i>Yādavaprakāśa</i> 19
<i>vyabhicārin</i> 74	<i>Yoga</i> 65, 81, 143, 164, 165
<i>vyadhikarana</i> 156	<i>Yogācāra</i> 97
<i>vyadhikaranaprakāratājñāna</i> 158	<i>Yogasūtra</i> 165
<i>vyāpaka</i> 23, 69, 106	<i>yogin</i> 77
<i>vyapti</i> 3, 109, 111	<i>yogya</i> 92
<i>Vyaptipañcaka</i> 100	<i>yogyānupalabdhi</i> 92, 93, 94
<i>vyāpya</i> 23, 106	<i>yogyatā</i> 44, 93, 96
<i>vyāpyatvāsiddhi</i> 56, 57, 60, 104	<i>Tuktīdīpikā</i> 160, 163